Bouteflika évoque Mohamed VI et le Sahara occidental

ID:	38855
Date:	2005-08-19 11:35:00
Origin:	05ALGIERS1753
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario. Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika's efforts to create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right to resume fighting "on its own territory" if it chose to do so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco's last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying he could not accept "dealing with diplomatic relations in such an irresponsible manner." Referring to advice from Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King Mohammed's youth, Bouteflika said, "I am not Jesus Christ, and will not turn my other cheek." Algeria was ready to discuss "objective interests" with Morocco, but only if the Moroccans were "serious." Senator Lugar noted that President Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission, adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the land border and reengage at the highest level. Did Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on the UN's agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting international law and was defending the right of self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the U.S. End summary. LUGAR MISSION ------------- 2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones, and members of Lugar's delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5 General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh, Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel reports Lugar and Bouteflika's discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations and a number of regional issues. A HUMANITARIAN MISSION ---------------------- 3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG's appointment of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of the UN's support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the Senator's record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about Lugar's planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this should "not offend anyone from the land of Washington and Wilson," the leader of a war for independence and the founding father of the idea of self-determination. 4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker's resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the Polisario's. Baker "represented the American values we admire." WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI, BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT ------------------------------------- 5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario, he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not insisting on a time limit. 6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999 he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base. MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN -------------------------- 7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was considered a "mere tribal issue" even though it had been a Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis. From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the conflict. Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis' behalf. Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my sincerest hope, Bouteflika said. ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM ---------------------------------------- 8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum, whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a referendum was a "Pandora's box," but Algeria would accept the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to do so. "I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST" ----------------------- 9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year. Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour later, the Moroccans said that "circumstances were not favorable" for the visit, even though it had been prepared months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not accept dealing with diplomatic relations "in such an irresponsible manner." Morocco would always be Algeria's neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in an "infantile manner." Bouteflika said that in his discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a veteran diplomat. But, he said, "I am not Jesus Christ" and will not turn the other cheek. 10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how they treat Algeria. 11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the AMU. U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING ------------------------------- 12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights and respect for the right of self-determination that Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own national interests were not directly engaged when it was the right thing to do. It was in this context that President Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The President respected Bouteflika's initiative to gain the release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two countries should reopen their border and reengage at the highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see how we could make a difference. 13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria would support the results of a referendum no matter what they were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote still a significant issue? What were the other principal issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not mean it would "condone Moroccan tricks." The Western Sahara has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since independent. Algeria supported respecting international law. It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United States, but Algeria would defend the right of self-determination. 14. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear this message. 15. (U) Minimize considered. ERDMAN http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/Argelia/descarta/enfrentamiento/Marruecos/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_17/Tes

Bouteflika parle du Maroc et du Sahara occidental

ID:	70010
Date:	2006-07-01 11:15:00
Origin:	06ALGIERS1219
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001219 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016 TAGS: PREL, PBTS, WI, MO, AG SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend met with President Bouteflika for three and a half hours June 18. NSC Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti and DCM accompanied Townsend. Bouteflika's Counterterrorism Adviser Rezzag Bara and a notetaker were also present. This cable reports their discussion of the Western Sahara and relations with Morocco. 2. (C/NF) Well into the meeting, Bouteflika raised Western Sahara, noting that U.S. visitors always wanted to discuss it with him. Townsend noted that President Bush had asked both Bouteflika and Moroccan King Mohamed VI to find a way to resolve their differences. Townsend said the President appreciated Bouteflika's role in last summer's release by the Polisario of the remaining 404 Moroccan prisoners, noting that "this would not have happened without your courage." She asked Bouteflika about his view on fully resolving this issue. . 3. (C/NF) Bouteflika responded that as the world's biggest power, the U.S. should respect the decisions of the UN on the Western Sahara. He recalled that in his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, the President had asked him to work faithfully with James Baker and he had done so. Bouteflika noted that he had supported the Baker Plan, even though he would not have done so without President Bush's request. Now, he said, Algeria was "stuck in the middle" with Morocco; "we reject anything they accept and vice versa." Bouteflika commented that despite this stalemate, he had made two important decisions: the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria, and he had made clear to the Moroccans that Algeria had no claims on the Western Sahara's territory or resources. 4. (C/NF) Bouteflika asserted that there was no bilateral problem between Algeria and Morocco. The Moroccans, he went on, claimed the Western Sahara was an issue between Morocco and Algeria. "I would solve it if I could," he stated, "but I cannot speak for the Sahrawis." Morocco and the Polisario must find a solution, and they can do so with American help. Algeria will support any agreement reached by Morocco and the Polisario. But, Bouteflika cautioned, a solution cannot be imposed on the Sahrawis. In that case, Algeria will defend to the end the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. 5. (C/NF) Bouteflika complained that Algeria was in a situation whereby any gesture toward Morocco would be held up by the Moroccan side as the beginning of a process of working out a settlement bilaterally with Algeria. "So I do not want to shake the King's hand." However, Bouteflika said he had recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos. Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!" He added that he could also joke with the King's late father, King Hassan II. King Mohamed, however, "is not open, and he lacks experience." In a rare moment of self-criticism, Bouteflika said he had found his own weak point: he believed others should resolve problems through dialogue, but he did not believe in dialogue for himself with Mohamed VI. 6. (C/NF) Townsend said the Western Sahara continued to be a matter of great interest to President Bush. She added that the lack of a settlement was impeding regional cooperation on counterterrorism and preventing the Maghreb from achieving the level of economic relations that it should enjoy. Bouteflika suggested that James Baker would be a good source of advice to the President, he was a man of "exceptional qualities." It was a "shame Baker quit," Bouteflika commented. He then wondered whether the President might convince Baker to resume his previous role. Bouteflika concluded that offering concessions to Morocco would be tantamount to "giving a bonus to the most undisciplined student in the class." The U.S. "should not award Morocco's bad behavior." 7. (U) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend has cleared this message. ERDMAN

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/malas/relaciones/Buteflika-Mohamed/VI/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_18/Tes

Algérie, Sahara occidental

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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000261

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH
A/S WELCH

REF: 07 ALGIERS 1069

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEA
Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem emphasized
their familiar line on self-determination for Western Sahara,
as well as the need to find a way out that would allow
Algeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that relations with
Morocco were "brotherly" and that Western Sahara was the only
issue standing between them. Because the U.S. was unburdened
by the colonial past of France in the region, Bouteflika felt
it was ideally placed to serve as an informal referee in
resolving the dispute. Although he said he understood
Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of Western Saharan
independence, Bouteflika said that Morocco only had itself to
blame for the current situation, as it had proceeded in a
"clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said,
Morocco could have encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, where
Sahrawis would happily choose to remain a part of Morocco in
some form. Welch underlined to the Algerian officials that
the U.S. sought a practical approach that could help the
current negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomy
proposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.

LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD
-----------------------------

¶2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the Moroccan
plan served to move a frozen situation forward in the absence
of any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that the plan of
former Secretary of State James Baker was such an
alternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option was
necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and the
Baker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that the
Baker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate
progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it was
not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not taking
its UN Security Council responsibilities seriously."
Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less autonomy for
Western Sahara than an Algerian province currently enjoys
(reftel). He conceded that Algeria does have influence in
Western Sahara, but swore he would not use it to violate what
he sees as international law.

MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME
------------------------------

¶3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch on
February 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria's
interest, and that attempting "to transform an anti-colonial
issue" was not the right path to take and was potentially
destabilizing to the region. Bouteflika, meanwhile, said
that he understood Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of
independence for Western Sahara, but stressed that the
Moroccans only had themselves to blame for current Sahrawi
determination. Bouteflika explained, saying that Morocco
could have easily used a more "elegant" approach to produce a
Western Sahara independence that could be controlled or
supervised. Instead, he said, "they want Anschluss like
Saddam Hussein with Kuwait." Bouteflika said he easily could
have imagined an outcome in which Western Sahara chose to
remain a part of Morocco after seeing the benefits of
Moroccan rule, in much the same way "as Puerto Rico chose to
remain part of the U.S." According to Bouteflika, Morocco
needs to offer the Polisario something, since "you cannot ask
concessions from people who have nothing in their pockets."
Had it not been for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika
said "they could have gotten what they wanted."

ON FRANCE AND U.S.
------------------

¶4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,
France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving the
Western Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika. France "has
never really accepted Algerian independence," Bouteflika
said, and he claimed that France was trying to settle scores
with Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara in support of
Morocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the U.S. was an ideal
counterweight to balance Morocco, as none of the parties

ALGIERS 00000261 002 OF 002


involved had any bone of contention with the U.S. Bouteflika
complained that the U.S. treats Algeria as "second class"
compared to the preferential treatment it gives to Tunisia
and Morocco. He said the U.S. should understand Algeria
better, as "you also paid a price for your independence."
Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's admiration for U.S.
positions on the independence of East Timor and Kosovo. "Why
don't you share the same views on Western Sahara?" asked
Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering what our U.S. friends
want." With both Algerians, A/S Welch underlined that the
U.S. sought practical approaches that would advance the
Western Sahara negotiations forward. The Moroccan proposal,
he noted, offered a possibility. He urged the Algerians to
consider what they could do to help the current negotiations
make concrete progress.

COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE
--------------------------

¶5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times the
need for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Sahara
dispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." He
reiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke of
looking towards positive future relations with Morocco, as
"one day we will need to get beyond this." In a February 27
meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, A/S Welch
invited the Algerian delegation to visit Washington
immediately following the next round of negotiations at
Manhasset, to continue the discussions.

¶6. (U) This cable has not been cleared by A/S Welch.

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html
FORD