tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-41045642077799648832024-03-08T03:53:28.590-08:00Tous les câbles sur l'Algérie de WIKILEAKSWikiLeaks est un site Web lanceur d'alerte, publiant des documents et des analyses politiques et sociétales. Sa raison d'être est de donner une audience aux fuites d'information, tout en protégeant ses sources.
Nous reproduisons ici tous les "cables" qui parlent de l'Algérie, en version originale et avec leurs traductions dans toutes les langues (Français, Anglais et Espagnol).A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.comBlogger30125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-54650068697295575982010-12-21T06:31:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:31:19.486-08:00Viewing cable 07ALGIERS45, SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED<pre>VZCZCXYZ0010<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0045 0161707<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />P 161707Z JAN 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2696<br />INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6429<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1573<br />RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1486<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2048<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2834</pre> <code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000045<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED<br /><br />REF: A. 2006 ALGIERS 2067<br /><br /><a id="parB" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#parB">¶</a>B. ALGIERS 30<br /><br />Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 b/d<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) Abdelkader Bensalah was re-elected, 129-0, as the<br />President of the Conseil de la Nation (Senate) on January 12.<br />Bensalah remains first in line to succeed President<br />Bouteflika in the event that he is unable to complete his<br />current term. Bensalah's re-election became a foregone<br />conclusion when no other senator challenged him for the post.<br />A reporter for French-language daily newspaper Liberte,<br />XXXXXXXXXXXX, who covered all aspects of the election, told<br />us the result was predetermined once President Bouteflika<br />signaled to the senators that he wanted Bensalah to retain<br />his position. XXXXXXXXXXXX said senators privately complained<br />that, out of respect to Bouteflika, no other candidates had<br />presented themselves. Many told her the election became a<br />formality rather than an exercise in democracy, which was a<br />shame in their view.<br /><br />BOUTEFLIKA APPOINTS SENATORS OF HIS GENERATION<br />--------------------------------------------- -<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) On the day of the election, eight new senators joined<br />the Conseil de la Nation as part of the third of the<br />membership appointed directly by President Bouteflika (ref<br />A). All have one characteristic in common: they are<br />"moudjahidine," or veterans (like Bouteflika) of the war of<br />independence against France. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, these<br />newly appointed senators, as members of the "revolutionary<br />family" and in a sense "siblings of President Bouteflika,"<br />will be very loyal to him. Some senators quietly expressed<br />to her their frustration that the president did not reach out<br />to members of the younger generation who will need to lead<br />the country after Bouteflika and his generation pass from the<br />scene.<br /><br />VACANT SEATS FOR DEPARTING MINISTERS?<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Bouteflika appointed just eight senators out of the 24<br />allotted to him this year. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a former senator<br />from the presidential tier, told us Bouteflika made a<br />conscious decision to leave 16 seats vacant for later<br />appointment. While it may be true that Bouteflika had not<br />yet made up his mind in some cases, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought it more likely that he wanted to keep some Senate seats in reserve<br />for ministers who are expected to be dismissed shortly from<br />the cabinet. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the number of vacant seats was a<br />good indicator that a cabinet shuffle was coming soon.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) COMMENT: Even though Bouteflika's illness is receding<br />in the minds of the public (thanks to television pictures of<br />an active president), the widely respected Bensalah is<br />considered able to manage the presidential succession process<br />should Bouteflika not be able to finish his term. XXXXXXXXXXXX<br />analysis of the vacant Senate seats also strikes us as on the<br />mark.<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-75273014043520712472010-12-21T06:30:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:30:41.342-08:00Viewing cable 08ALGIERS261, ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH<pre>VZCZCXRO3499<br />PP RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #0261/01 0631552<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 031552Z MAR 08<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5393<br />INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8851<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2604<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2226<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7079<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6275<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1514<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0463<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3309<br />RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000261<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2023<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH<br />A/S WELCH<br /><br />REF: 07 ALGIERS 1069<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEA<br />Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Abdelaziz<br />Bouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem emphasized<br />their familiar line on self-determination for Western Sahara,<br />as well as the need to find a way out that would allow<br />Algeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that relations with<br />Morocco were "brotherly" and that Western Sahara was the only<br />issue standing between them. Because the U.S. was unburdened<br />by the colonial past of France in the region, Bouteflika felt<br />it was ideally placed to serve as an informal referee in<br />resolving the dispute. Although he said he understood<br />Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of Western Saharan<br />independence, Bouteflika said that Morocco only had itself to<br />blame for the current situation, as it had proceeded in a<br />"clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said,<br />Morocco could have encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, where<br />Sahrawis would happily choose to remain a part of Morocco in<br />some form. Welch underlined to the Algerian officials that<br />the U.S. sought a practical approach that could help the<br />current negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomy<br />proposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD<br />-----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the Moroccan<br />plan served to move a frozen situation forward in the absence<br />of any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that the plan of<br />former Secretary of State James Baker was such an<br />alternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option was<br />necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and the<br />Baker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that the<br />Baker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate<br />progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it was<br />not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not taking<br />its UN Security Council responsibilities seriously."<br />Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less autonomy for<br />Western Sahara than an Algerian province currently enjoys<br />(reftel). He conceded that Algeria does have influence in<br />Western Sahara, but swore he would not use it to violate what<br />he sees as international law.<br /><br />MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME<br />------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch on<br />February 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria's<br />interest, and that attempting "to transform an anti-colonial<br />issue" was not the right path to take and was potentially<br />destabilizing to the region. Bouteflika, meanwhile, said<br />that he understood Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of<br />independence for Western Sahara, but stressed that the<br />Moroccans only had themselves to blame for current Sahrawi<br />determination. Bouteflika explained, saying that Morocco<br />could have easily used a more "elegant" approach to produce a<br />Western Sahara independence that could be controlled or<br />supervised. Instead, he said, "they want Anschluss like<br />Saddam Hussein with Kuwait." Bouteflika said he easily could<br />have imagined an outcome in which Western Sahara chose to<br />remain a part of Morocco after seeing the benefits of<br />Moroccan rule, in much the same way "as Puerto Rico chose to<br />remain part of the U.S." According to Bouteflika, Morocco<br />needs to offer the Polisario something, since "you cannot ask<br />concessions from people who have nothing in their pockets."<br />Had it not been for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika<br />said "they could have gotten what they wanted."<br /><br />ON FRANCE AND U.S.<br />------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,<br />France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving the<br />Western Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika. France "has<br />never really accepted Algerian independence," Bouteflika<br />said, and he claimed that France was trying to settle scores<br />with Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara in support of<br />Morocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the U.S. was an ideal<br />counterweight to balance Morocco, as none of the parties<br /><br />ALGIERS 00000261 002 OF 002<br /><br /><br />involved had any bone of contention with the U.S. Bouteflika<br />complained that the U.S. treats Algeria as "second class"<br />compared to the preferential treatment it gives to Tunisia<br />and Morocco. He said the U.S. should understand Algeria<br />better, as "you also paid a price for your independence."<br />Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's admiration for U.S.<br />positions on the independence of East Timor and Kosovo. "Why<br />don't you share the same views on Western Sahara?" asked<br />Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering what our U.S. friends<br />want." With both Algerians, A/S Welch underlined that the<br />U.S. sought practical approaches that would advance the<br />Western Sahara negotiations forward. The Moroccan proposal,<br />he noted, offered a possibility. He urged the Algerians to<br />consider what they could do to help the current negotiations<br />make concrete progress.<br /><br />COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times the<br />need for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Sahara<br />dispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." He<br />reiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke of<br />looking towards positive future relations with Morocco, as<br />"one day we will need to get beyond this." In a February 27<br />meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, A/S Welch<br />invited the Algerian delegation to visit Washington<br />immediately following the next round of negotiations at<br />Manhasset, to continue the discussions.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par6">¶</a>6. (U) This cable has not been cleared by A/S Welch.<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-63632129463981272052010-12-21T06:29:00.002-08:002010-12-21T06:30:18.871-08:00Viewing cable 07ALGIERS652, ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR<pre>VZCZCXYZ0003<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0652/01 1330941<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 130941Z MAY 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3595<br />INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 000652<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KAWC_0.html">KAWC</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR<br />RETURN OF GTMO DETAINEES<br /><br />REF: 2005 ALGIERS 2155<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reasons 1.4 (b,d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: In April 21-22 discussions led on the<br />Algerian side by Counselor to the President for<br />Counterterrorism Issues Kamel Rezag Bara, the government of<br />Algeria gave oral assurances to S/WCI Ambassador Williamson<br />and an interagency delegation to establish the terms for the<br />transfer of Algerian detainees from the U.S. Naval Base at<br />Guantanamo to Algeria. A working group consisting of members<br />of both delegations encapsulated these oral assurances in<br />written minutes of the meetings, which Williamson and Rezag<br />Bara initialed at the end of the two-day dialogue. The<br />meetings and their output produced sufficient assurances to<br />permit the repatriation of the seven Algerian detainees<br />scheduled for transfer, except with respect to ensuring that<br />these individuals would not pose a security risk to the U.S.<br />or international community. The Algerian delegation<br />indicated that it took seriously its obligations, but that<br />Algerian security services balked at providing such<br />guarantees in the written meeting minutes.<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Ambassador Williamson explained to<br />Rezag Bara that we sought maximum effort from the security<br />services, understanding that there could be no solid<br />guarantees. Nonetheless, Rezag Bara said the security<br />assurances in writing sought by the U.S. on Algerian<br />responsibility for transferred detainees and potential travel<br />restrictions after their repatriation could not be given<br />without consulting the highest levels of the Algerian<br />government. In exchange for receiving additional time (until<br />May 31) to coordinate on these outstanding points, Rezag Bara<br />and the Algerian delegation agreed to the earliest possible<br />transfer of detainee Sofiane Haderbache, who suffers from<br />mental illness and for whom the U.S. does not require<br />security assurances. At the close of the bilateral<br />discussions, both sides agreed that the remaining assurances<br />would be worked out between the Algerian and U.S. delegations<br />through Embassy Algiers. End Summary.<br /><br />COURTESY CALL ON FM BEDJAOUI<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) S/WCI Ambassador at Large J. Clint Williamson and an<br />interagency team consisting of Christopher Camponovo (NSC),<br />Jay Alan Liotta (DoD), Andrew Morrison (S/WCI), and Vijay<br />Padmanabhan (State L) sought assurances from the government<br />of Algeria during April 21-22 discussions that would permit<br />the return to Algeria of Algerian nationals detained at<br />Guantanamo who have been approved for transfer. Williamson<br />opened the visit with a courtesy call on FM Bedjaoui during<br />which he delivered a letter from Secretary Rice seeking<br />Bedjaoui's assistance in providing the Algerian government<br />assurances necessary for the transfers. Williamson also<br />explained the process by which the U.S. made decisions on<br />transferring detainees out of Guantanamo, including the 25<br />Algerians on the naval base.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Noting Algerian reluctance to enter into an exchange<br />of diplomatic notes offering assurances on security and<br />humane treatment of transferred detainees, Williamson told<br />Bedjaoui he and his team could work with their Algerian<br />counterparts to record the necessary assurances in signed<br />minutes of their discussions. The end goal, stated<br />Williamson, was to find an arrangement that both fulfilled<br />the Administration's policies and satisfied the Algerian<br />government. Bedjaoui responded that the Algerian team would<br />accommodate Williamson and his team, adding that signed<br />minutes were a better vehicle for conveying the necessary<br />assurances than an exchange of diplomatic notes. The FM<br />observed that the travaux preparatoires for the UN Charter<br />are as important as the Charter itself.<br /><br />DISCUSSIONS WITH ALGERIAN INTERAGENCY<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) The Algerian delegation led by presidential<br />counterterrorism Counselor Kamel Rezag Bara included<br />representatives from the Presidency, Ministry of Interior,<br />National Police, security services, Ministry of Justice, and<br />the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior MFA official<br />present was Director General for Consular Affairs Hassane<br />Rabehi. The U.S. representatives (paragraph 3) also included<br />Ambassador Ford and PolEc Chief. Ambassador Williamson noted<br />that the Algerians were a valued partner in counterterrorism<br />cooperation and gave an overview of U.S. policy on Guantanamo<br />detainees, explaining that the U.S had determined that seven<br />Algerian detainees were eligible for transfer. He emphasized<br />our need for commitments concerning humanitarian treatment<br />for returned detainees and assurances that persons<br /><br />transferred do not re-engage in terrorist activity before<br />their transfer to Algeria could be effected.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S) Rezag Bara said Algeria encouraged the U.S. to close<br />the Guantanamo detention facility, since its operation<br />created image problems for the U.S. among its friends around<br />the world. The GOA, he continued, understood the need for<br />investigations at Guantanamo on the detained individuals and<br />supported a resolution of all Algerian detainee cases. Rezag<br />Bara said the Algerian delegation understood what kinds of<br />assurances and commitments the U.S. side sought and hoped to<br />provide them in the course of their bilateral discussions.<br />The presidential counselor stressed the Algerian need to<br />ensure that any transferred detainees, unless previously<br />arrested or charged in Algeria, were returning to the country<br />by their own choice. Finally, he noted that Algerian law<br />criminalized terrorist acts committed outside Algeria, even<br />if Algeria was not a target of the activity. In this regard,<br />the U.S. delegation should expect the Algerian government to<br />pursue investigations and charges for returned detainees.<br />From its own experience with terrorism, Rezag Bara told<br />Williamson, Algeria would take all measures possible to<br />prevent re-engagement of the returned detainees in terrorist<br />activity.<br /><br />LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL<br />------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par7">¶</a>7. (S) Williamson responded that he saw very few differences<br />in approach between the two sides. Algeria's taking steps to<br />control detainees and keep them from returning to terrorism<br />would be sufficient for the U.S. Williamson made clear we<br />were not asking Algeria to detain or incarcerate the returned<br />detainees; it was sufficient for us to receive confirmation<br />that the transferred detainees would be treated in accordance<br />with Algerian law and international conventions. DoD's<br />Liotta expressed appreciation for the Algerian readiness to<br />accept responsibility for what would be in all cases medium-<br />or high-threat detainees. He asked if based on Algerian<br />review of the detaineesQ, case files there was the likelihood<br />of prosecution. Liotta also inquired what measures could be<br />taken to limit the foreign travel of returned detainees.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) To Liotta's first point, the justice ministry<br />representative responded that an investigative judge would<br />review facts related to the cases if the detainees once they<br />were returned. It would be up to the judge to determine<br />whether charges would be filed. Rezag Bara added that as<br />part of this judicial review process, the U.S. and other<br />third parties could submit evidence for the judge to<br />consider. The national police representative, for his part,<br />briefed that under Algerian law "convicted and subversive<br />persons" lose the right to a passport and are subject to<br />additional surveillance. Liotta requested further precision<br />about non-convicted persons, since most Algerian detainees<br />fell into this category. Rezag Bara clarified that the<br />passport was lifted for all convicted persons. Persons who<br />"otherwise present a threat but retain a passport" may be<br />administratively prevented from leaving Algeria regardless of<br />their passport status, said Rezag Bara. He added that both<br />judicial and security service reviews of the detainees' files<br />would be undertaken following their return.<br /><br />CASE OF SOFIANE HADERBACHE<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S) Williamson noted that one of the seven detainees whom<br />the U.S. sought to transfer to Algeria did not pose a<br />security threat and no security assurances were necessary in<br />his case. Sofiane Haderbache, said Williamson, had suffered<br />a gunshot wound to the head in Afghanistan. As a result,<br />this detainee had degenerative brain damage and would require<br />extensive medical care for the duration of his life.<br />Williamson indicated that the U.S. sought to return this<br />detainee quickly, since we believed the mental health<br />treatment and attention he required would be well provided in<br />Algeria, where Haderbache could be near family and friends<br />and receive mental health care in his own language and<br />culture. Asked how the Algerians would address Haderbache's<br />mental incapacity, Rezag Bara retrieved the case file.<br />Reading from it, Rezag Bara noted that Haderbache had one<br />outstanding traffic violation but otherwise had no legal<br />entanglements. He said the GOA was fully aware of his unique<br />medical requirements and was prepared to provide Haderbache a<br />psychological and medical evaluation and treatment in an<br />appropriate facility upon his return.<br /><br />HUMANE TREATMENT AND ICRC ACCESS TO ALGERIAN PRISONERS<br />--------------------- ------------------- --------------<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S) Bara had explained in his opening presentation that<br /><br />returned detainees would be fully protected by Algerian law<br />and Algerian international human rights commitments.<br />Returning to the other six detainees who posed a medium or<br />high security threat, Williamson asked if third parties such<br />as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had<br />access to prisoners in Algeria in the event that some of the<br />returned detainees were held in penal facilities for a period<br />of time. Rezag Bara responded that through intelligence<br />channels the Algerian government could provide the location<br />of government facilities in which any returned detainees<br />would be held and questioned under the oversight of an<br />investigative judge and the Ministry of Justice. The GOA, he<br />continued, had no problem with making that information<br />available or providing the ICRC access to the detainees under<br />existing agreements between the ICRC and the Ministry of<br />Justice. Rezag Bara added that ICRC personnel stationed in<br />Tunis visited Algerian prisons on a monthly basis to assess<br />conditions under which prisoners were held.<br /><br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par11">¶</a>11. (S) In a separate meeting, Williamson met April 22 with<br />Mohamed Amara, Director General of Juridical and Judicial<br />Affairs at the Ministry of Justice. Amara noted as a point<br />of pride the strong cooperation between his government and<br />the ICRC, which he explained was critical to the reform of<br />jails and prisons in Algeria. He elaborated that the ICRC<br />regularly visited Algerian prisons. In response to a<br />question from Williamson, Amara explained that the Algerians<br />began allowing ICRC access to their detention facilities in<br />the 1990s. The ICRC currently, said Amara, has freedom to<br />move within Algerian prisons and have direct contact with<br />prisoners. He added there are no restrictions on access or<br />topics of conversation. According to Amara, AlgeriaQ,s goal<br />in cooperating with the ICRC is to ensure that Algeria meets<br />international standards of detention.<br /><br />DEVIL IN THE DETAILS<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par12" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par12">¶</a>12. (S) Following the discussions between the two<br />delegations, both sides assembled teams to prepare minutes of<br />the conversations that would satisfy the U.S. need for<br />assurances and the Algerian desire not to provide such<br />assurances through the exchange of diplomatic notes. The<br />final English-language version of the minutes, which appears<br />in paragraph 13 below, was initialed April 22 by both heads<br />of delegation along with the final French-language version.<br />After protracted discussions led to an impasse on the<br />inclusion in the minutes of two security-related points vital<br />for the U.S. side, Ambassador Ford proposed working through<br />Embassy Algiers to provide acceptable assurances to<br />Washington by May 31. (Note: Without additional internal<br />discussions, the Algerian security services could not be<br />persuaded to lift their objection to including language<br />confirming GOAQ,s responsibility for transferred detainees.<br />End Note.) Rezag Bara stressed the security services were<br />uncomfortable guaranteeing that no returned detainee would<br />later leave Algerian territory or return to terrorist<br />activity. Williamson emphasized that the U.S. was looking<br />for 100-percent effort and understood no 100-percent<br />guarantee is possible. If the Algerian authorities become<br />aware that a detainee exited Algeria, we merely ask to be<br />informed, stated Williamson. The points in question which<br />did not appear in the final minutes at GOA request follow:<br /><br />-- The Algerian government has agreed to take responsibility<br />for these persons in conformity with its legislation and its<br />international obligations, and will take all necessary and<br />appropriate measures in conformity with its legislation and<br />its international obligations to prevent the transferred<br />persons from becoming involved in or facilitating terrorist<br />activities.<br /><br />-- In response to an expressed request of the American<br />Government concerning the possibility of the restriction of<br />the freedom to travel abroad of the transferred persons, the<br />Algerian Government indicated that measures of this nature<br />will be taken only in the framework of legislative provisions<br />in force.<br /><br />FINAL MINUTES AS INITIALED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION<br />--------------------------------------------- ----<br /><br /><a id="par13" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par13">¶</a>13. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF MINUTES:<br /><br />Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War<br />Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State, conducted a<br />working visit to Algiers from April 20 to 22, 2007,<br />accompanied by a delegation composed of representatives from<br />the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the<br />National Security Council.<br /><br />During his visit, Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON called on<br />Mr. Mohammed BEDJAOUI, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign<br />Affairs, to whom he delivered a letter from Secretary of<br />State Condoleezza RICE.<br /><br />He was also received at the Ministry of Justice.<br /><br />A bilateral meeting bringing together delegations from<br />the two countries (the members of which appear on the<br />attached list) took place at Residence El Mithak on April 21<br />and 22, 2007, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mohamed Kamel<br />REZAG BARA, Counselor to the President of the Republic, and<br />Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes<br />Issues at the U.S. Department of State.<br /><br />The discussions concerned the situation of Algerian nationals<br />detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation and the American Delegation expressed<br />their great satisfaction with the quality of relations that<br />exist between the PeopleQ,s Democratic Republic of Algeria<br />and the United States of America and with the perspectives<br />for their expansion and strengthening.<br /><br />Both Delegations particularly expressed their joint will to<br />reach a comprehensive settlement concerning the situation of<br />Algerian nationals detained in the U.S. Naval Base at<br />Guantanamo.<br /><br />This settlement can be finalized according to a timetable and<br />practical modalities to be defined through discussions<br />between the two Delegations by the end of May 2007.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation indicated that it had no objection to<br />the transfer of the Algerian nationals whose Algerian<br />nationality is established, to Algeria or to another country<br />of their choice.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation stated that in all cases, its<br />nationals will be brought before the national judicial<br />authority, which will ultimately determine their status.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation underscored that Algerian legislation<br />criminalizes membership by any Algerian national in a<br />terrorist organization abroad, even if acts committed are not<br />directed against Algeria.<br />With respect to the concerns expressed by the American<br />Delegation about the treatment of the Algerian nationals<br />after their return to Algeria, the two Delegations, after an<br />exchange of information, agreed that these concerns are dealt<br />with, at a political level, by the consistent commitment of<br />Algeria to the fight against international terrorism and, at<br />a legal level, by Algerian legislation as well as by virtue<br />of the obligations assumed by Algeria in the framework of the<br />different pertinent international conventions to which it has<br />adhered, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<br />the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International<br />Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial<br />Discrimination, as well as the body of international<br />instruments relating to human rights and the arrangements<br />concluded with the ICRC.<br />Within the framework of relevant UN Security Council<br />Resolutions for combating terrorism, particularly UNSCR<br />1373/01, the two Delegations decided to reinforce their<br />cooperation through necessary and appropriate measures,<br />notably through the exchange of information and intelligence,<br />with the goal of preventing these persons from being able to<br />become involved in terrorist activities.<br /><br />Taking account of the preceding, the two Delegations accepted<br />the principle, as a first step, upon the agreement of<br />practical modalities, of the transfer of detainees whose<br />names are as follows:<br /><br />- TRARI Mohamed<br />- FEGHOUL Abdelli<br />- HAMLILI Mustapha<br />- ABBAR Houari<br />- GHALLAB Bachir<br />- HADJ-ARAB Nabil<br /><br />Due to his health condition, Sofiane HADERBACHE is to be<br />transferred as soon as possible.<br /><br />END TEXT.<br /><br /><a id="par14" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par14">¶</a>14. (U) Ambassador Williamson and his delegation have cleared<br />the text of this message.<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-90254945154157560162010-12-21T06:29:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:29:55.832-08:00Viewing cable 10ALGIERS20, ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING<pre>VZCZCXYZ0008<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0020/01 0061738<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 061738Z JAN 10<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8302<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 000020<br /><br />SIPDIS<br />NOFORN<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2020<br />TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINR, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING<br /><br />REF: ALGIERS 15 (NOTAL)<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />Summary<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum expressed to the Ambassador January 6 the GOA’s “profound dismay” regarding Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list for enhanced screening. He said this message came directly from President Bouteflika. The TSA decision, Boukadoum stressed, did not accurately reflect the level and quality of our bilateral relations, especially in regard to counterterrorism cooperation. Algeria’s placement on the list had created the impression that Algeria was part of the problem, a misunderstanding that is now circulating in the international press. Boukadoum told the Ambassador that Algeria’s leadership would like an official U.S. statement to correct this impression. Ambassador replied that the intent of the new measures was to ensure air travel safety and not to discriminate or embarrass our friends and partners. Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and hoped the bilateral relationship would continue to grow and develop. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />GOA Not Pleased, Seeks Removal from List<br />----------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum called the Ambassador to the MFA on January 6 to deliver instructions expressing the “profound dismay” of Algeria’s highest authorities at Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list of countries subject to new air passenger screening measures. MFA Director for the Protection of Algerian Citizens Overseas Hocine Sahraoui, a representative of the presidency, Houria Khiari, and U.S. desk officer Abdulmutalib Bouacha also attended. Boukadoum stressed several times at the outset of the meeting that his demarche instructions came directly from the “highest authority” -- i.e., President Bouteflika.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Boukadoum told the Ambassador that he had been asked to convey two main points. The first concerned Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list. Algeria respected and understood the U.S. need to secure the safety of its citizens and interests. But Algeria’s inclusion on this list did not accurately reflect either the level or the quality of our bilateral relations, and especially the nature of those relations with regard to the fight against terrorism. The placement of Algeria on a list that includes state sponsors of terrorism and countries of interest creates the impression that Algeria is part of the problem and less than a full partner in the fight against terrorism.<br /><br />GOA Seeks U.S. Statement on Algeria as Key CT Partner<br />--------------------------------------------- --------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) The second point, he said, besides the GOA’s desire to be removed from the list, was that the country’s leadership hoped to see an official U.S. statement that would underscore Algeria’s important counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. -- in order to help correct the erroneous image of Algeria that had been created by coverage of the TSA story in the international media and on the Internet. “We are partners,” he said. “The highest levels did not appreciate this.”<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C) Boukadoum said Algeria’s Ambassador to the U.S. Abdullah Baali would deliver the same message in Washington. Baali also had instructions to see Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano.<br /><br />U.S. Focus is on Air Travel Safety<br />----------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) The Ambassador said GOA views would be reported fully and immediately to Washington. He told Boukadoum that President Obama had addressed the issue squarely in a statement the previous day. The problem was that on Christmas Day a terrorist had gotten through. This had been a systemic failure, and as a result the President had ordered two reviews -- one of our watch list system, and another of aviation screening procedures. The intent of the new measures was not to discriminate against or embarrass any persons, groups, or countries, and most especially not our friends and partners. The intent was to do the necessary to ensure air travel safety, for everyone. President Obama had thus made clear on January 5 that he had personally ordered, and approved, the new measures. And he had promised that more steps could be on the way in coming days, whether with regard to information integration or passenger screening.<br /><br />U.S. Values Counterterrorism Cooperation with Algeria<br />--------------------------------------------- --------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador continued, the President also had made clear that an important part of our approach would be to deepen cooperation with our international partners. This was where Algeria, and US-Algerian cooperation, came in. The Ambassador noted that we have worked together to improve both the quality and level of our bilateral exchanges in recent years, and he hoped that trend would continue. It was unnecessary to say how much the United States valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria, as well as our overall relationship with Algeria. We hoped to continue to develop and build on the progress that has been made.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par8">¶</a>8. (C) Boukadoum reiterated that Algeria’s disagreement was not with the measures themselves. Rather Algeria protested its inclusion on TSA’s list because it gives the impression that Algeria is not cooperating. “We are cooperating on counterterrorism, and we will continue to do so,” he stated. Meanwhile, Boukadoum asserted that other countries with nationals who have committed terrorist acts have not been placed on the list. Boukadoum argued that to suggest that Algeria is part of the problem is simply unfair. He regretted that international press coverage of the TSA screening measures had cast Algeria in this light and not as country that is a victim of terrorism.<br /><br />Comment<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S/NF) A key line in this demarche was the point that Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list “does not reflect the level and quality of our relations, or the nature of our relations in the fight against terrorism”. With this, the GOA implicitly brought the quality of the entire relationship into play. What grates is that, instead of being seen as a nation that has suffered from terrorism and as an active leader in combating it, they feel instead cast as part of the problem and associated with state sponsors. This sense of damage to Algeria’s international reputation, and especially by the way the story has pinged around in the press and on the Internet, is what undoubtedly fueled President Bouteflika’s “profound dismay”. That said, it is encouraging that Algeria carefully separated the meeting yesterday -- to inform us of their approval of EP-3 overflights by Africa Command against AQIM in the Sahel -- and the meeting today on the TSA issue. This suggests they are trying to separate issues and limit damage. But domestic and regional public opinion does count, so the leadership will want to redress somehow what they perceive as a blow to their national dignity and international prestige. Hence the request that a senior U.S. official make a statement that will help turn around the negative image in the international media.<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S/NF) It is worth remembering that no country is more important than Algeria in the fight against al-Qa’ida in the Sahel and Maghreb. So it is probably worth looking for a good chance to make that point publicly, and at as high a level as possible. If we do not, it is doubtful that we would see any dramatic gestures or sudden moves by Algeria. On the contrary, counterterrorism cooperation would probably continue, to the extent it is in the interest of both sides. It would more likely be a matter of what we don’t see - mil-mil relations frozen instead of advancing, efforts to expand law enforcement cooperation slowed, large commercial contracts going to non-U.S. bidders, reduced Embassy access to senior officials, and generally less receptivity to coordination on regional issues and in multilateral fora. PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-83746912536243763232010-12-21T06:28:00.002-08:002010-12-21T06:29:09.201-08:00Viewing cable 09ALGIERS1162, OVER-FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR AFRICOM EP-3 MISSIONS<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1162 3641633<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 301633Z DEC 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8283<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 1060<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6822<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2813<br />RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001162<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 12/30/2024<br />TAGS PREL, PINR, MOPS, KCOM, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: OVER-FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR AFRICOM EP-3 MISSIONS:<br />PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN RESPONSE<br />REF: SECSTATE 130969<br /><br />Classified By: DCM William Jordan for reasons 1.4. (b), (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) OSC Chief delivered reftel request for EP-3 overflight permission to the Algerian Defense Ministry’s Office of External Relations and Cooperation (DREC) on December 29. There was no immediate response, but the DREC summoned OSC Chief for a follow-up meeting December 30 to state that (1) no decision was possible before next week and (2) overflight requests generally require two-weeks advance notice before they can be approved.<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S/NF) DCM, on December 30, double-tracked the request with Algerian MFA DG for the Americas Sabri Boukadoum. In presenting the message, DCM stressed (1) that the request was intended to survey the SIGINT environment in areas of Mauritania and Mali where AQIM operates, (2) that, without knowing what that survey would yield, the USG could not make any commitments ahead of time as to what data it might share with the GOA, and (3) that the request should be regarded in large measure as a follow-up to the recent visit by AFRICOM Commander General Ward and a demonstration of the enhanced security cooperation we want to support in the face of the AQIM threat in the trans-Sahara region. He further explained that we had made the same request to other governments in the region and were awaiting their responses.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S/NF) Boukadoum asked for information on the expected flight path of the EP-3 over Algerian airspace (DCM confirmed that, departing from Rota, the flights would likely overfly the southwestern corner near Tindouf), whether the aircraft would seek to overfly Mauritania and Mali on each mission (DCM responded that the missions would be divided between those principally flying over Mali or Mauritania but not both), and whether collection would occur inside Algerian airspace (DCM reiterated the notation in reftel that the aircraft would not collect on AQIM in Algeria unless the GOA specifically requested it).<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) As with the DREC, Boukadoum indicated that we should not expect a definitive answer before next week. He agreed, however, to forward our request up his hierarchy immediately. Boukadoum expected that the highest levels of the GOA would consider the request.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) Comment: Although post will be closed for the New Year holiday from COB December 30, our interlocutors know how to reach key Embassy POCs if and as necessary before we reopen on Sunday, January 3. In the meantime, and given the DREC’s stress on the longstanding requirement for two-weeksQ, notice prior to any overflight, operational planners for this mission should be prepared to provide at least a notional schedule for flights should we get indications that the GOA and neighboring countries are prepared to provide clearance. We stressed the number of sorties and timeframe envisaged under this concept of operations, but we should not expect to receive blanket clearance for all overflights. Having as much advance information on the flights as possible to share with the GOA would minimize the potential need to have to clear each and every mission with 14-days advance notice.<br />PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-82589726376432063562010-12-21T06:28:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:28:38.467-08:00Viewing cable 09ALGIERS1077, BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC<pre>VZCZCXYZ0001<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1077/01 3400757<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 060757Z DEC 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8190<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE 1048<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 1989<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 6814<br />RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1259</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001077<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PBTS_0.html">PBTS</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KPAL_0.html">KPAL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KWBG_0.html">KWBG</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/US_0.html">US</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IR_0.html">IR</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IZ_0.html">IZ</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IS_0.html">IS</a><br />AF, XA<br />SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC<br />RELATIONSHIP<br /><br />Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Jordan;<br />reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />Summary<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General<br />William Ward met Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika<br />November 25, during Ward's first visit to Algeria since<br />assuming command of AFRICOM. Ward said AFRICOM's strategy<br />was to assist African nations in providing for their own<br />security needs, not do the job for them. The U.S. recognized<br />Algeria's leadership in the region, and AFRICOM was prepared<br />to assist Algeria and its neighbors combat terrorism.<br />Bouteflika said Algeria wanted to be a strategic partner, not<br />an adversary. Our military relationship already included<br />training and technical cooperation. End-use-monitoring<br />requirements infringed on Algeria's national sovereignty and<br />therefore imposed some limits on military engagement. But<br />the U.S. and Algeria shared a common goal in combating<br />terrorism. Terrorism in the region had taken a dangerous<br />form, and Sahel countries were prepared to address the<br />problem jointly. More needed to be done to ensure the<br />participation and commitment of Mali's political leadership<br />in the regional struggle. Bouteflika told Ward the Malian<br />president needed to understand he could not be friends with<br />both the thieves and their victims at the same time.<br />Trans-Sahara heads of state still planned to convene a<br />security and development summit in Bamako but had yet to set<br />a firm date. Bouteflika also reviewed Egyptian-Algerian<br />tensions in the aftermath of a World Cup qualifying match,<br />Western Sahara, the negative repercussions of Israeli<br />settlement activities, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the<br />soccer issue, he made a point of telling Ward that the king<br />of Morocco -- in contrast to the strain with Egypt -- had<br />sent him a very warm congratulatory message after the game.<br />At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika invited Ward to return<br />to Algeria in the near future. End summary.<br /><br />Addressing Common Challenges<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) Visiting Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General<br />William Ward met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika<br />November 25 at the presidential residence. With Bouteflika<br />were Chief of Staff of the Algerian National Popular Army<br />(ANP) Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid-Salah, Ministry of<br />National Defense (MND) Director of External Relations and<br />Cooperation General Nourredine Mekri, ANP Chief of<br />Organization and Logistics Major General Abdelhamid Ghriss<br />and a translator. The Ambassador, General Ward's foreign<br />policy advisor, Dr. Raymond Brown, the DATT and Poloff<br />(notetaker) accompanied General Ward to the meeting, which<br />lasted two hours. Ward emphasized that his visit to Algiers<br />was symbolic of our countries' growing bilateral<br />relationship. Africa Command's mission was to assist African<br />nations address their own security challenges, not to do it<br />for them. The purpose of his visit, Ward said, was to listen<br />to Algeria's perspective on enhancing our cooperation as we<br />seek ways to work together to address common challenges in<br />Africa. Ward recognized that these challenges were complex<br />and required development and political solutions, not just<br />military intervention. Going forward, we sought to cooperate<br />in areas that Algeria determines are priorities. AFRICOM<br />welcomed the regional counterterrorism efforts Algeria has<br />engaged in with neighboring Sahel countries. Algeria is<br />leading the effort; we will work with Algeria and its<br />neighbors to assist in eliminating the terrorist threat in<br />the region.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) President Bouteflika said that the United States and<br />Algeria shared a common objective and the will to work<br />cooperatively in the fight against terrorism. Bouteflika<br />noted the U.S. and Algeria started to work more closely<br />together during the Clinton administration when both sides<br />came to realize they were fighting the same problem.<br />Bouteflika underscored that after 9/11, Algeria was the first<br />Arab and Muslim country to send a message of solidarity to<br />President Bush. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of<br />some Bush policies, political and economic relations between<br />our countries improved. Today, relations were excellent, he<br />said, noting that Algeria was the United States' second<br />largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia<br />and our largest trading partner in Africa. President Obama's<br />new approach to U.S. foreign policy was "a breath of fresh<br />air" and well regarded by developing world countries. But<br />this meant there were also high expectations for his<br />administration. Bouteflika predicted that our bilateral<br />relationship would continue in a positive direction. He<br />commented that the U.S. and Algeria were moving forward with<br />cooperation, recognizing the value of dialogue across all<br />leadership levels. In this regard, Bouteflika declared he<br />was ready to assist Ward and invited him to visit Algeria<br />again.<br /><br />Military Cooperation<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Bouteflika attached importance to Algeria's<br />military-military cooperation with the United States but<br />noted that U.S. end-use monitoring requirements contravened<br />Algeria's national sovereignty. Nonetheless, we had made<br />progress on training and technical cooperation. Bouteflika<br />said the capabilities of U.S. and Algerian forces were well<br />understood in the region. Bouteflika argued that frank,<br />direct talks were the key to a successful military dialogue,<br />as well as recognizing that, in some cases, there would be<br />limits on the extent of cooperation. "Tell us what you want,<br />and we will tell you what we can do." Algeria, he continued,<br />wanted to be a strategic partner for the U.S. in the region,<br />not an adversary.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) General Ward thanked Bouteflika for his candid<br />assessment of our mil-mil relationship. He said the<br />President, secretaries of State and Defense, and US Joint<br />Chiefs of Staff, all recognized the value of the US-Algeria<br />partnership. Bouteflika responded that he would help us to<br />consolidate that partnership. Ward argued that to enhance<br />our partnership, Algeria needed to tell us how we can<br />contribute best to achieve mutual objectives. Despite the<br />bad things sometimes said about AFRICOM, Ward said with a<br />smile, his command had not been created to take over Africa.<br />Without missing a beat, Bouteflika replied with an even<br />bigger smile that he had been unsure about this himself until<br />Ward came. Ward said that, as we continue our military<br />dialogue, we want to do the things Algeria tells us are<br />important. Ward affirmed Algeria had long recognized the<br />challenge of extremism and demonstrated its ability to fight<br />back. AFRICOM would do its part to support Algeria and its<br />neighbors in this effort. Addressing Bouteflika's point on<br />end-use-monitoring requirements, Ward suggested focusing our<br />efforts in areas where cooperation was possible, i.e.,<br />training and equipping. He acknowledged that some U.S. laws<br />and regulations may preclude for now Algeria's participation<br />in other forms of engagement.<br /><br />Civil-Military Relations<br />------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S) Bouteflika underscored that Algeria's military<br />"absolutely" respected the authority of civilian leadership.<br />"This is not at all like Turkey," he said. Bouteflika<br />asserted that the army was forced to take drastic measures<br />during the violence of the 1990s in order to save the<br />country. This was a difficult period, but constitutional<br />rule had been restored. "The house is now in order," he<br />stressed, "and I can tell you that the army obeys the<br />civilians. There is one constitution and all obey it."<br />Bouteflika acknowledged, however, that the problems of the<br />past still haunted the country. He cited foreign press<br />reports referring to Algeria as a dictatorship and argued<br />that the term was sometimes used carelessly. The Algerian<br />constitution had established the rule of law. In 2004 it was<br />decided that there was no more historical "revolutionary<br />legitimacy". The only legitimacy was the constitution.<br />"Anyone can be a candidate for election, in accordance with<br />the constitution, even a general." He paused, then grinned<br />and said, "but the generals realize the difficulties and none<br />has been a candidate yet."<br /><br />Counterterrorism<br />----------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) Bouteflika said terrorism in Africa had taken a<br />dangerous form. The situation in Somalia was hopeless, he<br />commented. Meanwhile, the Sahel region presented a complex<br />set of issues. Fortunately, most Sahel countries were<br />determined to cooperate and have the capability to fight the<br />threat if they work together. Mauritania expressed a clear<br />commitment as did Niger, although Bouteflika recognized U.S.<br />concerns with President Tandja. Mali's full cooperation<br />remained elusive, however. Mali's policies have failed to<br />create stability in the north. The result is a lawless<br />environment in which smuggling, along with arms and drug<br />trafficking, enable terrorism. Bouteflika said the region<br />was prepared to tackle this problem, and bilateral and<br />regional efforts were already underway. In this regard,<br />Algeria was closely monitoring U.S. military assistance to<br />Mali and Niger.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) Ward told Bouteflika that he planned to visit Bamako<br />after Algiers and would encourage Mali's leaders to cooperate<br />in the region's counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. was<br />providing military assistance to Mali, and we hoped it<br />complemented the work Algeria was doing. Ward emphasized<br />that, ultimately, defeating terrorism was the responsibility<br />of the region. Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for<br />U.S. assistance to Mali and said Algeria also provided aid,<br />including some equipment. Bouteflika urged the U.S. to tell<br />Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure that "he cannot be a<br />friend to the thieves and victims at the same time." Many in<br />Mali's security services shared the same concern, Bouteflika<br />asserted. In the past, he said, Algeria has waited for the<br />chance to debrief terrorist suspects held in Mali, only to<br />find out later that Malian officials were conducting<br />negotiations for the terrorist's release back to the<br />terrorist organizations at the same time. "It is difficult<br />to cooperate in these conditions," he said. Despite<br />difficulties, Bouteflika said regional leaders still planned<br />to convene a security and development summit in Bamako. All<br />agreed on the need for the summit, he said, but there was<br />still no set date. Bouteflika said that Algeria would be<br />open to sharing information with the U.S. regarding Algeria's<br />cooperation with its neighbors. General Ward said AFRICOM<br />would do the same for Algeria regarding U.S. initiatives in<br />the region.<br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br /><a id="par16" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par16">¶</a>16. (S) The Ward-Bouteflika meeting was significant in a<br />number of respects. The Algerian president spoke repeatedly<br />of his readiness to build a strategic relationship with the<br />US. He transmitted clear readiness for closer coordination<br />and contact on Sahel counter-terrorism issues. The simple<br />fact of the meeting with the president was itself a green<br />light to the military bureaucracy on stepped-up bilateral<br />military cooperation. Not least, the warm and high-level<br />official reception provided a powerful antidote to the<br />persistent negative mythology about Africa Command since the<br />command's rollout. It was also noteworthy that, in the<br />presence of three generals, including the chief of staff,<br />Bouteflika spoke assertively to Ward about civilian control<br />of the military. He described the revolutionary origins of<br />military influence in Algeria, said this so-called<br />revolutionary legitimacy ended in 2004, and the military now<br />obeys the civilians and they all obey the constitution. In<br />the course of his regional political review, Bouteflika<br />delivered Algeria's views on Western Sahara in familiar<br />terms. But in doing so, he also struck an unusually<br />positive note about Morocco and the king's message. Clearly,<br />in the context of the high emotions stirred in Algeria over<br />the controversial World Cup contest with Egypt, Mohammed VI's<br />message of congratulations struck a chord with Bouteflika.<br />JORDAN</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-37564809557863152272010-12-21T06:27:00.002-08:002010-12-21T06:28:05.064-08:00Viewing cable 09ALGIERS948, ALGERIA SAYS BAMAKO SUMMIT KEY TO REGIONAL<pre>VZCZCXRO9169<br />OO RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #0948/01 2980928<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 250928Z OCT 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8010<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY<br />RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0780<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 1013<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1954<br />RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0109<br />RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0297<br />RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000948<br /><br />SIPDIS<br />NOFORN<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2029<br />TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MCAP, MOPS, SNAR, AG, ML, MR, NG,<br />UV, US<br />SUBJECT: ALGERIA SAYS BAMAKO SUMMIT KEY TO REGIONAL<br />CAMPAIGN AGAINST AQIM<br /><br />ALGIERS 00000948 001.2 OF 004<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Guenaizia told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October 19 that the Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerien and Malian chiefs of staff had agreed to set up a regional command for joint counter terrorism operations at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. He indicated the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria was determined that terrorists not be allowed to set up logistics, training and supply bases along its frontiers, i.e., in neighboring countries, with the intent of delivering weapons and explosives to Algeria. Algeria has taken the lead in sensitizing its southern neighbors to the nature of the threat and the need for combined action. Huddleston asked how the U.S. and others could support this effort. Guenaizia replied that intelligence-sharing was fundamental. So was provision of certain technical means, like IED jammers. A delegation from Northrop Grumman was coming to Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of a Boeing 737 aircraft with a modified AWACS array. But the U.S. could perhaps assist most before the impending Bamako summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel countries that would make the summit a success and facilitate effective military cooperation. Here, he contended, the biggest problem was the Malian political leadership. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston said she expected the U.S. would indeed be engaging Mali and its neighbors to help make the summit a success. Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in late November. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />U.S. RECOGNIZES ALGERIA’S LEADING ROLE<br />--------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C/NF) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston met October 19 with Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik Guenaizia and other senior generals, including Defense Ministry (MND) SG Major General Ahmed Senhadji, MND Director of External Relations and Cooperation General Mekri, MND Director of the Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DDSE) Major General Lallali and Colonel Mohamed Benmousset, Project Manager for Major General Senhadji. She told Guenaizia that the United States recognized Algeria’s leadership in Africa, including Algeria’s history of support to Africa’s independence movements, promotion of economic and social development, and on security matters. Huddleston acknowledged Algeria’s own experience in combating terrorism and underscored USG appreciation for Algeria’s lead on efforts to secure the Sahel region and prevent terrorism from taking root in neighboring countries. She recalled her cooperation with Algeria when she was ambassador in Mali to confront the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), forerunner of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after the GSPC captured European tourists and brought them to northern Mali from Algeria in 2003. Algeria’s commitment to combat GSPC in the region was clear, she said, and its engagement with Mali was impressive. The U.S. played its part through training to increase Mali’s military planning capacity. In the end, Huddleston concluded, we were successful. GSPC fled Mali to Niger and then to Chad, where GSPC leader “al-Para” was captured and returned to Algeria. Huddleston noted the regional military chiefs of staff meeting held in Tamanrasset in July and the planned regional heads of state summit in Bamako demonstrated that Algeria understood once more the importance of a coordinated regional response to combat terrorism in the Sahel. The U.S. recognized Algeria’s commitment to working with the countries of the region, she stressed, and Algeria’s leading role in that effort. She explained the goal of her visit was to learn how the U.S. can support Algeria’s effort.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Guenaizia thanked Huddleston for focusing her discussion on counterterrorism. Terrorism, he emphasized, was not a local phenomenon in the region. It was brought from outside with all its horrors, he said, and it is a phenomenon the people of the region reject. When the threat<br />ALGIERS 00000948 002.2 OF 004<br />first emerged in Algeria, the international community misunderstood the scope of the problem and left Algeria alone to fight in the 1990s. Algeria faced an international embargo in its time of need, he said. Despite this embargo and the challenge of protecting an area of 2.3 million square kilometers and a population of 34 million, he said, Algeria became self-reliant and prevailed with the overwhelming support of the Algerian people the security services and the army.<br /><br />MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE<br />----------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C/NF) Guenaizia said today the situation had improved considerably, but terrorism remains a serious threat, and Algeria will maintain the same level of pressure and dedication to its counterterrorism efforts. He stressed, however, that terrorism was not only a threat to Algeria, it threatened the entire region and beyond. AQIM, he argued, wants to embed itself in the region and, therefore, Algeria intended to take the fight beyond Algeria’s borders. Like a skilled boxer, he said, the key is to keep pressure on your opponent and increase your room for maneuver. Guenaizia made it clear that Algeria will not tolerate a situation in which AQIM or other armed groups are able to establish camps for logistics and training along Algeria’s frontier in neighboring countries with the intent of facilitating the entry of trained insurgents, weapons and explosives into Algeria.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C/NF) Guenaizia said the situation in northern Mali presented the greatest obstacle to combating terrorism. The nexus of arms, drug and contraband smuggling in northern Mali created an enabling environment, Guenaizia argued, and provided a source of logistical and financial support. Guenaizia added that terrorists will use any means available to finance their activities, including corruption and hostage-taking. Thus, he underlined, fighting terrorism requires “implacable” political will to neutralize all avenues of support terrorists can exploit. Guenaizia asserted that increased drug trafficking represented a critical problem in this regard. Thousands of tons of drugs now cross through the region, he said. Based on clashes with Algerian security forces, Guenaizia assessed that those involved in drug trafficking were well organized and had military training. Guenaizia said that Morocco was a major smuggling route for cannabis and hashish and was not doing enough to interdict traffickers. Huddleston told Guenaizia the U.S. was equally concerned with drug trafficking in northwest Africa, particularly Colombian drugs transiting west Africa and the Sahel en route to Europe. The drug trade added another source of finance for terrorists, and its destabilizing effect on local populations could expand the geographic scope of terrorist recruitment efforts, she said, citing the example of the Boko Haram in Nigeria.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) Guenaizia cautioned that the terrorist network in the Sahel is a sophisticated organization. “These are not simple warlords we are facing,” he emphasized. They use the best explosives, have honed their bomb-making expertise and use sophisticated means to deploy explosives against their targets, Guenaizia underscored. He added that information to build highly sophisticated IEDs is easily obtainable from the Internet. No country is safe, he went on; “We need to remain vigilant.”<br /><br />TAMANRASSET REGIONAL COMMAND<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C/NF) Guenaizia noted that regional chiefs of staff met in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset in July to create a mechanism to allow militaries in the region to coordinate efforts against terrorist threats while at the same time respecting each country’s sovereignty. Military leaders of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, he said, agreed to establish a regional command in Tamanrasset that will host military representatives from each country and coordinate joint operations against AQIM targets. Joint military efforts, Guenaizia elaborated, are necessary to prevent AQIM from implanting itself in the region. He called this the fundamental challenge. Regional military leaders are<br />ALGIERS 00000948 003.2 OF 004<br />now sensitized to the problem, he asserted, and are willing to wage a common CT campaign. He indicated that the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria will provide resources to optimize the command center’s capacity. “What we can’t obtain among ourselves,” he added, “we will seek from our friends.”<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par8">¶</a>8. (C/NF) Guenaizia cautioned that, although the regional command in Tamanrasset was an important first step, he didn’t expect immediate results. The meeting in Tamanrasset, he noted, concerned military coordination, but successful action hinged on two operational aspects: military readiness and political will. Guenaizia said regional military leaders had done their job, now it was up to the civilian leaders of the region to demonstrate the political will to act. “We are waiting for the Bamako summit,” Guenaizia stressed.<br /><br />HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP<br />---------------------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S/NF) As to how the U.S. and others could support the regional effort, Guenaizia emphasized (repeating himself three times to make the point) that sharing intelligence was fundamental. Guenaizia reminded Huddleston that Algeria once agreed to U.S. surveillance overflights years ago, but the experience yielded few positive results for Algeria even though the intelligence collected related directly to Algeria’s national security and used Algeria’s sovereign airspace. Huddleston replied that the U.S. and Algeria were already sharing a lot of intelligence. There would be a willingness to conduct overflights, but she underlined that any overflight mission would have to be linked to direct action on the ground. The cost of one mission, she emphasized, was around USD 50,000, so we had to be sure of the result. Huddleston suggested Guenaizia could raise this matter during AFRICOM Commander General Ward’s expected visit in November.<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S/NF) The provision of technical means was also key. Guenaizia complained that in many ways Algeria still faced an embargo in regards to the provision of technical equipment, including counter-IED measures and sensors for intelligence gathering. He informed Huddleston that a Northrop Grumman delegation will arrive in Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of an AWACS-type platform based on a Boeing 737 airframe. Algeria also needed sophisticated IED jammers, he said. Insurgents use cell phones to detonate IEDs remotely, he stressed, resulting in huge casualties for Algerian forces. Guenaizia lamented that despite this critical need, Algeria’s partners had been slow in responding to Algeria’s request to purchase jammers. He did not refer directly to U.S. end-use-monitoring rules, but he shared an anecdote about Algeria’s difficulties purchasing jamming technology from Portugal, a request, he continued, that has been pending for more than a year with no response.<br /><br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par11">¶</a>11. (S/NF) He said the U.S. and others could perhaps assist most before the Bamako heads of state summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel governments needed to make the summit a success and facilitate effective military action. DDSE Major General Lallali said the key to securing commitment for effective cooperation rested with top-level leaders in Bamako. Lallali said Mali’s political leadership was the biggest problem. “We need a signal from Bamako that shows their commitment,” Lallali stated. Malians are suffering from terrorism, he said, yet when local populations try to fight back, the authorities crack down on those populations.<br /><br /><a id="par12" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par12">¶</a>12. (S/NF) Lallali complained that Malian officials have alerted insurgents that their cell phone calls were being monitored and leaked sensitive intelligence. Lallali also accused Mali of facilitating ransom payments for hostages. He called Mali a favorable business environment for terrorists and believed many wealthy and powerful families in Mali benefited from illegal trafficking. He termed the XXXXXXXXXXXX the “Terrorist Bank” and said, “we need to suppress that bank,” noting the connection between drug trafficking and support for terrorist finance and logistics. Lallali commented that Algeria’s effort in the UN to criminalize<br />ALGIERS 00000948 004.2 OF 004<br />ransom payments aimed to curb corruption’s role in facilitating terrorism. He implored DASD Huddleston to “please do something with them.”<br /><br /><a id="par13" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par13">¶</a>13. (S/NF) Guenaizia agreed that trust was an issue with Mali. Although Algeria has provided materiel and training support to Mali to help resolve the Tuareg issue, it was not inclined to give Mali weapons and communications gear because of concerns that such equipment might be trafficked to Ivory Coast or Guinea. Guenaizia said there was a “double language” in Mali-- its political leadership did not share the commitment Mali’s military leaders demonstrated. In order to succeed in the fight, Guenaizia affirmed, Mali had to cooperate fully. The Bamako summit has to deliver a clear political commitment. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston agreed that complicity in Mali regarding the desire to share in the spoils of illegal trafficking seemed to have become worse since her tenure as ambassador. She concurred that Mali’s cooperation was essential but said that engaging Mali was a task for the entire region, not only Algeria. Huddleston cited the potential role of other partners in the region with influence in Mali, like Libya and Burkina Faso. She also suggested involving the AU to press for a general statement on fighting terrorism in the Sahel that would not single out Mali but rather deliver a broad message that countries in the region should act in concert and not allow terrorists to operate with impunity. The U.S., she said, will engage Mali and others in the region to play a constructive role in the region’s fight against terrorism.<br /><br />BETTER COMMUNICATION<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par14" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par14">¶</a>14. (S/NF) Huddleston told Guenaizia that U.S. military assistance in the region aimed to improve the capacity of militaries in Mali, Mauritania and Chad through training and equipment. President Tandja’s bid for a third term in office, she regretted, probably meant the U.S. will not be able to assist Niger, but we will extend our assistance to Burkina Faso soon. It was important, she stressed, that U.S. efforts were in step with regional efforts already underway. In this regard, Huddleston emphasized that communication among regional governments and other partners, like the U.S., was essential. Huddleston referred to recent talks between the U.S. and European allies on security in the Sahel, during which the European Commission and France mentioned plans for assistance. Guenaizia noted Europe’s interest in getting involved and said that some European governments had tried to insert themselves into the Tamanrasset meeting. He bluntly stated that Africa had already endured a period of colonialism. Lallali interjected that European participation could complicate matters.<br /><br /><a id="par15" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par15">¶</a>15. (S/NF) Huddleston clarified that outside partners did not have to be involved directly but needed to be apprised of future steps and planning in order to provide support. Huddleston suggested regular meetings by the MOD with the Ambassador and DATT in Algiers. Guenaizia said he had no objection, both with the U.S. and others. The threat concerns all. But cooperation had to advance gradually. We should review progress in stages, he added. Immediate efforts, he reiterated, should focus on pressuring Mali and achieving a successful summit in Bamako. The next step was to allow time for standing up the regional command in Tamanrasset and determining equipment needs. He suggested in two to three months we might be able meet and take stock of that effort. In this regard, Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in November.<br /><br /><a id="par16" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par16">¶</a>16. (U) DASD Huddleston did not clear this cable.<br /><br /><a id="par17" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ALGIERS948.html#par17">¶</a>17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-88592335697880121572010-12-21T06:27:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:27:38.409-08:00Viewing cable 08ALGIERS198, SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA<pre>VZCZCXRO5451<br />PP RUEHCD<br />DE RUEHAS #0198/01 0531128<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 221128Z FEB 08 ZDS<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5295<br />INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2178<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7030<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3265<br />RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000198<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />C O R R E C T E D COPY --CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />NEA FOR K.HARRINGTON AND M.POPAL<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2023<br />TAGS PREL, PGOV, AG<br /><br />SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA<br />REF: A. ALGIERS 111 B. ALGIERS 110 AND ALGIERS 140 C. 07 ALGIERS 1806 D. 07 ALGIERS 1807 AND 08 ALGIERS 0075 E. ALGIERS 141<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) We and the Algerians are looking forward to your visit next week. There was a prominent article about your visit, generated with help from our PAO, in best-selling el-Khabar newspaper on February 21. You will be visiting just as the government machine is gearing up to amend the Algerian constitution to enable President Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. There is no strong, influential voice criticizing this effort; only small parties and a few notable individuals have spoken against the building momentum (ref A). The only issue that appears unresolved inside the top civilian and military leadership is whether or not there should be a change to the constitution that establishes a vice president as well. This vice president would be the obvious successor to Bouteflika, especially if his health prevents him from serving out a third term that would expire in 2014. We are arranging for you to meet with former Prime Minister Ouyahia, the man most frequently thought to be tapped for vice president.<br /><br />AN UNHAPPY COUNTRY<br />------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) There is much discussion among political circles about the constitution, the third term and the succession issue, but precious little discussion about how to address long-standing political alienation and social discontent throughout the country. Housing is woefully short, while unemployment and underemployment are endemic (at least 50 percent among young people). In a relatively new phenomenon, many young people are trying to flee the country, by small boat if necessary. The average age at which Algerians marry is now into the mid 30s - a vivid indicator of how unhappy the twenty-somethings are. Meanwhile, most world food price hikes are being passed to consumers, resulting in strikes by different labor groups almost weekly (see ref B for example. Notably, while you are here we expect school teachers nationwide to strike; on the positive side, school closures may ease traffic during your visit, inshallah.) Almost daily there are isolated demonstrations with the occasional government office in some distant town attacked. Meanwhile, voter turnout for the 2007 legislative and local elections was lower than ever before because Algeria’s young people do not see the political system as having any relevance to addressing their problems. This is not the quaking state of the early 1990s. The government is firmly entrenched. However, much of political and social elite sense that Algeria is drifting (see also ref C).<br /><br />THE VISION THING<br />----------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) These political, economic and social problems notwithstanding, Algeria is richer than ever. The oil and gas sector is running up record export revenues - USD 70 billion likely in 2007, while imports will only be about USD 45 billion, according to the IMF. As a result, the GoA is piling up record foreign exchange reserves, now around USD 110 billion. The public knows about the riches and the GoA’s inability to relieve problems like housing and unemployment hits at the GoA’s credibility. Bouteflika and his team have only one approach to energize the economy: spend tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure as well as some grandiose projects to generate jobs and also create a Bouteflika legacy. The construction industry is growing but not as fast as in other oil-boom states. Red tape, burdensome regulations and centralization slow project implementation and impede new private investment. The GoA seems incapable of addressing these systemic problems. This inability stems from a lack of vision at the top. Bouteflika and his team have yet to make a choice on whether Algeria will be a market-driven economy where Algerians must integrate into the world economy or an economy whose government still provides the old social contract of the 1960s and 1970s. We have small technical assistance projects to help the GoA reform its financial and education sectors, but bureaucratic ineptitude and a lack of Algerian urgency slow progress. We therefore extract small, new reforms where we can get them. (Treasury DAS McDonald will be here at the same time as you to look at Treasury-funded assistance<br />ALGIERS 00000198 002 OF 004<br />programming.)<br /><br />TERRORISM PROBLEM NOT A THREAT TO STABILITY<br />-------------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) The social discontent enables al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to find a steady supply of recruits but not enough to threaten stability. There are terror-related attacks almost daily now, usually in the mountains east of Algiers. (There are occasional attacks in southern and western Algeria now too.) AQIM and other Islamist extremists usually hit Algerian security forces, but there are regular threats against Western interests, especially French and American. The terrorists’ tactics have not much changed except in one important manner: nine suicide car bomb attacks since April 2007. AQIM can’t threaten the government’s stability but it has hurt the credibility of Bouteflika’s national amnesty program; it likely weakened him in internal debates with the Algerian hard-liners inside the security force leadership. It has hurt the credibility of the Algerian security forces among the Algerian public and the Western community here. In particular, the December 2007 attack that destroyed the UN headquarters here deeply embarrassed the Algerian government. When the UN said it would conduct its own investigation into the security shortcomings before the attack, the hypersensitive Algerian authorities reacted vehemently and forced the UN to back down. Watching this brittle response, Western companies and embassies now are jittery. Many say that they are watching us for signals on when to send out expatriates. Algiers has seen no incidents since December 11 but there are constant threat reports in sensitive channels.<br /><br />COUNTER-TERROR COOPERATION VERY GOOD<br />------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) As the AQIM threat has ratcheted up, we have increased our collaboration with Algerian military intelligence. They are prickly, paranoid group to work with, but with them we have rolled up several networks that sent Algerian jihadis to Iraq. According to information from an al-Qaida in Iraq cell, 64 Algerian fighters reached Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. Thus, our collective work is not perfect, but the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq likely would have been far higher were we not working closely together. We have also helped the GoA roll up AQIM networks that were planning attacks inside Algeria. Notably, the Algerian authorities do not like to discuss our cooperation against AQIM publicly. Instead, they limit themselves to saying that they cooperate with the U.S. and other nations against international terror networks. We have a new FBI office at the embassy that we hope will establish collaborative programs with the Interior Ministry, but the Algerians are not rushing to cooperate.<br /><br />MILITARY TO MILITARY: WE MUST BE PATIENT<br />-----------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S/NF) While the Algerians are not rushing to expand our mil-mil relationship. it is slowly growing. For the first time in early 2007 the Algerians themselves proposed some joint activities, and we undertook training exercises here involving the navy and air force. AFRICOM has offered much more, but the Algerians purposely keep a foot on the brake. They want to avoid dependence in their military relations, so they spread out activities among foreign partners. They have limited administrative capacity, and the officers who work on bilateral activities with France or Germany or Russia are the same ones who work with us. They are not good at multi-tasking. Part of the Algerian caution also results from bureaucratic gamesmanship and paranoia. In contrast to programming with some other countries, Algerian military intelligence clears all our bilateral military activities. (They likely seek to enhance their own position within the Algerian power structure by controlling the security relationship with the U.S.) In addition, GoA security personnel are exceptionally careful in their contacts with foreigners due to their CI concerns. Probably because Algerian military intelligence was not ready, the Algerians lost their chance to have a high-level bilateral military committee meeting at the Pentagon in April 2008 that would have drawn up plans for expanded activities into 2009. Their failure to reserve the April dates probably will push that meeting into the autumn or even to the next administration. We warned them clearly but their own system was too sclerotic to respond.<br />ALGIERS 00000198 003 OF 004<br /><br />REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us:<br />-- Peace Process: They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement (ref D). They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.<br />-- Lebanon: The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues (ref E). Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.<br />-- Iraq: President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.<br />-- Iran: Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iran’s regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte’s visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.<br />-- Western Sahara: This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don’t want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western Sahara is so important to the throne’s hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the<br />ALGIERS 00000198 004 OF 004<br />exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.<br /><br />AND THE GUANTANAMO PROBLEM<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) For the past two years we have sought GoA approval for the repatriation of some of the two dozen Algerians held at the facility. During the April 2007 visit of S/WCI Williamson we all agreed on principles to govern the return of Algerians, but since then the GoA has refused to agree to accept even a single detainee back despite our repeated attempts. We think that President Bouteflika and military intelligence chief LTG Medienne agree that it would be harmful to Algeria to take any detainees back, and that consensus at the very top makes any movement by lower officials impossible. The GoA has told us we can send detainees back to the countries where we detained them, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a non-starter. We need you to explain firmly that the Guantanamo detainee issue will not go away and probably will become more important in the next year as we move closer to shutting down the detention center at Guantanamo.<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-45121270391363649922010-12-21T06:26:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:27:03.949-08:00Viewing cable 07ALGIERS1809, AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1809/01 3541012<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 201012Z DEC 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5028<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0358<br />RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8739<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1408<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6154<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2473<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2084<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 6941<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3188<br />RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001809<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2027<br />TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, AG<br />SUBJECT: AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A<br />LONG HAUL<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: The December 11 bombings in Algiers demonstrate that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) can adapt its tactics to discredit the Algerian government even if it cannot destabilize the state. Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by Al-Qaida in Iraq and we expect in the future to see AQIM resort to operations such as kidnapping, attacks by women suicide bombers and more suicide vests, for example. The Algerian security forces appeared to enjoy some success dampening AQIM operations in October and November, but there is no sign that they can completely secure the capital. Indeed, they are warning in public and private that they cannot. Their public line is, therefore, that the country must soldier on even with the occasional terrorist atrocity. Behind closed doors, however, the December 11 bombings have opened a debate about whether President Bouteflika’s amnesty program is appropriate or not; some in the security services want to cast it aside and use an iron fist. According to the Portuguese ambassador, who joined his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, the Algerian president appeared shaken and unsure of how to respond to the bombings. His advisors appear glum, and Bouteflika himself has yet to say anything to the nation in the wake of the bombings. Looking forward, we see a terror organization able to adapt and shift tactics and targets facing a government that easily holds military superiority but is not exactly sure what more it can or should do. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent new attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. Thus, the security situation could stay roughly as it is now, or it might deteriorate further; we do not expect it to improve. Our contacts all expect more terror attacks, although none knows when or what form they will take. Al-Qaida tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. The Embassy has already adopted stricter security measures for staff and dependents and is urging the non-official American community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will have to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />----------------------------<br />AQIM IS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par2">¶</a>2. (SBU) AQIM is using a variety of tactics to keep the Algerian government guessing and that are slowly raising concerns among the foreign community and the broader public in Algiers. The following list shows the evolution of AQIM tactics:<br />-- Summer 2006: ambushes with roadside bombs and gunfire against Algerian army patrols in the mountains east of Algiers;<br />-- October 2006: first car bombs in years in the Algiers region, hitting two police stations;<br />-- December 2006: first attack on foreigners in years, using a roadside bomb to hit a U.S.-Algerian company bus in Algiers suburb, killing two (no Amcits);<br />-- February 2007: multiple, coordinated, powerful car bombs in towns scattered in the mountains outside Algiers;<br />-- March 2007: another roadside bomb against a bus full of foreigners, this time a Russian company bus west of Algiers;<br />-- April 2007: suicide van and truck bombs simultaneously hit Prime Minister’s offices in downtown Algiers and destroy a police station east of the city center near the airport; there were two suicide vehicles against the police station in a tactic very similar to that seen in Iraq;<br />-- July 2007: suicide truck bomb hits Algerian army base at Lakhdaria, east of Algiers, killing dozens of soldiers;<br />-- September 2007: another suicide truck bomb, this one driven by a 15 year old, hits Algerian coast guard base at Dellys, east of Algiers, again killing dozens; -- September 2007: first suicide vest attack, this one directly targeting President Bouteflika in Batna, 200 miles east of Algiers;<br />-- September 2007: drive-by suicide car bomb attack on a French/Italian company convoy in the mountains east of Algiers<br />-- September 2007: suspected planning of a kidnapping of two French nationals working at the Algiers airport leads to the sudden departure of the two men;<br />-- December 2007: roadside bomb attack again targets a Russian company bus west of Algiers;<br />-- December 2007: simultaneous suicide truck bombs destroy UN offices and damage Supreme Court building in central Algiers; one of the truck drivers was 64 years old, something heretofore unseen here.<br /><br />---------------------------------------------<br />EXPECT MORE ATTACK METHOD VARIATION A LA IRAQ<br />---------------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) The Al-Qaida in Iraq network, which already has ties to jihadi groups in Algeria, has strong influence on AQIM elements. The suicide bomber in July 2007 was nicknamed “Abu Musaab” because he was so enamored with Zarqawi in Iraq. The AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq in terms of the music, Quranic citations and filming of hits on enemy targets they show. They strongly pitch the alleged American wrongdoings in Iraq and Palestine to recruit men to join AQIM. AQIM is also copying tactics we have seen in Iraq, including use of suicide vehicle bombs and vests. (Comment: Notably, during the 1990s violence in Algeria, there was only one suicide attack. We have now seen nine since April 2007. End Comment.) Water Resources Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, who previously held top jobs in the Interior Ministry, warned Ambassador on December 16 that it would be easy to imagine AQIM resorting to SVBIEDs driven by women or women attacking a target wearing a suicide bomb vest. Security officers at other embassies have pointed to the use of kidnappings in Iraq and worry that AQIM could actively start such a campaign in Algeria. Historically, AQIM has paused between vehicle bomb attacks, although we do not know if that is due to resource constraints or tactical decisions. History suggests we may have a pause lasting as long as months before the next car bomb attack, although it could be much sooner. In any case, our intelligence is incomplete and we may not see the next attack, in whatever form it takes, coming.<br /><br />-----------------------------------<br />IRAQ AND PALESTINE HELP RECRUITMENT<br />-----------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) A prominent conservative Islamist political leader, Abdallah Djaballah, told the Ambassador on December 17 that the suicide attacks demonstrated the influence of the Iraqi jihadis whose appeal to religious sensitivities finds a ready audience here. In addition, he noted, Islamist extremists released under the government’s amnesty program are hugely frustrated because they can find no jobs and lack any means to support themselves. They are easy to recruit, he claimed. AQIM’s choice to put a video of Ayman Zawahari ranting about Palestine last week is likely to further boost recruitment. The website has had over 35,000 hits in a week. Djaballah warned that many young Algerians react strongly to any suggestion that foreign forces are attacking Islam itself, and Palestine, along with Iraq, is the perfect symbol. Jaghloul Abdelghafar, a counselor at the Presidency working on extremism issues, echoed the point about Algeria suffering because of Palestine and Iraq to the Ambassador December 18. He stated that there is a “hard-core five percent” that will always plague Algeria. Political scientist Lyes Boukraa, who has written two books about the terrorism phenomenon in Algeria, told DCM December 18 that he thought the terror groups have more potential recruits than they need.<br /><br />-------------------------------------<br />ALGERIAN SECURITY FORCES: FRUSTRATED<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) The Algerian government is trying to figure out how best to contain and eliminate the extremist problem.<br />Algerian military forces conducted major sweeping operations in the troublesome mountains east of Algiers as well as along the eastern border region near Tebessa in November. They also continued to try wrapping up AQIM support networks and, until the December 11 bombings, they appeared to be having some successes. The number of security force casualties reported in the press dropped steadily in October and November 2007 from the spike seen in September 2007 due to the AQIM suicide attack in Dellys. In contrast to 1994-1996, the Algerian army and gendarmerie can deploy to any location in the country and immediately establish control. AQIM in its December 12 communique felt obliged to tell the government very directly that it had not disappeared.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) The government now is warning the public that it cannot completely contain the terrorist threat. Interior Minister Zerhouni told the press after the December 11 bombings that there was no such thing as perfect security posture since bomb attacks were so easy. Other terror attacks are possible even though the terror groups are weakening, Zerhouni told the press December 12. He also commented that the security forces had relaxed somewhat after their successful security measures for the November 29 local elections, and the suicide bombers had exploited that opening. Head of the Defense Ministry’s External Relations Director General Sefendji told DATT on December 17 that the Algerian military had enjoyed successes in combined air-ground operations against terrorist groups in mountainous areas, but they could not stop suicide attacks in Algiers. National police chief (DGSN director) Ali Tounsi told the press on December 15 that the security services had put in place special measures to protect the Constitutional Council in view of the threat information the GOA had. However, he commented, there was no way to protect against such an “exceptional” attack. Tounsi pledged that the GOA would stand up new, stronger security measures in Algiers in the wake of the December 11 bombings. Pressed by Ambassador for details about the measures on December 18, Tounsi would only say that police reinforcements would surge into the capital in the coming days. He declined to give more details but said he would consider the Ambassador’s strong suggestion that the DGSN brief the key ambassadors about the new security plan. (Comment: Tounsi appeared not entirely on top of the brief and probably couldn’t have provided many details even if he had wanted to. The Interior Ministry is avoiding repeated requests from embassies for information on Interior Ministry plans and operations. End Comment.)<br /><br />-----------------------<br />HARD LINE OR SOFT TOUCH ?<br />-----------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par7">¶</a>7. (S) Water Resources Minister Sellal, who is often rumored to be on a short list to be the next prime minister, told Ambassador December 16 that the GOA ought to strike much harder against the terrorists than it is doing. He was entirely in favor of the iron fist, he stated flatly. However, he noted, current political reality (“la conjuncture politique”) does not allow for such a tough policy. Indeed, Prime Minister Belkhadem had reiterated on December 12 that Bouteflika’s signature national reconciliation program would continue. Ahmed Fattani, publisher of L’Expression newspaper who has good contacts in the security services, told Ambassador December 17 that many in the security forces want to launch a broad campaign of arrests. For this reason, he said, they leaked to him information that some 250 of the Islamist extremists previously released under President Bouteflika’s amnesty program had rejoined the AQIM fight against the government. Fattani claimed that some in the security services said the number was even higher, but L’Expression used the 250 number so as not to anger Bouteflika further.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) Bouteflika himself has made no public remarks in the wake of the December 11 bombings. The Portuguese ambassador, who accompanied his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, told the Ambassador on December 18 that Bouteflika appeared very distressed by the Algiers bombings and unsure of what to do. According to the Portuguese, Bouteflika urged Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates to convince European states to help the Algerian security services. Bouteflika reportedly asked for advice on how to secure fixed sites and sought help from the Europeans to tap cell phones whose SIM cards are changed. One of Bouteflika’s aides, Rachid Aissat, who was the Algerian DATT in Damascus and Moscow in the 1960s, earnestly asked the Ambassador on December 16 for help in countering car bombs. The GOA, he conceded, had no good sense of how to respond. (Comment: Many of our contacts interpret Bouteflika’s silence since December 11 to his embarrassment that both suicide bombers were previously known to the security services and had benefited from the provisions of the national reconciliation program. End Comment.)<br /><br />-------<br />COMMENT<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S) AQIM is very far from being able to bring down the Algerian government but it can certainly make it look weak and foolish. From a narrow security perspective, the December 11 attacks represent not so much the result of diminished Algerian security capabilities as a successful change in AQIM targeting to hit the UN and the Constitutional Council. Security and military contacts have been asking us for a technological fix for the car bomb threat for months. They do not seem to fully appreciate the fact that they are now fight an al-Qaida group, and not just the old Algerian terrorist group GSPC of the late 1990s. AQIM subscribes to international jihadist goals as well as attacking the Algerian government. The more success the GOA has killing the senior terrorist leaders from the GSPC, the more quickly the newer amirs recruited under the al-Qaida banner will rise to the forefront.<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S) Looking forward, we can imagine that the security situation could stay roughly as it is now or deteriorate; we do not expect it to improve. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent more terrorist attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. AQIZ tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. Meanwhile, the GOA is slow at best to share information with us. As a result, the Embassy has taken stricter security measures for staff and dependents, and upgraded security of our chancellery and main staff residence. We are telling the non-official community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will need to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-62138368867952143422010-12-21T06:25:00.002-08:002010-12-21T06:26:38.520-08:00Viewing cable 10ALGIERS111, ALGERIA: DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0111/01 0391658<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />P 081658Z FEB 10<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8404<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE<br />RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE<br />RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC<br />RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC</pre> <code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000111<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS <br /> <br />DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI <br /> <br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 <br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/ENRG_0.html">ENRG</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/ETRD_0.html">ETRD</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KCRM_0.html">KCRM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PINS_0.html">PINS</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: ALGERIA: DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY <br />INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION <br /> <br />Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d) <br /> <br />Summary <br />------- <br /> <br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C/NF) Eight directors, including the CEO, of Algeria's national oil company Sonatrach are under investigation for corruption and have been fired and replaced. Industry insiders fear company operations will soon be affected. Algeria's intelligence services are leading the investigation. This scandal is the latest in a dramatically escalating series of investigations and prosecutions that we have seen since last year involving Algerian government ministries and public enterprises. Significantly, many of the ministries affected are headed by ministers considered close to Algerian President Bouteflika, including Energy /Mines Minister Chekib Khelil. Speculation is rife that political infighting between civilian and military leadership lies behind the case, but we have no hard evidence. Bouteflika's determined silence is only fueling <br />the uncertainty. End summary. <br /> <br />Eight Senior Officials Implicated <br />--------------------------------- <br /> <br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par2">¶</a>2. (U) A corruption scandal has broken involving Algeria's largest company, the state oil and gas monopoly Sonatrach. The press first reported on January 14 that an examining magistrate ordered Sonatrach's CEO Mohamed Meziane, VP for pipelines Benamar Zenasni, VP for upstream activity Boumediene Belkacem, and five other company executives to answer questions concerning allegations of irregularities in the awarding of contracts to two consulting firms owned by Meziane's sons and a supplier of security equipment. They <br />were questioned for twenty hours. <br /> <br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par3">¶</a>3. (U) All eight Sonatrach officials were then placed under formal investigation ("judicial control") which requires a person to report periodically to police and not leave the country). Some were detained. Meziane himself was placed under judicial control; the two Sonatrach VPs were detained in Serkadji prison. An additional Sonatrach senior official, VP for commercialization Chawki Rahal, was placed under <br />judicial control. Four Sonatrach directors (for social affairs, exploration, pipelines and transport, and commercialization) were placed under judicial control. Meziane's two sons were detained -- some stories say, for being major shareholders in companies to which the Sonatrach <br />contracts were awarded. All efforts by defense lawyers to lift the detentions and judicial control have been rejected. Outside Sonatrach, former CEO of the bank Credit Populaire d'Algerie Hachemi Meghaoui and his son were ordered detained. <br /> <br /> <br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par4">¶</a>4. (U) Abdelhafid Feghouli, VP for downstream operations, was immediately appointed acting Sonatrach CEO. The three other VPs under suspicion have been replaced. Energy/Mines Minister Dr. Chakib Khelil, whose ministry has responsibility for Sonatrach, claimed in a January 17 press conference that the investigation had caught him unawares and that all he knew was what had been reported in the press. He has since refused to discuss the allegations or take responsibility for the affair, saying February 2 that he had no details of the charges and that he would not resign. Khelil pleaded that he was responsible for the entire energy sector but not for managing Sonatrach or any of the some 50 other state energy companies under his ministry's purview. He assured the press soon after the affair broke that Sonatrach's production would not be affected and that the company would continue to carry out all projects underway. The week of January 24, the press reported that Sonatrach lawyers would not defend the suspects, since Sonatrach was a victim of the fraud they are suspected of committing. <br /> <br />Foreign Producers Worried <br />------------------------- <br /> <br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C/NF) Ambassador on January 27 met XXXXXXXXXXXX. Meziane XXXXXXXXXXXX sources tell him the issue under investigation is Sonatrach's granting of sole-source contracts. Sonatrach's regulations specify strict conditionsfor this type of contract ("procedure R-115"). Only CEO Meziane would have had authority to authorize and approve them. <br /> <br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX had heard that 1,600 such contracts were <br />under investigation. Some of these contracts reportedly went through Meziane's sons. A few years earlier, Sonatrach had pressed Anadarko to enter into one such contract jointly with the U.S.-Algerian joint venture BRC (Brown and Root-Condor) to develop the el-Merk oilfield. XXXXXXXXXXXX, the contract was never carried out, BRC was liquidated, and Sonatrach in 2008 awarded the el-Merk contract to Anadarko. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that this contract was not/not one of those under investigation. (Comment: BRC, nonetheless, figures in the list of ongoing investigations cited in the press. End comment) <br /> <br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Abdelhafid Ferghouli, former VP for downstream operations now appointed interim CEO, is the one (now former) Sonatrach VP with whom Anadarko was not acquainted. XXXXXXXXXXXX doubted he would last long or beeffective in the top position. No one expects the Sonatrach executives under investigation to return to their previous positions. <br /> <br />Continuity of Sonatrach Operations <br />---------------------------------- <br /> <br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par8">¶</a>8. (C/NF) Energy/Mines Minister Khelil's Jan. 17 assurances that company operations would be unaffected have not gone unchallenged. Several press reports sourced to industry insiders and experts say that fear has paralyzed Sonatrach upper ranks, who are all afraid to make a decision. XXXXXXXXXXXX view paralleled this assessment, and we have heard similar views from French -- quite concerned about Sonatrach because of the French oil company Total's exposure here -- and other diplomats. He said that all senior executives, at least in <br />the upstream end of operations he is familiar with, are looking over their shoulders and afraid to make decisions or sign anything. The company would not sign amendments to XXXXXXXXXXXX insurance contracts on oil production necessitated by the 2009 budget amendments (Complementary Finance Law) -- contracts for which former VP for Upstream Operations Belkacem was responsible. Sonatrach had contracted foreign insurance companies to provide this insurance. Now these companies were not getting paid. Before long, they would cease insuring XXXXXXXXXXXX production operations. If that happened, work would stop. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX fields are the largest upstream project with foreign participation in Algeria. <br /> <br />Leading Role of Algeria's Intelligence Services <br />--------------------------------------------- -- <br /> <br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par9">¶</a>9. (C) All papers report that Algeria's equivalent to the DNI, the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite (DRS), which is no longer under the Ministry of National Defense, carried out the investigation. Although DRS' move out of the shadows and into the limelight has been unprecedented, its special investigative service for internal corruption has been active for years (i.e., even as far back <br />as the Boumedienne era). The magazine "Jeune Afrique" recently claimed, for example, that DRS had investigated 1650 elected Algerian local officials (or about one out of ten) since 2002 for corruption. XXXXXXXXXXXX was well aware of DRS' involvement in the Sonatrach case and related that former VP Belkacem, in many meetings with XXXXXXXXXXXX, had been extremely careful in what he said when others, even company waiters, were present. He was very guarded over the telephone. XXXXXXXXXXXX imputed this behavior to concern over DRS surveillance. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that DRS has interviewed many of XXXXXXXXXXXX company's local staff. <br /> <br />Political Ramifications <br />----------------------- <br /> <br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par10">¶</a>10. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that no one believe Energy/Mines <br />Minister Khelil's claims to know nothing of the investigation. Most believe Khelil exercised a guiding hand over Sonatrach operations. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that his conversations with industry insiders had pointed to a cousin of the minister known only as Hemche who was a close adviser to former CEO Meziane. His sources believed Hemche was a key decision-maker, although Meziane did the signing. Early last December, Hemche reportedly abruptly retired and took up <br />residence in Lugano, Switzerland. <br /> <br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par11">¶</a>11. (C) Ambassador noted that Algiers is swirling with speculation about the political background of this and other scandals affecting several government ministries and public enterprises. Some believed it was a logical outcome of President Bouteflika's oft-stated commitment to attack corruption. Most, however, interpret the DRS move against <br />high-level Sonatrach officials -- who all owed their jobs to Bouteflika-confidant Khelil -- as the military's retaliation via the DRS against the civilian control over it that Bouteflika had imposed since his reelection to a second term in 2004. <br /> <br />Comment <br />------- <br /> <br /><a id="par12" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par12">¶</a>12. (C) The investigation against the leadership of the company that finances over half the country's budget and produces 98 percent of its export revenue has shocked the country and generated rampant speculation about the political motivations behind it. In a country where power relationships and processes are opaque, speculation is as rife as hard evidence is scarce. A visiting analyst of a leading U.S. risk analysis firm told Poloff the week of January 31, for example, that all his contacts believe the DRS shaped the investigation to send a message to Bouteflika, either that he should allow relatives of leading generals a greater slice of the economic pie, or that Bouteflika's western Algerian "clan" should cede power back to the military (which many regard as dominated by eastern Algerians), or simply that the civilian-dominated authority should restore more behind-the-scenes influence to the military. Despite this theory and others we have heard, we see no hard evidence for any particular political interpretation. What is certain is that the alleged infraction and sums involved in this corruption case may only represent the tip of an iceberg -- which was precisely the point of an open letter to the DRS published by a former <br />Sonatrach VP January 30 in the French language daily "El Watan." That article urged the DRS to look into a long list of much large Sonatrach operations, including spot market sales to a handful of select customers connected to senior members of the power structure. The U.S. risk analyst's sources were certain the DRS planted this article as a further warning to civilian authority. <br /> <br /><a id="par13" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10ALGIERS111.html#par13">¶</a>13. (C) This case is the latest in a series of corruption investigations that started to surface with increasing frequency since last spring and which are now competing with indignation over TSA measures and Algeria's failed bid to win the African Cup of Nations football tournament for the main headlines in the daily press. Two of the larger cases already underway are alleged wrongdoing in the construction <br />of the East-West Highway and in the awarding of fishing licenses to Turkish companies. Others involve state-controlled telephone operator Algerie Telecom, BRC (mentioned previously), and the National Bank of Algeria. Few cases have yet produced a trial or conviction, helping <br />harden the widespread view that leading public officials continue to enrich themselves with impunity at public expense. With DRS "commissars" believed present in virtually every public company or ministry front office, senior officials are said to be worried that every visitor, especially non-Algerians, is duly noted and reported. DRS <br />files, already swollen with decades of political and personal financial dirt on practically all notable Algerians, are said to be growing fatter with information on suspicious business dealings or allegations of special favors. The big question no one can answer definitively is whether Bouteflika is orchestrating this anti-corruption blitz, as PM Ouyahia has publicly claimed and as would be consistent with Bouteflika's longstanding intention, or is its ultimate target. His silence, noted by the press, has only fueled the speculation. PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-29004597222875935252010-12-21T06:25:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:25:57.693-08:00Viewing cable 08ALGIERS85, FRENCH AMBASSADOR: BOUTEFLIKA MAY NOT NEED TO<pre>VZCZCXRO1124<br />RR RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #0085/01 0251117<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />R 251117Z JAN 08<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5162<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0391<br />RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8776<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6192<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2514<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2125<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6984<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3223<br />RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000085<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2028<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/FR_0.html">FR</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR: BOUTEFLIKA MAY NOT NEED TO<br />MOVE BUT ALGERIA NEEDS TO<br /><br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08ALGIERS85.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) French Ambassador Bajolet told the Ambassador on January 23 that he and the French government are worried that Algeria is gradually headed towards more instability, but they do not see an alternative to Bouteflika's remaining in power for a third term beginning in 2009. Bajolet, who served here in the 1980s, said that the French strategic<br />interest in Algeria above all is stability and economic growth. Increased pressure on Algerians to emigrate to France because of a lack of opportunities in Algeria weighs heavily on French political sensitivities and ultimately on the social ties between the two countries. The French<br />government, he said, sees few positive developments in Algeria now:<br /><br />-- municipalities, who are closest to the population, have no authority or resources to address needs locally;<br />-- there is an inability throughout the government to make hard decisions; Bajolet called it a kind of immobilism;<br />-- the political parties have little space and seem ready to make short-term deals at long-term political loss;<br />-- public interest in the formal political system has diminished sharply, as seen in the two 2007 elections;<br />-- the business climate is difficult and not improving; and investment and job creation are lacking (Bajolet noted that a French business association had prepared a white paper that detailed problems French companies face in Algeria and how to recitify them. Bajolet observed that the Interior Minister Zerhouni and the Algerian government were anxious that it not be released publicly.);<br />-- corruption, all the way up to the Bouteflika brothers, has reached a new level and is interfering with economic development;<br /><br />BOUTEFLIKA'S THIRD TERM AMBITIONS<br />---------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08ALGIERS85.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) Bajolet said he understood that the security service leadership has given its approval for the constitution to be changed so that Bouteflika can run for election again in 2009. Bajolet stated that Bouteflika's health is better and that he might live several more years. His improved health and activity has given him more leverage over the army, he speculated. That said, Bajolet also opined that the<br />consensus within the top security leadership to support a third term for Bouteflika resulted in part from the widespread view that Bouteflika will not finish his third term due to his his health problems. The relationship<br />between the security services and Bouteflika is still ticklish. For example, the French have concluded that the security services encouraged Minister of Veteran Affairs Cherif Abbas to criticize Sarkozy on the eve of the French president's visit in order to embarrass Bouteflika by provoking the French to cancel the trip.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08ALGIERS85.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Bajolet said the French are being extremely careful about what they say to the Algerians about changing the constituton and enabling Bouteflika to run for the third term that everyone understands he will win. Bajolet sensed that the Algerians clearly floated the idea publicly again right before Sarkozy's visit in December to test whether the French president would advise against it. He intentionally did not<br />do so. Bajolet observed that the French see no obvious successor to Bouteflika. Former Prime Minister Hamrouche, he noted, speaks of reform but the French are unsure whether he could actually push through a reform program. Former Prime Minister Ouyahia, they believe, is yet another apparatchik and has little popularity in the country. Bajolet concluded that without an obvious successor, pushing against Bouteflika simply opens up new sources of instability. Instead, the French have decided that the best message for them to deliver<br />is that they are neutral on the issue of Bouteflika's third term but that the government needs to start addressing Algeria's serious economic and political problems. (Bajolet is particularly interested in decentralization, for example.)<br /><br />SECURITY<br />--------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08ALGIERS85.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) Bajolet expressed great concern about the security situation and asked numerous questions about our latest warden message. Our recommendations that Americans avoid<br /><br />ALGIERS 00000085 002 OF 002<br /><br /><br />Western schools had put him in a difficult spot, he noted, since there are two official French schools in Algiers. Bajolet asserted that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appears to target the Algerian government mainly and targets foreigners only as a means to embarrass the government. The Ambassador disagreed, expressing his view that AQIM is targeting both but with different goals. It targets the GoA to embarrass it and as a means of retaliating for AQIM losses. It targets foreigners to drive them out of Algeria (and ultimately help destabilize the GoA). Bajolet noted that there are multiple French vulnerabilities, including French cultural centers around Algeria and scattered diplomatic residences. So far, however, the Algerian security services have handled threats to the French appropriately and have, he claimed, kept the French authorities informed.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08ALGIERS85.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C) COMMENT: Bajolet opined that external pressure on the government here to try to force it to drop the Bouteflika third-term idea will not compel the GoA to drop it. Instead, he thought, it would merely make working with the Algerians more difficult, and the French now perceive that on both security and economic/social issues they must work with Algiers. He readily admitted that the medium- and long-term<br />outlook here is not good unless the government really begins to fix the economy and the political system. He was not confident that it would, but he had no clear idea of what to do in that case. FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-77789191543250757422010-12-21T06:24:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:25:11.526-08:00Viewing cable 07ALGIERS1806, AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO<pre>VZCZCXRO5580<br />PP RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #1806/01 3531206<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 191206Z DEC 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5022<br />INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2467<br />RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8733<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2078<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6935<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6149<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1403<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0353<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3182<br />RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 001806<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2027<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PINS_0.html">PINS</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO<br />2008<br /><br />REF: A. ALGIERS 1704<br /> <a id="parB" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parB">¶</a>B. ALGIERS 1618<br /> <a id="parC" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parC">¶</a>C. ALGIERS 1237<br /> <a id="parD" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parD">¶</a>D. ALGIERS 1658<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with former government<br />officials, long-term opposition leaders and journalists paint<br />a picture of an Algerian regime that is fragile in ways it<br />has not been before, plagued by a lack of vision,<br />unprecedented levels of corruption and rumblings of division<br />within the military rank and file. Our Algerian contacts are<br />often a grumpy lot, but we now hear more than the ordinary<br />amount of concern about the GOA's inability or unwillingness<br />to address political, economic and security problems. The<br />December 11 suicide bombings in Algiers, carried out by two<br />men amnestied under the Charter for Peace and National<br />Reconciliation, have ignited heated debate about the ability<br />of President Bouteflika's reconciliation program to protect<br />the country. The debate pits proponents of an urgent and<br />aggressive approach to the terrorist threat against those<br />aligned with Bouteflika who still believe that amnesty has a<br />role to play. The picture of an isolated president, a<br />stagnant reform process and an uncertain approach towards<br />terror comes at a time when efforts within the government to<br />engineer a third term for Bouteflika are gathering steam. We<br />do not sense an explosion coming right away. Instead, we see<br />a government drifting and groping for a way forward. END<br />SUMMARY.<br /><br />SHIP OF STATE ADRIFT<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) On December 3, opposition Rally for Culture and<br />Democracy (RCD) leader Said Sadi presented a somber overview<br />of the Algerian regime, saying it insisted on continued<br />control but lacked vision and capacity. Sadi warned that in<br />the context of current stagnation in economic and political<br />reform, Algeria's institutions were corroding from within,<br />losing many of their best cadres of workers and civil<br />servants. The former leader of the Islamist al-Islah party,<br />Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from the party's<br />leadership with active help from the Interior Ministry,<br />pointed out to us on December 17 that the harraga phenomenon<br />(ref A), in which youth flee on makeshift crafts to Europe,<br />was no longer limited only to poor, unemployed youth.<br />Djaballah viewed Algerian youth as having a choice "between<br />death at sea and a slow, gradual death at home" given the<br />profound lack of opportunities in the country's stagnant<br />economy. Sadi told us he was shocked to find so many<br />educated, middle-class Algerians in Quebec and parts of the<br />U.S. on a recent visit. "Those people are the future of<br />Algeria," Sadi said.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us<br />December 17 that when it came to national reconciliation, the<br />December 11 bombings had polarized the debate within the<br />Algerian security services, with an increasing number of<br />voices favoring a tougher approach. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the<br />regime had no single, clear approach to fighting terror, a<br />fact proven by its indecisiveness on how to handle<br />high-profile amnesty cases such as that of Hassan Hattab (ref<br />B). According to Sadi and XXXXXXXXXXXX ordinary Algerians, who<br />have already lost confidence in the economic and political<br />reform agenda, are now losing faith in the ability of the<br />regime to protect them. Laila Aslaoui, a former minister,<br />women's rights activist and writer, told Ambassador at dinner<br />December 18 that much of Algerian society was demobilizing<br />against the terror threat. It was scandalous that the<br />Interior Ministry knew the Supreme Court was a target and did<br />nothing to improve the building's security or warn the<br />public, she claimed. She was caustic about the Interior<br />Minister's comment that it was impossible to provide complete<br />protection against bomb attacks, wondering why the GOA does<br />not more vigorously pursue terrorist suspects. The GOA had<br />asked Ms. Aslaoui on December 17 to help organize a march<br />condemning terrorism. In the 1990s, she said she would not<br />have hesitated. Now, she remarked bitterly, she would do<br />nothing that helps the Algerian government justify its<br />approach to security. XXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Ambassador December 17<br />that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians<br />see as their key needs and what they perceive the government<br />is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a<br />result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the<br />government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you<br />have to do business in a government office, go but then leave<br />promptly and stay out of the way.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread<br />disenchantment about the government's willingness to share<br />power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists<br />to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott<br />the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,<br />that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to<br />marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip<br />on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more<br />extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the<br />U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also<br />understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.<br />does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s<br />and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek<br />it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal<br />political system. The important point, the Ambassador<br />underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow<br />it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.<br />Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having<br />raised election process problems with the GOA.<br /><br />A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"<br />---------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, XXXXXXXXXXXX<br />stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than<br />this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for<br />instability. The regime, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out, values<br />stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile<br />and stable at the same time. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with an analogy<br />made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing<br />the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a<br />disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals<br />came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen<br />as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle<br />come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this<br />"gang," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Sadi, is key to maintaining<br />stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.<br /><br />SADI: "STAND UP FOR OUR YOUTH"<br />------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) Sadi warned of the long-term dangers of the U.S.<br />remaining silent on what he perceived as the deterioration of<br />Algerian democracy, as evidenced by the local elections. In<br />Sadi's view, outside support is critical to the survival of<br />democracy and the productive engagement of Algerian youth --<br />70 percent of the population -- in political and economic<br />life. If the U.S. is seen to be complicit in meaningless<br />elections and the process of amending the constitution to<br />allow Bouteflika to run for a third term, he warned, it risks<br />losing the youth demographic for the future.<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) The Ambassador reminded Sadi of our fruitless efforts<br />to maintain a National Democratic Institute program in<br />Algeria that the Interior Ministry consciously shut down; few<br />political parties had pushed hard to save it. Ambassador<br />told Sadi we had raised on multiple occasions problems with<br />the election process and its credibility. He noted to Sadi<br />that we had heard other parties ask for more public U.S.<br />support, and urged the RCD and other Algerian parties to make<br />their voices heard. The U.S. would be credible in raising<br />obstacles to liberalization only if the Algerian political<br />parties themselves spoke out loudly. Given the absence of an<br />international election monitoring commissions in the 2008<br />legislative and local elections, the Ambassador advised Sadi<br />to consider sooner rather than later generating public<br />requests for international observers for the 2009<br />presidential elections.<br /><br />STABILITY IN THE HANDS OF A DIVIDED MILITARY...<br />--------------------------------------------- --<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) Sadi, who maintains contacts with elements of the<br /><br />ALGIERS 00001806 003 OF 004<br /><br /><br />Algerian military and security services, told us that the<br />army was no longer as unified as it had been even a few years<br />ago. Two splits were emerging, he said. The first is among<br />younger officers who know Algeria is not well and blame the<br />old guard for neglect and mismanagement. These officers,<br />Sadi said, want change and feel an increasing sense of<br />urgency that the country is adrift. The second split<br />identified by Sadi lies within the senior ranks of the<br />military, between officers who favor a tougher approach to<br />security and counter-terrorism (the "eradicateurs") and those<br />still aligned with Bouteflika's national reconciliation<br />policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX, whose brother<br />is an army officer, said on December 17 that there are<br />colonels in the Algerian military who think the current drift<br />cannot continue. The question, XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered, is whether<br />they can organize themselves.<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S) Sadi told us of at least one conversation he has had<br />recently with General Toufik Mediene, the head of Algeria's<br />DRS (military intelligence apparatus) who is widely viewed as<br />the key figure in ensuring regime control and survival. He<br />said Mediene acknowledged that all was not well with the<br />health of Bouteflika and Algeria writ large. However,<br />according to Sadi, Mediene said that he needed some kind of<br />reassurance that any political alternative "would be viable"<br />and, by implication, would not destabilize the country. Sadi<br />said that many senior officers were beginning to wonder if<br />they could get the army out of politics altogether, without<br />fear of public retribution for past abuses during the civil<br />war.<br /><br />...WHILE CORRUPTION AND OIL PRICES REACH NEW HEIGHTS<br />--------------------------------------------- -------<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S) Sadi, Djaballah, XXXXXXXXXXXX and numerous other<br />contacts have told us that corruption has reached<br />unprecedented levels in the current regime. As we reported<br />in ref D, the ruling FLN party, intent on laying the<br />groundwork for a Bouteflika third term, has sought to install<br />local officials through electoral wrangling based on loyalty<br />even at the expense of competence. With oil prices at record<br />highs, former Finance and Prime Minister Benbitour told<br />Ambassador in November, there was less incentive for the<br />regime to carry out much-needed reforms. High oil prices are<br />bringing incredible wealth into the country, Benbitour told<br />us, but ordinary people are not seeing any impact on their<br />daily lives. (Indeed, Benbitour publicly coined a term we<br />see often in the media now: Algeria is rich, but the people<br />are poor. Islamist leader Djaballah used it with us often on<br />December 17.) Corruption, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has reached epic<br />proportions, even within the military. He cited Lieutenant<br />General Ahmad Gaid Salah, commander of Algerian military<br />forces, as perhaps the most corrupt official in the military<br />apparatus, something other contacts have told us as well.<br />When Sadi mentioned the corruption problem to General<br />Mediene, Sadi said, Mediene acknowledged the problem.<br />Motioning silently to the portrait of Bouteflika that hung<br />over their heads, he indicated to Sadi that the extent of the<br />problem went all the way to the top. (Comment: many embassy<br />contacts think President Bouteflika himself is not<br />particularly corrupt, but they readily finger the President's<br />brothers, Said and Abdallah, as being particularly rapacious.<br />The Algerian military, meanwhile, has launched an<br />anti-corruption program that is ambitious by Algerian<br />standards but has left the senior leadership relatively<br />untouched. End Comment.)<br /><br />COMMENT: AN AILING REGIME, AN AILING PRESIDENT<br />--------------------------------------------- -<br /><br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par11">¶</a>11. (S) Our Algerian contacts are often a grumpy lot, but we<br />now hear more than the ordinary amount of concern about the<br />GOA's inability or unwillingness to address political,<br />economic and security problems. The bombings and the debate<br />about how to handle Islamist extremism also are starting to<br />remind of the ferocious arguments within Algerian society<br />during the worst of 1990s violence. These contacts agree<br />that while the 1990s showed most Algerians can withstand lots<br />of pain, the December 11 bombings laid bare the regime's lack<br />of vision and inability to manage the pressures. We are<br />starting to hear echoes of a debate within some circles of<br />the military establishment of an increasingly polarized<br /><br />ALGIERS 00001806 004 OF 004<br /><br /><br />debate over national reconciliation has become a discussion<br />about the viability of Bouteflika's government itself.<br />According to our contacts, stability remains the top priority<br />even among officials on opposite sides of the debate,<br />although they see stability as flowing not from Bouteflika's<br />leadership but from a military apparatus that appears to<br />realize that the buck stops with them. The new element is<br />the push from Prime Minister Belkhadem and the FLN apparatus,<br />probably with impetus from Bouteflika's brothers if not<br />President Bouteflika himself, to arrange a constitutional<br />amendment and a third term. Sadi, a medical doctor, said<br />that both Bouteflika and Algeria itself were in critical<br />condition and fading. According to Sadi (who may or may not<br />know), Bouteflika suffers from terminal stomach cancer, and<br />the regime lies on the operating table, slipping towards a<br />point of no return as "untrained surgeons" stand by.<br />Meanwhile, the government's seeming inability to jump-start<br />the stagnant economy has Algerians, especially youth, feeling<br />gloomy and grim about the fate of their country as it drifts<br />into the new year.<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-18098250756949868192010-12-21T06:21:00.002-08:002010-12-21T06:22:38.867-08:00Bouteflika évoque Mohamed VI et le Sahara occidental<table><tbody><tr><td class="nb">ID:</td><td>38855</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Date:</td><td>2005-08-19 11:35:00</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Origin:</td><td>05ALGIERS1753</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Source:</td><td>Embassy Algiers</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Classification:</td><td>CONFIDENTIAL</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Dunno:</td><td><br /></td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Destination:</td><td>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.<br /><br /></td></tr> <tr><td class="nb" colspan="2"><br />C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015<br />TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario<br />SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA,<br />ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA<br /><br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)<br /><br /> 1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee<br />Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme<br />Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members<br />of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the<br />morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar<br />and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the<br />release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario.<br />Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika's efforts to<br />create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara<br />conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President<br />Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done<br />so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had<br />left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika<br />reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a<br />casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right<br />to resume fighting "on its own territory" if it chose to do<br />so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the<br />outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not<br />be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the<br />Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco's<br />last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King<br />Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying<br />he could not accept "dealing with diplomatic relations in<br />such an irresponsible manner." Referring to advice from<br />Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King<br />Mohammed's youth, Bouteflika said, "I am not Jesus Christ,<br />and will not turn my other cheek." Algeria was ready to<br />discuss "objective interests" with Morocco, but only if the<br />Moroccans were "serious." Senator Lugar noted that President<br />Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission,<br />adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the<br />land border and reengage at the highest level. Did<br />Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a<br />referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on<br />the UN's agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting<br />international law and was defending the right of<br />self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating<br />partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain,<br />Morocco or the U.S. End summary.<br /><br />LUGAR MISSION<br />-------------<br /><br />2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard<br />Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied<br />Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria<br />August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the<br />release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario<br />Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones,<br />and members of Lugar's delegation met with President<br />Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of<br />August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5<br />General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended<br />the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential<br />Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh,<br />Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister<br />Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel<br />reports Lugar and Bouteflika's discussion of U.S.-Algerian<br />relations and a number of regional issues.<br /><br />A HUMANITARIAN MISSION<br />----------------------<br /><br />3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of<br />President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission<br />to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative<br />taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for<br />Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the<br />Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG's appointment<br />of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of<br />the UN's support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator<br />Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the<br />Senator's record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he<br />was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about<br />Lugar's planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader<br />Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern<br />since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The<br />Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this<br />should "not offend anyone from the land of Washington and<br />Wilson," the leader of a war for independence and the<br />founding father of the idea of self-determination.<br /><br />4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President<br />Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was<br />ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the<br />President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done<br />so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario<br />to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker's<br />resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that<br />still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for<br />being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the<br />Polisario's. Baker "represented the American values we<br />admire."<br /><br />WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI,<br />BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br />5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker<br />with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still<br />been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought<br />the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for<br />implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario,<br />he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right<br />to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not<br />implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not<br />insisting on a time limit.<br /><br />6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999<br />he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at<br />the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the<br />Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The<br />Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if<br />they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be<br />their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to<br />fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base.<br /><br /><br />MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN<br />--------------------------<br /><br />7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the<br />UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international<br />community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was<br />considered a "mere tribal issue" even though it had been a<br />Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the<br />Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis.<br />From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering<br />negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the<br />conflict. Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western<br />Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis' behalf.<br />Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating<br />self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter.<br />Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria<br />would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN<br />framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to<br />accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my<br />sincerest hope, Bouteflika said.<br /><br />ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM<br />----------------------------------------<br /><br />8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now<br />committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum,<br />whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a<br />referendum was a "Pandora's box," but Algeria would accept<br />the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of<br />self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to<br />do so.<br /><br />"I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST"<br />-----------------------<br /><br />9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with<br />Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year.<br />Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large<br />delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with<br />Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of<br />review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed<br />would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour<br />later, the Moroccans said that "circumstances were not<br />favorable" for the visit, even though it had been prepared<br />months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not<br />accept dealing with diplomatic relations "in such an<br />irresponsible manner." Morocco would always be Algeria's<br />neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get<br />along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in<br />an "infantile manner." Bouteflika said that in his<br />discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other<br />leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a<br />veteran diplomat. But, he said, "I am not Jesus Christ" and<br />will not turn the other cheek.<br /><br />10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and<br />knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great<br />deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco<br />depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with<br />the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year<br />from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective<br />interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to<br />discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how<br />they treat Algeria.<br /><br />11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said<br />that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in<br />order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon<br />as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western<br />Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the<br />AMU.<br /><br />U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING<br />-------------------------------<br /><br />12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in<br />a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights<br />and respect for the right of self-determination that<br />Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own<br />national interests were not directly engaged when it was the<br />right thing to do. It was in this context that President<br />Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The<br />President respected Bouteflika's initiative to gain the<br />release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve<br />Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two<br />countries should reopen their border and reengage at the<br />highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see<br />how we could make a difference.<br /><br />13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the<br />Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria<br />would support the results of a referendum no matter what they<br />were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote<br />still a significant issue? What were the other principal<br />issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new<br />issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the<br />UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria<br />will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not<br />mean it would "condone Moroccan tricks." The Western Sahara<br />has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time<br />as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since<br />independent. Algeria supported respecting international law.<br /> It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the<br />Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United<br />States, but Algeria would defend the right of<br />self-determination.<br /><br />14. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear<br />this message.<br /><br />15. (U) Minimize considered.<br />ERDMAN<br /><br />http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/Argelia/descarta/enfrentamiento/Marruecos/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_17/Tes<br /></td></tr></tbody></table>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-38759568040789317802010-12-21T06:21:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:21:53.599-08:00Bouteflika parle du Maroc et du Sahara occidental<table><tbody><tr><td class="nb">ID:</td><td>70010</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Date:</td><td>2006-07-01 11:15:00</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Origin:</td><td>06ALGIERS1219</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Source:</td><td>Embassy Algiers</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Classification:</td><td>CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Dunno:</td><td><br /></td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Destination:</td><td>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1219/01 1821115<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />P 011115Z JUL 06<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1480<br />INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316<br />RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8466<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1868<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1356<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 6204<br />RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY<br />RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY<br />RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0358<br />RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0365<br /></td></tr> <tr><td class="nb" colspan="2"><br />C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001219<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016<br />TAGS: PREL, PBTS, WI, MO, AG<br />SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH<br />MOROCCO<br /><br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)<br /><br />1. (C) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and<br />Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend met with President<br />Bouteflika for three and a half hours June 18. NSC Senior<br />Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti and DCM<br />accompanied Townsend. Bouteflika's Counterterrorism Adviser<br />Rezzag Bara and a notetaker were also present. This cable<br />reports their discussion of the Western Sahara and relations<br />with Morocco.<br /><br />2. (C/NF) Well into the meeting, Bouteflika raised Western<br />Sahara, noting that U.S. visitors always wanted to discuss it<br />with him. Townsend noted that President Bush had asked both<br />Bouteflika and Moroccan King Mohamed VI to find a way to<br />resolve their differences. Townsend said the President<br />appreciated Bouteflika's role in last summer's release by the<br />Polisario of the remaining 404 Moroccan prisoners, noting<br />that "this would not have happened without your courage."<br />She asked Bouteflika about his view on fully resolving this<br />issue. .<br /><br />3. (C/NF) Bouteflika responded that as the world's biggest<br />power, the U.S. should respect the decisions of the UN on the<br />Western Sahara. He recalled that in his first meeting with<br />President Bush in 2001, the President had asked him to work<br />faithfully with James Baker and he had done so. Bouteflika<br />noted that he had supported the Baker Plan, even though he<br />would not have done so without President Bush's request.<br />Now, he said, Algeria was "stuck in the middle" with Morocco;<br />"we reject anything they accept and vice versa." Bouteflika<br />commented that despite this stalemate, he had made two<br />important decisions: the Western Sahara would never be a<br />casus belli for Algeria, and he had made clear to the<br />Moroccans that Algeria had no claims on the Western Sahara's<br />territory or resources.<br /><br />4. (C/NF) Bouteflika asserted that there was no bilateral<br />problem between Algeria and Morocco. The Moroccans, he went<br />on, claimed the Western Sahara was an issue between Morocco<br />and Algeria. "I would solve it if I could," he stated, "but<br />I cannot speak for the Sahrawis." Morocco and the Polisario<br />must find a solution, and they can do so with American help.<br />Algeria will support any agreement reached by Morocco and the<br />Polisario. But, Bouteflika cautioned, a solution cannot be<br />imposed on the Sahrawis. In that case, Algeria will defend<br />to the end the Sahrawis' right to self-determination.<br /><br />5. (C/NF) Bouteflika complained that Algeria was in a<br />situation whereby any gesture toward Morocco would be held up<br />by the Moroccan side as the beginning of a process of working<br />out a settlement bilaterally with Algeria. "So I do not want<br />to shake the King's hand." However, Bouteflika said he had<br />recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in<br />Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos.<br />Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad<br />discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted<br />comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this<br />with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!" He<br />added that he could also joke with the King's late father,<br />King Hassan II. King Mohamed, however, "is not open, and he<br />lacks experience." In a rare moment of self-criticism,<br />Bouteflika said he had found his own weak point: he believed<br />others should resolve problems through dialogue, but he did<br />not believe in dialogue for himself with Mohamed VI.<br /><br />6. (C/NF) Townsend said the Western Sahara continued to be a<br />matter of great interest to President Bush. She added that<br />the lack of a settlement was impeding regional cooperation on<br />counterterrorism and preventing the Maghreb from achieving<br />the level of economic relations that it should enjoy.<br />Bouteflika suggested that James Baker would be a good source<br />of advice to the President, he was a man of "exceptional<br />qualities." It was a "shame Baker quit," Bouteflika<br />commented. He then wondered whether the President might<br />convince Baker to resume his previous role. Bouteflika<br />concluded that offering concessions to Morocco would be<br />tantamount to "giving a bonus to the most undisciplined<br />student in the class." The U.S. "should not award Morocco's<br />bad behavior."<br /><br />7. (U) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and<br /><br />Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend has cleared this<br />message.<br />ERDMAN </td></tr></tbody></table><br />http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/malas/relaciones/Buteflika-Mohamed/VI/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_18/TesA and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-48017545604008085592010-12-21T06:20:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:21:10.800-08:00Relations entre l'Algérie et le Maroc, rencontre avec Mohamed VI<table><tbody><tr><td class="nb">ID:</td><td>143518</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Date:</td><td>2008-02-28 16:08:00</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Origin:</td><td>08RABAT185</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Source:</td><td>Embassy Rabat</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Classification:</td><td>CONFIDENTIAL</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Dunno:</td><td><br /></td></tr> <tr><td class="nb">Destination:</td><td>VZCZCXRO9993<br />PP RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHRB #0185/01 0591608<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />P 281608Z FEB 08<br />FM AMEMBASSY RABAT<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8201<br />INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4700<br />RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0595<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0096<br />RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2297<br />RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0444<br />RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0705<br />RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1410<br />RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3534<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3669<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4946<br />RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0682<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0274<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9535<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3919<br />RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 2226<br />RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1933<br />RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0786<br />RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY</td></tr> <tr><td class="nb" colspan="2"><br />C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000185<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />STATE FOR NEA, EUR/SCE AND AF/W<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018<br />TAGS: PREL, OVIP, MO<br />SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH,S MEETINGS WITH KING MOHAMMED VI AND<br />MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TAIEB FASSI FIHRI<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />1. (C) SUMMARY: King Mohammed VI received NEA A/S Welch for<br />an hour on February 25. The wide-ranging exchange of views<br />focused on bilateral cooperation, the Middle East Peace<br />Process (MEPP), Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria,<br />Algeria and Western Sahara. In most respects, the audience<br />mirrored the meeting that preceded it with Minister of<br />Foreign Affairs Fassi Fihri and MFA Director General for<br />Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Azeroual. However, we heard<br />that Amr Moussa,s latest visit to Beirut had been "a<br />catastrophe;" the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend the<br />Arab summit in Damascus; and Morocco was looking at other<br />Arab countries' reaction to Kosovo's declaration of<br />independence. The King asked us to assist Mauritania and<br />warned that the POLISARIO must not attempt to occupy the area<br />east of the berm in Western Sahara. In his meeting with the<br />Foreign Minister, Ambassador Welch pressed for an agreement<br />on the status of the American schools in Morocco and informed<br />the Minister of a planned accord with the U.S. Holocaust<br />Memorial Museum. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />BILATERAL COOPERATION<br />---------------------<br />2. (C) Receiving NEA A/S Welch, the Ambassador, DCM and Erin<br />Yerger, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Assistant to the<br />President for National Security Affairs Elliot Abrams, at the<br />royal palace in Marrakech on February 25, the King thanked<br />the United States for the excellent cooperation on<br />counterterrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account and the<br />Free Trade Agreement. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri also<br />attended the audience.<br /><br />KOSOVO<br />------<br />3. (C) The King noted that he had just met with the Greek<br />Foreign Minister, who urged him not to recognize Kosovo. The<br />King and the Foreign Minister indicated that they intended to<br />discuss recognition with other Arab leaders at the<br />Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Dakar<br />in March. Fassi Fihri said the Serbian Foreign Minister has<br />also requested a meeting.<br /><br />MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS<br />----<br />4. (C) Ambassador Welch began by underscoring that this is<br />an important year for the region and that the President is<br />determined to make progress on the MEPP. Welch briefed the<br />King and the Minister on the process and assured them that<br />the Israelis and the Palestinians are making progress, but<br />the public is unaware of it. On Gaza, Welch averred that<br />Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is focused on the least bad<br />option. For his part, the King expressed deep concern about<br />the humanitarian situation in Gaza.<br /><br />LEBANON<br />-------<br />5. (C) Turning to the continuing leadership vacuum in<br />Lebanon, A/S Welch said that we see three options: 1) to<br />continue efforts to elect a President by consensus; 2) to<br />elect a President with 50 percent of the vote plus one; or 3)<br />to support the Siniora government. Welch indicated that we<br />increasingly believe the third option affords the best means<br />to support Lebanon,s institutions. Asked about Arab League<br />Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Beirut, Fassi Fihri<br /><br />SIPDIS<br />characterized it as 'a catastrophe.'<br /><br />SYRIA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT<br />--------------------------------<br />6. (C) Noting that Kings Mohammed VI and Abdullah II of<br />Jordan had come to power at approximately the same time as<br /><br />RABAT 00000185 002 OF 003<br /><br /><br />President Bashar al-Assad, Welch decried Syria,s lost<br />opportunities. Welch said that he understood that the Syrian<br />Foreign Minister would be in Marrakech on February 26 to<br />deliver an invitation to the Arab Summit in Damascus, and<br />Welch predicted that attendance would be poor. The King said<br />he understood that the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend,<br />implying that Morocco would be represented at the ministerial<br />level at best.<br /><br />IRAN<br />----<br />7. (C) Ambassador Welch asked if he might say a few words<br />about Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The King<br />responded that he understood that Iran had suspended its<br />nuclear weapons program. Welch thanked the King for the<br />opportunity to clarify, declaring that the U.S. intelligence<br />estimate had been misunderstood and that the reporting on<br />this issue has been unclear. Welch said that we continued to<br />believe that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons; so President<br />Bush was seeking a middle ground "between the bomb and<br />bombing," without giving up any option. Diplomatic pressure<br />is best for now. When the King asked what that middle ground<br />might look like, Welch said that more Security<br />Council-approved sanctions loom and that Iran must accept a<br />diplomatic solution.<br /><br />ALGERIA<br />-------<br />8. (C) The conversation then turned to Algeria, and Welch<br />asked if the GOM had any views on President Abdelaziz<br />Bouteflika,s plans. The King said he understood that<br />Bouteflika was amending the Constitution to permit a third<br />term, and Welch noted wryly that Bouteflika was doing so<br />without Syrian assistance. The King praised the "frustrated"<br />Algerian Ambassador in Rabat for his tireless efforts to<br />improve bilateral relations, stating, &We have no relations<br />with Algeria, except for limited cooperation on security<br />issues." In spite of obvious opportunities for cooperation<br />in agriculture, energy and a host of other areas, President<br />Bouteflika and his government clearly prefer the status quo.<br />The King noted that he had even traveled to Algiers to try to<br />break the impasse, but the GOA continues to insist on the<br />Western Sahara issue being resolved before proceeding with<br />other bilateral or regional initiatives.<br /><br />WESTERN SAHARA<br />--------------<br />9. (C) The King and Fassi Fihri expressed grave concern<br />about the POLISARIO's stated plans to move people into the<br />area east of the berm. The King said bluntly that Morocco<br />could not allow that. Praising the King,s autonomy<br />initiative, Welch urged the GOM to press ahead with the<br />Manhasset talks. He said support for Morocco,s position is<br />growing ever so slowly. Separately, Welch cautioned the<br />King's intelligence chief against militarization of the<br />dispute.<br /><br />MAURITANIA<br />----------<br />10. (C) Looking at Western Sahara's neighbor Mauritania, the<br />King stressed that Mauritania needs help and that he will see<br />the Mauritanian President in Dakar.<br /><br />AMERICAN SCHOOLS<br />----------------<br />11. (U) Welch took advantage of a few private minutes with<br />Fassi Fihri to underscore the need for an agreement on the<br />status of the American schools in Morocco. Noting that he<br />had attended the Rabat American School (RAS)as a child, Welch<br />said if a solution is not found soon that RAS could not<br />produce more David Welches. Fassi Fihri replied that he had<br /><br />RABAT 00000185 003 OF 003<br /><br /><br />been in contact with Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi and<br />Director General of Taxation Nouredine Bensouda about our<br />proposal.<br /><br />U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM<br />------------------------------<br />12. (U) Welch also raised made the Minister aware of the<br />planned signing of an accord between the U.S. Holocaust<br />Memorial Museum and the Moroccan National Archives. Welch<br />also mentioned that the Museum still planned to host a<br />conference on the Holocaust in Arab lands.<br /><br />COMMENT<br />-------<br />13. (C) Although his face looked puffy, the King appeared<br />relaxed and rested after four weeks in France. The meeting<br />itself underscored how much U.S. and Moroccan views coincide.<br /> END COMMENT.<br /><br />14. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.<br /><br /><br />*****************************************<br />Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;<br />http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat<br />*****************************************<br /><br />Riley </td></tr></tbody></table><br />http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/Marruecos/relacion/Argelia/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_19/TesA and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-40963187335135234222010-12-21T06:19:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:20:24.519-08:00Assurances algériennes pour le retour des détenus de Guantanamo<pre>VZCZCXYZ0003<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0652/01 1330941<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 130941Z MAY 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3595<br />INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 000652<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KAWC_0.html">KAWC</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR<br />RETURN OF GTMO DETAINEES<br /><br />REF: 2005 ALGIERS 2155<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reasons 1.4 (b,d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: In April 21-22 discussions led on the<br />Algerian side by Counselor to the President for<br />Counterterrorism Issues Kamel Rezag Bara, the government of<br />Algeria gave oral assurances to S/WCI Ambassador Williamson<br />and an interagency delegation to establish the terms for the<br />transfer of Algerian detainees from the U.S. Naval Base at<br />Guantanamo to Algeria. A working group consisting of members<br />of both delegations encapsulated these oral assurances in<br />written minutes of the meetings, which Williamson and Rezag<br />Bara initialed at the end of the two-day dialogue. The<br />meetings and their output produced sufficient assurances to<br />permit the repatriation of the seven Algerian detainees<br />scheduled for transfer, except with respect to ensuring that<br />these individuals would not pose a security risk to the U.S.<br />or international community. The Algerian delegation<br />indicated that it took seriously its obligations, but that<br />Algerian security services balked at providing such<br />guarantees in the written meeting minutes.<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Ambassador Williamson explained to<br />Rezag Bara that we sought maximum effort from the security<br />services, understanding that there could be no solid<br />guarantees. Nonetheless, Rezag Bara said the security<br />assurances in writing sought by the U.S. on Algerian<br />responsibility for transferred detainees and potential travel<br />restrictions after their repatriation could not be given<br />without consulting the highest levels of the Algerian<br />government. In exchange for receiving additional time (until<br />May 31) to coordinate on these outstanding points, Rezag Bara<br />and the Algerian delegation agreed to the earliest possible<br />transfer of detainee Sofiane Haderbache, who suffers from<br />mental illness and for whom the U.S. does not require<br />security assurances. At the close of the bilateral<br />discussions, both sides agreed that the remaining assurances<br />would be worked out between the Algerian and U.S. delegations<br />through Embassy Algiers. End Summary.<br /><br />COURTESY CALL ON FM BEDJAOUI<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) S/WCI Ambassador at Large J. Clint Williamson and an<br />interagency team consisting of Christopher Camponovo (NSC),<br />Jay Alan Liotta (DoD), Andrew Morrison (S/WCI), and Vijay<br />Padmanabhan (State L) sought assurances from the government<br />of Algeria during April 21-22 discussions that would permit<br />the return to Algeria of Algerian nationals detained at<br />Guantanamo who have been approved for transfer. Williamson<br />opened the visit with a courtesy call on FM Bedjaoui during<br />which he delivered a letter from Secretary Rice seeking<br />Bedjaoui's assistance in providing the Algerian government<br />assurances necessary for the transfers. Williamson also<br />explained the process by which the U.S. made decisions on<br />transferring detainees out of Guantanamo, including the 25<br />Algerians on the naval base.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Noting Algerian reluctance to enter into an exchange<br />of diplomatic notes offering assurances on security and<br />humane treatment of transferred detainees, Williamson told<br />Bedjaoui he and his team could work with their Algerian<br />counterparts to record the necessary assurances in signed<br />minutes of their discussions. The end goal, stated<br />Williamson, was to find an arrangement that both fulfilled<br />the Administration's policies and satisfied the Algerian<br />government. Bedjaoui responded that the Algerian team would<br />accommodate Williamson and his team, adding that signed<br />minutes were a better vehicle for conveying the necessary<br />assurances than an exchange of diplomatic notes. The FM<br />observed that the travaux preparatoires for the UN Charter<br />are as important as the Charter itself.<br /><br />DISCUSSIONS WITH ALGERIAN INTERAGENCY<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) The Algerian delegation led by presidential<br />counterterrorism Counselor Kamel Rezag Bara included<br />representatives from the Presidency, Ministry of Interior,<br />National Police, security services, Ministry of Justice, and<br />the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior MFA official<br />present was Director General for Consular Affairs Hassane<br />Rabehi. The U.S. representatives (paragraph 3) also included<br />Ambassador Ford and PolEc Chief. Ambassador Williamson noted<br />that the Algerians were a valued partner in counterterrorism<br />cooperation and gave an overview of U.S. policy on Guantanamo<br />detainees, explaining that the U.S had determined that seven<br />Algerian detainees were eligible for transfer. He emphasized<br />our need for commitments concerning humanitarian treatment<br />for returned detainees and assurances that persons<br /><br />transferred do not re-engage in terrorist activity before<br />their transfer to Algeria could be effected.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S) Rezag Bara said Algeria encouraged the U.S. to close<br />the Guantanamo detention facility, since its operation<br />created image problems for the U.S. among its friends around<br />the world. The GOA, he continued, understood the need for<br />investigations at Guantanamo on the detained individuals and<br />supported a resolution of all Algerian detainee cases. Rezag<br />Bara said the Algerian delegation understood what kinds of<br />assurances and commitments the U.S. side sought and hoped to<br />provide them in the course of their bilateral discussions.<br />The presidential counselor stressed the Algerian need to<br />ensure that any transferred detainees, unless previously<br />arrested or charged in Algeria, were returning to the country<br />by their own choice. Finally, he noted that Algerian law<br />criminalized terrorist acts committed outside Algeria, even<br />if Algeria was not a target of the activity. In this regard,<br />the U.S. delegation should expect the Algerian government to<br />pursue investigations and charges for returned detainees.<br />From its own experience with terrorism, Rezag Bara told<br />Williamson, Algeria would take all measures possible to<br />prevent re-engagement of the returned detainees in terrorist<br />activity.<br /><br />LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL<br />------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par7">¶</a>7. (S) Williamson responded that he saw very few differences<br />in approach between the two sides. Algeria's taking steps to<br />control detainees and keep them from returning to terrorism<br />would be sufficient for the U.S. Williamson made clear we<br />were not asking Algeria to detain or incarcerate the returned<br />detainees; it was sufficient for us to receive confirmation<br />that the transferred detainees would be treated in accordance<br />with Algerian law and international conventions. DoD's<br />Liotta expressed appreciation for the Algerian readiness to<br />accept responsibility for what would be in all cases medium-<br />or high-threat detainees. He asked if based on Algerian<br />review of the detaineesQ, case files there was the likelihood<br />of prosecution. Liotta also inquired what measures could be<br />taken to limit the foreign travel of returned detainees.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) To Liotta's first point, the justice ministry<br />representative responded that an investigative judge would<br />review facts related to the cases if the detainees once they<br />were returned. It would be up to the judge to determine<br />whether charges would be filed. Rezag Bara added that as<br />part of this judicial review process, the U.S. and other<br />third parties could submit evidence for the judge to<br />consider. The national police representative, for his part,<br />briefed that under Algerian law "convicted and subversive<br />persons" lose the right to a passport and are subject to<br />additional surveillance. Liotta requested further precision<br />about non-convicted persons, since most Algerian detainees<br />fell into this category. Rezag Bara clarified that the<br />passport was lifted for all convicted persons. Persons who<br />"otherwise present a threat but retain a passport" may be<br />administratively prevented from leaving Algeria regardless of<br />their passport status, said Rezag Bara. He added that both<br />judicial and security service reviews of the detainees' files<br />would be undertaken following their return.<br /><br />CASE OF SOFIANE HADERBACHE<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S) Williamson noted that one of the seven detainees whom<br />the U.S. sought to transfer to Algeria did not pose a<br />security threat and no security assurances were necessary in<br />his case. Sofiane Haderbache, said Williamson, had suffered<br />a gunshot wound to the head in Afghanistan. As a result,<br />this detainee had degenerative brain damage and would require<br />extensive medical care for the duration of his life.<br />Williamson indicated that the U.S. sought to return this<br />detainee quickly, since we believed the mental health<br />treatment and attention he required would be well provided in<br />Algeria, where Haderbache could be near family and friends<br />and receive mental health care in his own language and<br />culture. Asked how the Algerians would address Haderbache's<br />mental incapacity, Rezag Bara retrieved the case file.<br />Reading from it, Rezag Bara noted that Haderbache had one<br />outstanding traffic violation but otherwise had no legal<br />entanglements. He said the GOA was fully aware of his unique<br />medical requirements and was prepared to provide Haderbache a<br />psychological and medical evaluation and treatment in an<br />appropriate facility upon his return.<br /><br />HUMANE TREATMENT AND ICRC ACCESS TO ALGERIAN PRISONERS<br />--------------------- ------------------- --------------<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S) Bara had explained in his opening presentation that<br /><br />returned detainees would be fully protected by Algerian law<br />and Algerian international human rights commitments.<br />Returning to the other six detainees who posed a medium or<br />high security threat, Williamson asked if third parties such<br />as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had<br />access to prisoners in Algeria in the event that some of the<br />returned detainees were held in penal facilities for a period<br />of time. Rezag Bara responded that through intelligence<br />channels the Algerian government could provide the location<br />of government facilities in which any returned detainees<br />would be held and questioned under the oversight of an<br />investigative judge and the Ministry of Justice. The GOA, he<br />continued, had no problem with making that information<br />available or providing the ICRC access to the detainees under<br />existing agreements between the ICRC and the Ministry of<br />Justice. Rezag Bara added that ICRC personnel stationed in<br />Tunis visited Algerian prisons on a monthly basis to assess<br />conditions under which prisoners were held.<br /><br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par11">¶</a>11. (S) In a separate meeting, Williamson met April 22 with<br />Mohamed Amara, Director General of Juridical and Judicial<br />Affairs at the Ministry of Justice. Amara noted as a point<br />of pride the strong cooperation between his government and<br />the ICRC, which he explained was critical to the reform of<br />jails and prisons in Algeria. He elaborated that the ICRC<br />regularly visited Algerian prisons. In response to a<br />question from Williamson, Amara explained that the Algerians<br />began allowing ICRC access to their detention facilities in<br />the 1990s. The ICRC currently, said Amara, has freedom to<br />move within Algerian prisons and have direct contact with<br />prisoners. He added there are no restrictions on access or<br />topics of conversation. According to Amara, AlgeriaQ,s goal<br />in cooperating with the ICRC is to ensure that Algeria meets<br />international standards of detention.<br /><br />DEVIL IN THE DETAILS<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par12" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par12">¶</a>12. (S) Following the discussions between the two<br />delegations, both sides assembled teams to prepare minutes of<br />the conversations that would satisfy the U.S. need for<br />assurances and the Algerian desire not to provide such<br />assurances through the exchange of diplomatic notes. The<br />final English-language version of the minutes, which appears<br />in paragraph 13 below, was initialed April 22 by both heads<br />of delegation along with the final French-language version.<br />After protracted discussions led to an impasse on the<br />inclusion in the minutes of two security-related points vital<br />for the U.S. side, Ambassador Ford proposed working through<br />Embassy Algiers to provide acceptable assurances to<br />Washington by May 31. (Note: Without additional internal<br />discussions, the Algerian security services could not be<br />persuaded to lift their objection to including language<br />confirming GOAQ,s responsibility for transferred detainees.<br />End Note.) Rezag Bara stressed the security services were<br />uncomfortable guaranteeing that no returned detainee would<br />later leave Algerian territory or return to terrorist<br />activity. Williamson emphasized that the U.S. was looking<br />for 100-percent effort and understood no 100-percent<br />guarantee is possible. If the Algerian authorities become<br />aware that a detainee exited Algeria, we merely ask to be<br />informed, stated Williamson. The points in question which<br />did not appear in the final minutes at GOA request follow:<br /><br />-- The Algerian government has agreed to take responsibility<br />for these persons in conformity with its legislation and its<br />international obligations, and will take all necessary and<br />appropriate measures in conformity with its legislation and<br />its international obligations to prevent the transferred<br />persons from becoming involved in or facilitating terrorist<br />activities.<br /><br />-- In response to an expressed request of the American<br />Government concerning the possibility of the restriction of<br />the freedom to travel abroad of the transferred persons, the<br />Algerian Government indicated that measures of this nature<br />will be taken only in the framework of legislative provisions<br />in force.<br /><br />FINAL MINUTES AS INITIALED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION<br />--------------------------------------------- ----<br /><br /><a id="par13" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par13">¶</a>13. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF MINUTES:<br /><br />Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War<br />Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State, conducted a<br />working visit to Algiers from April 20 to 22, 2007,<br />accompanied by a delegation composed of representatives from<br />the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the<br />National Security Council.<br /><br />During his visit, Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON called on<br />Mr. Mohammed BEDJAOUI, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign<br />Affairs, to whom he delivered a letter from Secretary of<br />State Condoleezza RICE.<br /><br />He was also received at the Ministry of Justice.<br /><br />A bilateral meeting bringing together delegations from<br />the two countries (the members of which appear on the<br />attached list) took place at Residence El Mithak on April 21<br />and 22, 2007, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mohamed Kamel<br />REZAG BARA, Counselor to the President of the Republic, and<br />Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes<br />Issues at the U.S. Department of State.<br /><br />The discussions concerned the situation of Algerian nationals<br />detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation and the American Delegation expressed<br />their great satisfaction with the quality of relations that<br />exist between the PeopleQ,s Democratic Republic of Algeria<br />and the United States of America and with the perspectives<br />for their expansion and strengthening.<br /><br />Both Delegations particularly expressed their joint will to<br />reach a comprehensive settlement concerning the situation of<br />Algerian nationals detained in the U.S. Naval Base at<br />Guantanamo.<br /><br />This settlement can be finalized according to a timetable and<br />practical modalities to be defined through discussions<br />between the two Delegations by the end of May 2007.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation indicated that it had no objection to<br />the transfer of the Algerian nationals whose Algerian<br />nationality is established, to Algeria or to another country<br />of their choice.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation stated that in all cases, its<br />nationals will be brought before the national judicial<br />authority, which will ultimately determine their status.<br /><br />The Algerian Delegation underscored that Algerian legislation<br />criminalizes membership by any Algerian national in a<br />terrorist organization abroad, even if acts committed are not<br />directed against Algeria.<br />With respect to the concerns expressed by the American<br />Delegation about the treatment of the Algerian nationals<br />after their return to Algeria, the two Delegations, after an<br />exchange of information, agreed that these concerns are dealt<br />with, at a political level, by the consistent commitment of<br />Algeria to the fight against international terrorism and, at<br />a legal level, by Algerian legislation as well as by virtue<br />of the obligations assumed by Algeria in the framework of the<br />different pertinent international conventions to which it has<br />adhered, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<br />the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International<br />Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial<br />Discrimination, as well as the body of international<br />instruments relating to human rights and the arrangements<br />concluded with the ICRC.<br />Within the framework of relevant UN Security Council<br />Resolutions for combating terrorism, particularly UNSCR<br />1373/01, the two Delegations decided to reinforce their<br />cooperation through necessary and appropriate measures,<br />notably through the exchange of information and intelligence,<br />with the goal of preventing these persons from being able to<br />become involved in terrorist activities.<br /><br />Taking account of the preceding, the two Delegations accepted<br />the principle, as a first step, upon the agreement of<br />practical modalities, of the transfer of detainees whose<br />names are as follows:<br /><br />- TRARI Mohamed<br />- FEGHOUL Abdelli<br />- HAMLILI Mustapha<br />- ABBAR Houari<br />- GHALLAB Bachir<br />- HADJ-ARAB Nabil<br /><br />Due to his health condition, Sofiane HADERBACHE is to be<br />transferred as soon as possible.<br /><br />END TEXT.<br /><br /><a id="par14" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html#par14">¶</a>14. (U) Ambassador Williamson and his delegation have cleared<br />the text of this message.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-75735258847921066572010-12-21T06:14:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:19:41.392-08:00Algérie, Sahara occidental<pre>VZCZCXRO3499<br />PP RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #0261/01 0631552<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 031552Z MAR 08<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5393<br />INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8851<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2604<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2226<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7079<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6275<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1514<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0463<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3309<br />RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000261<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2023<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH<br />A/S WELCH<br /><br />REF: 07 ALGIERS 1069<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEA<br />Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Abdelaziz<br />Bouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem emphasized<br />their familiar line on self-determination for Western Sahara,<br />as well as the need to find a way out that would allow<br />Algeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that relations with<br />Morocco were "brotherly" and that Western Sahara was the only<br />issue standing between them. Because the U.S. was unburdened<br />by the colonial past of France in the region, Bouteflika felt<br />it was ideally placed to serve as an informal referee in<br />resolving the dispute. Although he said he understood<br />Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of Western Saharan<br />independence, Bouteflika said that Morocco only had itself to<br />blame for the current situation, as it had proceeded in a<br />"clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said,<br />Morocco could have encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, where<br />Sahrawis would happily choose to remain a part of Morocco in<br />some form. Welch underlined to the Algerian officials that<br />the U.S. sought a practical approach that could help the<br />current negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomy<br />proposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD<br />-----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the Moroccan<br />plan served to move a frozen situation forward in the absence<br />of any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that the plan of<br />former Secretary of State James Baker was such an<br />alternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option was<br />necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and the<br />Baker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that the<br />Baker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate<br />progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it was<br />not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not taking<br />its UN Security Council responsibilities seriously."<br />Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less autonomy for<br />Western Sahara than an Algerian province currently enjoys<br />(reftel). He conceded that Algeria does have influence in<br />Western Sahara, but swore he would not use it to violate what<br />he sees as international law.<br /><br />MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME<br />------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch on<br />February 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria's<br />interest, and that attempting "to transform an anti-colonial<br />issue" was not the right path to take and was potentially<br />destabilizing to the region. Bouteflika, meanwhile, said<br />that he understood Morocco felt threatened by the prospect of<br />independence for Western Sahara, but stressed that the<br />Moroccans only had themselves to blame for current Sahrawi<br />determination. Bouteflika explained, saying that Morocco<br />could have easily used a more "elegant" approach to produce a<br />Western Sahara independence that could be controlled or<br />supervised. Instead, he said, "they want Anschluss like<br />Saddam Hussein with Kuwait." Bouteflika said he easily could<br />have imagined an outcome in which Western Sahara chose to<br />remain a part of Morocco after seeing the benefits of<br />Moroccan rule, in much the same way "as Puerto Rico chose to<br />remain part of the U.S." According to Bouteflika, Morocco<br />needs to offer the Polisario something, since "you cannot ask<br />concessions from people who have nothing in their pockets."<br />Had it not been for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika<br />said "they could have gotten what they wanted."<br /><br />ON FRANCE AND U.S.<br />------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,<br />France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving the<br />Western Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika. France "has<br />never really accepted Algerian independence," Bouteflika<br />said, and he claimed that France was trying to settle scores<br />with Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara in support of<br />Morocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the U.S. was an ideal<br />counterweight to balance Morocco, as none of the parties<br /><br />ALGIERS 00000261 002 OF 002<br /><br /><br />involved had any bone of contention with the U.S. Bouteflika<br />complained that the U.S. treats Algeria as "second class"<br />compared to the preferential treatment it gives to Tunisia<br />and Morocco. He said the U.S. should understand Algeria<br />better, as "you also paid a price for your independence."<br />Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's admiration for U.S.<br />positions on the independence of East Timor and Kosovo. "Why<br />don't you share the same views on Western Sahara?" asked<br />Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering what our U.S. friends<br />want." With both Algerians, A/S Welch underlined that the<br />U.S. sought practical approaches that would advance the<br />Western Sahara negotiations forward. The Moroccan proposal,<br />he noted, offered a possibility. He urged the Algerians to<br />consider what they could do to help the current negotiations<br />make concrete progress.<br /><br />COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times the<br />need for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Sahara<br />dispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." He<br />reiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke of<br />looking towards positive future relations with Morocco, as<br />"one day we will need to get beyond this." In a February 27<br />meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, A/S Welch<br />invited the Algerian delegation to visit Washington<br />immediately following the next round of negotiations at<br />Manhasset, to continue the discussions.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html#par6">¶</a>6. (U) This cable has not been cleared by A/S Welch.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-44484744607033739912010-12-21T06:13:00.001-08:002010-12-21T06:13:58.404-08:00Election de Bensalah et succession de Boutelika<pre>VZCZCXYZ0010<br />PP RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0045 0161707<br />ZNY CCCCC ZZH<br />P 161707Z JAN 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2696<br />INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6429<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1573<br />RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1486<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2048<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2834</pre> <code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000045<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a><br />SUBJECT: SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED<br /><br />REF: A. 2006 ALGIERS 2067<br /><br /><a id="parB" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#parB">¶</a>B. ALGIERS 30<br /><br />Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 b/d<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) Abdelkader Bensalah was re-elected, 129-0, as the<br />President of the Conseil de la Nation (Senate) on January 12.<br />Bensalah remains first in line to succeed President<br />Bouteflika in the event that he is unable to complete his<br />current term. Bensalah's re-election became a foregone<br />conclusion when no other senator challenged him for the post.<br />A reporter for French-language daily newspaper Liberte,<br />XXXXXXXXXXXX, who covered all aspects of the election, told<br />us the result was predetermined once President Bouteflika<br />signaled to the senators that he wanted Bensalah to retain<br />his position. XXXXXXXXXXXX said senators privately complained<br />that, out of respect to Bouteflika, no other candidates had<br />presented themselves. Many told her the election became a<br />formality rather than an exercise in democracy, which was a<br />shame in their view.<br /><br />BOUTEFLIKA APPOINTS SENATORS OF HIS GENERATION<br />--------------------------------------------- -<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) On the day of the election, eight new senators joined<br />the Conseil de la Nation as part of the third of the<br />membership appointed directly by President Bouteflika (ref<br />A). All have one characteristic in common: they are<br />"moudjahidine," or veterans (like Bouteflika) of the war of<br />independence against France. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, these<br />newly appointed senators, as members of the "revolutionary<br />family" and in a sense "siblings of President Bouteflika,"<br />will be very loyal to him. Some senators quietly expressed<br />to her their frustration that the president did not reach out<br />to members of the younger generation who will need to lead<br />the country after Bouteflika and his generation pass from the<br />scene.<br /><br />VACANT SEATS FOR DEPARTING MINISTERS?<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Bouteflika appointed just eight senators out of the 24<br />allotted to him this year. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a former senator<br />from the presidential tier, told us Bouteflika made a<br />conscious decision to leave 16 seats vacant for later<br />appointment. While it may be true that Bouteflika had not<br />yet made up his mind in some cases, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought it more likely that he wanted to keep some Senate seats in reserve<br />for ministers who are expected to be dismissed shortly from<br />the cabinet. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the number of vacant seats was a<br />good indicator that a cabinet shuffle was coming soon.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) COMMENT: Even though Bouteflika's illness is receding<br />in the minds of the public (thanks to television pictures of<br />an active president), the widely respected Bensalah is<br />considered able to manage the presidential succession process<br />should Bouteflika not be able to finish his term. XXXXXXXXXXXX<br />analysis of the vacant Senate seats also strikes us as on the<br />mark.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html<br />FORD</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-45453263120130368522010-12-21T06:08:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:13:00.600-08:00Demande de survol de l'espace aérien algérien par des avions US, suite<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1162 3641633<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 301633Z DEC 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8283<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 1060<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6822<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2813<br />RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001162<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 12/30/2024<br />TAGS PREL, PINR, MOPS, KCOM, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: OVER-FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR AFRICOM EP-3 MISSIONS:<br />PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN RESPONSE<br />REF: SECSTATE 130969<br /><br />Classified By: DCM William Jordan for reasons 1.4. (b), (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) OSC Chief delivered reftel request for EP-3 overflight permission to the Algerian Defense Ministry’s Office of External Relations and Cooperation (DREC) on December 29. There was no immediate response, but the DREC summoned OSC Chief for a follow-up meeting December 30 to state that (1) no decision was possible before next week and (2) overflight requests generally require two-weeks advance notice before they can be approved.<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S/NF) DCM, on December 30, double-tracked the request with Algerian MFA DG for the Americas Sabri Boukadoum. In presenting the message, DCM stressed (1) that the request was intended to survey the SIGINT environment in areas of Mauritania and Mali where AQIM operates, (2) that, without knowing what that survey would yield, the USG could not make any commitments ahead of time as to what data it might share with the GOA, and (3) that the request should be regarded in large measure as a follow-up to the recent visit by AFRICOM Commander General Ward and a demonstration of the enhanced security cooperation we want to support in the face of the AQIM threat in the trans-Sahara region. He further explained that we had made the same request to other governments in the region and were awaiting their responses.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S/NF) Boukadoum asked for information on the expected flight path of the EP-3 over Algerian airspace (DCM confirmed that, departing from Rota, the flights would likely overfly the southwestern corner near Tindouf), whether the aircraft would seek to overfly Mauritania and Mali on each mission (DCM responded that the missions would be divided between those principally flying over Mali or Mauritania but not both), and whether collection would occur inside Algerian airspace (DCM reiterated the notation in reftel that the aircraft would not collect on AQIM in Algeria unless the GOA specifically requested it).<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) As with the DREC, Boukadoum indicated that we should not expect a definitive answer before next week. He agreed, however, to forward our request up his hierarchy immediately. Boukadoum expected that the highest levels of the GOA would consider the request.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) Comment: Although post will be closed for the New Year holiday from COB December 30, our interlocutors know how to reach key Embassy POCs if and as necessary before we reopen on Sunday, January 3. In the meantime, and given the DREC’s stress on the longstanding requirement for two-weeksQ, notice prior to any overflight, operational planners for this mission should be prepared to provide at least a notional schedule for flights should we get indications that the GOA and neighboring countries are prepared to provide clearance. We stressed the number of sorties and timeframe envisaged under this concept of operations, but we should not expect to receive blanket clearance for all overflights. Having as much advance information on the flights as possible to share with the GOA would minimize the potential need to have to clear each and every mission with 14-days advance notice.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html<br />PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-51085477137765152482010-12-21T06:05:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:06:49.659-08:00Protestation de l'Algérie contre la liste noire, suite<pre>VZCZCXRO6018<br />OO RUEHTRO<br />DE RUEHAS #0039/01 0121750<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 121750Z JAN 10<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8323<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE<br />RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0078<br />RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0448<br />RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1515<br />RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0476<br />RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0013<br />RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0013<br />RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0247<br />RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0265<br />RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE<br />RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0001<br />RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0073<br />RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0008<br />RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 1463<br />RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0007<br />RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0082<br />RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0002<br />RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL IMMEDIATE 0001<br />RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0003<br />RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE<br />RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE<br />RHMFISS/TSA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE<br />RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0012<br />RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC IMMEDIATE<br />RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0577</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000039<br /><br />SIPDIS<br />NOFORN<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020<br />TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, MOPS, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FM: TSA LISTING “INTOLERABLE,<br />INAPPROPRIATE, INOPPORTUNE”<br /><br />REF: A. ALGIERS 20 (NOTAL) B. STATE 001187<br />ALGIERS 00000039 001.2 OF 004<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />Summary<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci January 11 summoned the Ambassador and forcefully objected to Algeria’s placement on the TSA enhanced screening list. He termed the decision intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It reflected neither the reality of Algeria’s security situation, its counterterrorism efforts nor our close bilateral cooperation. Further, the U.S. had not communicated the TSA decision to Algeria prior to releasing it to the press, which was how the GOA had learned of the measure. The GOA now had to contend with not only the collective humiliation felt by domestic opinion but also incomplete and inaccurate information regarding Algeria’s CT efforts circulating in the international press as a result of the story. Medelci reinforced the earlier MFA demarche (ref A) formally requesting removal from the list and a high-level U.S. statement to help correct the record regarding Algerian cooperation on counterterrorism. He pointedly asked the Ambassador to communicate this message to the Secretary and said the GOA would be monitoring the U.S. reaction closely. End Summary.<br /><br />TSA Decision Ignores Reality of CT Cooperation<br />--------------------------------------------- -<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S/NF) Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador to the MFA January 11 to underscore Algeria’s dissatisfaction with its placement on TSA’s enhanced screening list. Medelci began by noting he had had a productive visit to Washington in early December. He had been favorably impressed with both the quality and level of his meetings and had appreciated their focus on bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation. The visit had underscored the strategic importance of our countries’ counterterrorism partnership on this sensitive issue. “We are confident in the direction this cooperation is leading,” he remarked. “After my visit, I was eager to report my discussions in Washington to President Bouteflika, meetings which demonstrated that our relations have reached a new level.”<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S/NF) The discussions in Washington, he asserted, reflected the reality of the relationship. Algeria’s own struggle against terrorism and its contribution to defeat terrorists were well understood. It remained determined to continue that cooperation and reinforce the relationship with the U.S. “We are aware of the risks this threat poses. We must remain vigilant and preserve the progress that has been made,” Medelci said. The progress that both sides have made on the ground underscores the confidence and openness of the strategic partnership.<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) Therefore, the minister said, the GOA had been extremely disappointed with Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list, as well as the press coverage the decision had generated. The decision was intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It was a contradiction not only to Algeria’s<br />ALGIERS 00000039 002.2 OF 004<br />own progress on security and efforts to fight terrorism, but also to our countries’ counterterrorism cooperation. No attacks against the U.S. had been “signed” by an Algerian. Algeria had made major progress in recent years on its internal security. The domestic security environment had been stabilized, airports were secure, and Algeria was now an international partner in the fight against terrorism. TSA’s announcement had made no mention of any of this.<br /><br />Measures Viewed as Discriminatory<br />---------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) This was not just a matter of Algeria’s inclusion on the list, Medelci said. The GOA protested the discriminatory nature of the whole list. Thirteen of the 14 countries listed were Muslim. This sent a message that was inconsistent with President Obama’s Cairo speech, and the administration’s stated policy of outreach to Muslim communities. The decision will likely give further impetus to those who already question the sincerity of the administration’s approach.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S/NF) The GOA was also disappointed, Medelci continued, that the decision had not been communicated prior to its release and that the Algerian leadership had to learn of it via the media. The minister said the GOA had initially refrained from making a public statement out of concern for U.S. relations, but now, due to the extensive press play and sense of collective humiliation among the public, it felt it needed to respond.<br /><br />U.S. Focus on Air Travel Safety<br />-------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par7">¶</a>7. (S/NF) The Ambassador said the intention behind the TSA measures was not to harm or discriminate against any group or country, least of all our friends and partners. The intention was to make air travel as safe as possible for all. The problem was that, on Christmas day, a terrorist had gotten through the system. President Obama had reacted immediately, ordering reviews of both our watch list system and our air passenger screening measures. He had also made clear that our approach would not be static but would evolve as our evaluation of the risk evolved. Algeria’s concerns would be reported in full; Washington had already heard the message from Ambassador Baali. The Ambassador added that the U.S. understood well Algeria’s difficult history with terrorism and appreciated its leadership in the international fight against extremist violence. The U.S. wanted to continue, and build on, our very important counterterrorism cooperation as well as our new partnerships in other areas, including military relations, law enforcement, and economic and trade cooperation.<br /><br />Going Forward<br />-------------<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S/NF) Medelci said the GOA shared the desire to continue building our bilateral relationship. He reconfirmed GOA approval for a recent U.S. request to allow overflights of EP-3E surveillance aircraft. He also welcomed the visit of U.S. Attorney General Holder to conclude work on a mutual legal assistance treaty. The minister underscored as well the GOA’s readiness to assist with the upcoming Department of<br />ALGIERS 00000039 003.2 OF 004<br />Commerce trade mission to Algeria in February and offered to meet with the head of the U.S. delegation, schedule permitting. At the same time, he asked that the Ambassador convey his message on Algeria’s concerns about the TSA measures to Secretary Clinton. The GOA shared the U.S. desire to continue building the bilateral relationship. But it would also be watching closely to see how the U.S. responds to its stated concerns and looking forward to an “equitable solution”.<br /><br />GOA Statement<br />-------------<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par10">¶</a>10. (U) Below is Embassy’s informal translation of the statement issued January 11 by the Algerian MFA:<br />The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mourad Medelci, summoned Monday the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protest over the decision taken by U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals are subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports:<br />“In the wake of the decision taken by the U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals will be subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports, Foreign Affairs Minister Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protests over the unfortunate, unjustified, and discriminatory measure.<br />“This comes after several previous efforts that were deployed, once the TSA measures were known, by the central government and by our Ambassador in Washington with the relevant U.S. authorities.”<br />END INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF GOA STATEMENT.<br /><br />COMMENT<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par11" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par11">¶</a>11. (S/NF) The past year has seen developments in important new areas of government-to-government cooperation. These include:<br />-- Approval for visits by senior Department of Defense visitors, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston and the first by AFRICOM Commander General Ward. These have significantly improved the substance of our mil-mil engagement.<br />-- Prompt agreement to allow U.S. military overflights for surveillance aircraft against AQIM targets in the Sahel.<br />-- Repatriation of eight Algerian Guantanamo detainees since 2008 and agreement to cooperate on the return of the remaining Algerian detainees.<br />-- Bilateral cooperation on judicial matters; a mutual legal assistance treaty and a customs agreement are both ready for signature.<br />ALGIERS 00000039 004.2 OF 004<br />-- Cooperation with our new legatt office, including on a cybercrime investigation that will protect American citizens from hackers and identity thieves.<br />-- Improved police contacts and access for RSO, which plans to launch an anti-terrorism assistance program this year.<br /><br /><a id="par12" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par12">¶</a>12. (S/NF) On the commercial side, the U.S. exported about USD 400 million in oil field equipment and services to Algeria in 2008 and imported USD 19 billion worth of Algerian oil and natural gas. And our commercial interests are rapidly expanding beyond the hydrocarbons sector. Algeria signed two contracts, totaling USD 847 million, in December 2009, to purchase 11 Boeing aircraft. These were presidential decisions, made in the face of heavy French pressure for Airbus. A U.S. firm, Solar Turbines, concluded a USD 320-million contract in October 2009 with Algeria’s state electricity company to supply gas-fired turbines. U.S. companies are also competing for politically sensitive security contracts. Cogent, a U.S. biometrics company, is close to signing a USD 45-million deal to supply the Ministry of Interior with an automated fingerprint identification system but faces heavy competition from France. Harris Radio is bidding on a contract with a potential value of USD 500 million to manufacture and supply radios for Algeria’s defense ministry and signals corps. The Harris and Cogent contracts have significant implications for U.S. commercial and security interests.<br /><br /><a id="par13" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html#par13">¶</a>13. (S/NF) It is noteworthy that Medelci began and ended this conversation by stressing the importance the Algerian leadership attaches to continuing bilateral cooperation, especially on counterterrorism. But in-between, however, he delivered an unmistakable message that the GOA feels the TSA moves are inconsistent with that relationship and that they will be watching closely to see how we respond to this demarche. Over the past year, we have had a green light to develop important new ties across the board, from military to law enforcement. That light has now turned yellow. PEARCE<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS39.html<br /></pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-83439784393739584492010-12-21T06:04:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:05:12.441-08:00Protestation de l'Algérie contre son inscription sur une liste noire<pre>VZCZCXYZ0008<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #0020/01 0061738<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 061738Z JAN 10<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8302<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 000020<br /><br />SIPDIS<br />NOFORN<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2020<br />TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINR, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING<br /><br />REF: ALGIERS 15 (NOTAL)<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />Summary<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum expressed to the Ambassador January 6 the GOA’s “profound dismay” regarding Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list for enhanced screening. He said this message came directly from President Bouteflika. The TSA decision, Boukadoum stressed, did not accurately reflect the level and quality of our bilateral relations, especially in regard to counterterrorism cooperation. Algeria’s placement on the list had created the impression that Algeria was part of the problem, a misunderstanding that is now circulating in the international press. Boukadoum told the Ambassador that Algeria’s leadership would like an official U.S. statement to correct this impression. Ambassador replied that the intent of the new measures was to ensure air travel safety and not to discriminate or embarrass our friends and partners. Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and hoped the bilateral relationship would continue to grow and develop. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />GOA Not Pleased, Seeks Removal from List<br />----------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum called the Ambassador to the MFA on January 6 to deliver instructions expressing the “profound dismay” of Algeria’s highest authorities at Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list of countries subject to new air passenger screening measures. MFA Director for the Protection of Algerian Citizens Overseas Hocine Sahraoui, a representative of the presidency, Houria Khiari, and U.S. desk officer Abdulmutalib Bouacha also attended. Boukadoum stressed several times at the outset of the meeting that his demarche instructions came directly from the “highest authority” -- i.e., President Bouteflika.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) Boukadoum told the Ambassador that he had been asked to convey two main points. The first concerned Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list. Algeria respected and understood the U.S. need to secure the safety of its citizens and interests. But Algeria’s inclusion on this list did not accurately reflect either the level or the quality of our bilateral relations, and especially the nature of those relations with regard to the fight against terrorism. The placement of Algeria on a list that includes state sponsors of terrorism and countries of interest creates the impression that Algeria is part of the problem and less than a full partner in the fight against terrorism.<br /><br />GOA Seeks U.S. Statement on Algeria as Key CT Partner<br />--------------------------------------------- --------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) The second point, he said, besides the GOA’s desire to be removed from the list, was that the country’s leadership hoped to see an official U.S. statement that would underscore Algeria’s important counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. -- in order to help correct the erroneous image of Algeria that had been created by coverage of the TSA story in the international media and on the Internet. “We are partners,” he said. “The highest levels did not appreciate this.”<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par5">¶</a>5. (C) Boukadoum said Algeria’s Ambassador to the U.S. Abdullah Baali would deliver the same message in Washington. Baali also had instructions to see Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano.<br /><br />U.S. Focus is on Air Travel Safety<br />----------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) The Ambassador said GOA views would be reported fully and immediately to Washington. He told Boukadoum that President Obama had addressed the issue squarely in a statement the previous day. The problem was that on Christmas Day a terrorist had gotten through. This had been a systemic failure, and as a result the President had ordered two reviews -- one of our watch list system, and another of aviation screening procedures. The intent of the new measures was not to discriminate against or embarrass any persons, groups, or countries, and most especially not our friends and partners. The intent was to do the necessary to ensure air travel safety, for everyone. President Obama had thus made clear on January 5 that he had personally ordered, and approved, the new measures. And he had promised that more steps could be on the way in coming days, whether with regard to information integration or passenger screening.<br /><br />U.S. Values Counterterrorism Cooperation with Algeria<br />--------------------------------------------- --------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador continued, the President also had made clear that an important part of our approach would be to deepen cooperation with our international partners. This was where Algeria, and US-Algerian cooperation, came in. The Ambassador noted that we have worked together to improve both the quality and level of our bilateral exchanges in recent years, and he hoped that trend would continue. It was unnecessary to say how much the United States valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria, as well as our overall relationship with Algeria. We hoped to continue to develop and build on the progress that has been made.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par8">¶</a>8. (C) Boukadoum reiterated that Algeria’s disagreement was not with the measures themselves. Rather Algeria protested its inclusion on TSA’s list because it gives the impression that Algeria is not cooperating. “We are cooperating on counterterrorism, and we will continue to do so,” he stated. Meanwhile, Boukadoum asserted that other countries with nationals who have committed terrorist acts have not been placed on the list. Boukadoum argued that to suggest that Algeria is part of the problem is simply unfair. He regretted that international press coverage of the TSA screening measures had cast Algeria in this light and not as country that is a victim of terrorism.<br /><br />Comment<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S/NF) A key line in this demarche was the point that Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list “does not reflect the level and quality of our relations, or the nature of our relations in the fight against terrorism”. With this, the GOA implicitly brought the quality of the entire relationship into play. What grates is that, instead of being seen as a nation that has suffered from terrorism and as an active leader in combating it, they feel instead cast as part of the problem and associated with state sponsors. This sense of damage to Algeria’s international reputation, and especially by the way the story has pinged around in the press and on the Internet, is what undoubtedly fueled President Bouteflika’s “profound dismay”. That said, it is encouraging that Algeria carefully separated the meeting yesterday -- to inform us of their approval of EP-3 overflights by Africa Command against AQIM in the Sahel -- and the meeting today on the TSA issue. This suggests they are trying to separate issues and limit damage. But domestic and regional public opinion does count, so the leadership will want to redress somehow what they perceive as a blow to their national dignity and international prestige. Hence the request that a senior U.S. official make a statement that will help turn around the negative image in the international media.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10ALGIERS20.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S/NF) It is worth remembering that no country is more important than Algeria in the fight against al-Qa’ida in the Sahel and Maghreb. So it is probably worth looking for a good chance to make that point publicly, and at as high a level as possible. If we do not, it is doubtful that we would see any dramatic gestures or sudden moves by Algeria. On the contrary, counterterrorism cooperation would probably continue, to the extent it is in the interest of both sides. It would more likely be a matter of what we don’t see - mil-mil relations frozen instead of advancing, efforts to expand law enforcement cooperation slowed, large commercial contracts going to non-U.S. bidders, reduced Embassy access to senior officials, and generally less receptivity to coordination on regional issues and in multilateral fora. PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-83672268724494420332010-12-21T06:03:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:04:00.987-08:00Demande de survol de l'espace aérien algérien par des avions US<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1162 3641633<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 301633Z DEC 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8283<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 1060<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6822<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2813<br />RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY<br />RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001162<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 12/30/2024<br />TAGS PREL, PINR, MOPS, KCOM, AG, US<br />SUBJECT: OVER-FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR AFRICOM EP-3 MISSIONS:<br />PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN RESPONSE<br />REF: SECSTATE 130969<br /><br />Classified By: DCM William Jordan for reasons 1.4. (b), (d).<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) OSC Chief delivered reftel request for EP-3 overflight permission to the Algerian Defense Ministry’s Office of External Relations and Cooperation (DREC) on December 29. There was no immediate response, but the DREC summoned OSC Chief for a follow-up meeting December 30 to state that (1) no decision was possible before next week and (2) overflight requests generally require two-weeks advance notice before they can be approved.<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par2">¶</a>2. (S/NF) DCM, on December 30, double-tracked the request with Algerian MFA DG for the Americas Sabri Boukadoum. In presenting the message, DCM stressed (1) that the request was intended to survey the SIGINT environment in areas of Mauritania and Mali where AQIM operates, (2) that, without knowing what that survey would yield, the USG could not make any commitments ahead of time as to what data it might share with the GOA, and (3) that the request should be regarded in large measure as a follow-up to the recent visit by AFRICOM Commander General Ward and a demonstration of the enhanced security cooperation we want to support in the face of the AQIM threat in the trans-Sahara region. He further explained that we had made the same request to other governments in the region and were awaiting their responses.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S/NF) Boukadoum asked for information on the expected flight path of the EP-3 over Algerian airspace (DCM confirmed that, departing from Rota, the flights would likely overfly the southwestern corner near Tindouf), whether the aircraft would seek to overfly Mauritania and Mali on each mission (DCM responded that the missions would be divided between those principally flying over Mali or Mauritania but not both), and whether collection would occur inside Algerian airspace (DCM reiterated the notation in reftel that the aircraft would not collect on AQIM in Algeria unless the GOA specifically requested it).<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) As with the DREC, Boukadoum indicated that we should not expect a definitive answer before next week. He agreed, however, to forward our request up his hierarchy immediately. Boukadoum expected that the highest levels of the GOA would consider the request.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) Comment: Although post will be closed for the New Year holiday from COB December 30, our interlocutors know how to reach key Embassy POCs if and as necessary before we reopen on Sunday, January 3. In the meantime, and given the DREC’s stress on the longstanding requirement for two-weeksQ, notice prior to any overflight, operational planners for this mission should be prepared to provide at least a notional schedule for flights should we get indications that the GOA and neighboring countries are prepared to provide clearance. We stressed the number of sorties and timeframe envisaged under this concept of operations, but we should not expect to receive blanket clearance for all overflights. Having as much advance information on the flights as possible to share with the GOA would minimize the potential need to have to clear each and every mission with 14-days advance notice.<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html<br />PEARCE</pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-7499936157152749622010-12-21T06:02:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:03:15.133-08:00Bouteflika demande une relations stratégique avec Washington<pre>VZCZCXYZ0001<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1077/01 3400757<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 060757Z DEC 09<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8190<br />INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE<br />RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE 1048<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 1989<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 6814<br />RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1259</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001077<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019<br />TAGS: <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/PBTS_0.html">PBTS</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KPAL_0.html">KPAL</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/KWBG_0.html">KWBG</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/US_0.html">US</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IR_0.html">IR</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IZ_0.html">IZ</a> <a href="http://213.251.145.96/tag/IS_0.html">IS</a><br />AF, XA<br />SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC<br />RELATIONSHIP<br /><br />Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Jordan;<br />reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).<br /><br />Summary<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General<br />William Ward met Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika<br />November 25, during Ward's first visit to Algeria since<br />assuming command of AFRICOM. Ward said AFRICOM's strategy<br />was to assist African nations in providing for their own<br />security needs, not do the job for them. The U.S. recognized<br />Algeria's leadership in the region, and AFRICOM was prepared<br />to assist Algeria and its neighbors combat terrorism.<br />Bouteflika said Algeria wanted to be a strategic partner, not<br />an adversary. Our military relationship already included<br />training and technical cooperation. End-use-monitoring<br />requirements infringed on Algeria's national sovereignty and<br />therefore imposed some limits on military engagement. But<br />the U.S. and Algeria shared a common goal in combating<br />terrorism. Terrorism in the region had taken a dangerous<br />form, and Sahel countries were prepared to address the<br />problem jointly. More needed to be done to ensure the<br />participation and commitment of Mali's political leadership<br />in the regional struggle. Bouteflika told Ward the Malian<br />president needed to understand he could not be friends with<br />both the thieves and their victims at the same time.<br />Trans-Sahara heads of state still planned to convene a<br />security and development summit in Bamako but had yet to set<br />a firm date. Bouteflika also reviewed Egyptian-Algerian<br />tensions in the aftermath of a World Cup qualifying match,<br />Western Sahara, the negative repercussions of Israeli<br />settlement activities, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the<br />soccer issue, he made a point of telling Ward that the king<br />of Morocco -- in contrast to the strain with Egypt -- had<br />sent him a very warm congratulatory message after the game.<br />At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika invited Ward to return<br />to Algeria in the near future. End summary.<br /><br />Addressing Common Challenges<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) Visiting Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General<br />William Ward met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika<br />November 25 at the presidential residence. With Bouteflika<br />were Chief of Staff of the Algerian National Popular Army<br />(ANP) Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid-Salah, Ministry of<br />National Defense (MND) Director of External Relations and<br />Cooperation General Nourredine Mekri, ANP Chief of<br />Organization and Logistics Major General Abdelhamid Ghriss<br />and a translator. The Ambassador, General Ward's foreign<br />policy advisor, Dr. Raymond Brown, the DATT and Poloff<br />(notetaker) accompanied General Ward to the meeting, which<br />lasted two hours. Ward emphasized that his visit to Algiers<br />was symbolic of our countries' growing bilateral<br />relationship. Africa Command's mission was to assist African<br />nations address their own security challenges, not to do it<br />for them. The purpose of his visit, Ward said, was to listen<br />to Algeria's perspective on enhancing our cooperation as we<br />seek ways to work together to address common challenges in<br />Africa. Ward recognized that these challenges were complex<br />and required development and political solutions, not just<br />military intervention. Going forward, we sought to cooperate<br />in areas that Algeria determines are priorities. AFRICOM<br />welcomed the regional counterterrorism efforts Algeria has<br />engaged in with neighboring Sahel countries. Algeria is<br />leading the effort; we will work with Algeria and its<br />neighbors to assist in eliminating the terrorist threat in<br />the region.<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) President Bouteflika said that the United States and<br />Algeria shared a common objective and the will to work<br />cooperatively in the fight against terrorism. Bouteflika<br />noted the U.S. and Algeria started to work more closely<br />together during the Clinton administration when both sides<br />came to realize they were fighting the same problem.<br />Bouteflika underscored that after 9/11, Algeria was the first<br />Arab and Muslim country to send a message of solidarity to<br />President Bush. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of<br />some Bush policies, political and economic relations between<br />our countries improved. Today, relations were excellent, he<br />said, noting that Algeria was the United States' second<br />largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia<br />and our largest trading partner in Africa. President Obama's<br />new approach to U.S. foreign policy was "a breath of fresh<br />air" and well regarded by developing world countries. But<br />this meant there were also high expectations for his<br />administration. Bouteflika predicted that our bilateral<br />relationship would continue in a positive direction. He<br />commented that the U.S. and Algeria were moving forward with<br />cooperation, recognizing the value of dialogue across all<br />leadership levels. In this regard, Bouteflika declared he<br />was ready to assist Ward and invited him to visit Algeria<br />again.<br /><br />Military Cooperation<br />--------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S) Bouteflika attached importance to Algeria's<br />military-military cooperation with the United States but<br />noted that U.S. end-use monitoring requirements contravened<br />Algeria's national sovereignty. Nonetheless, we had made<br />progress on training and technical cooperation. Bouteflika<br />said the capabilities of U.S. and Algerian forces were well<br />understood in the region. Bouteflika argued that frank,<br />direct talks were the key to a successful military dialogue,<br />as well as recognizing that, in some cases, there would be<br />limits on the extent of cooperation. "Tell us what you want,<br />and we will tell you what we can do." Algeria, he continued,<br />wanted to be a strategic partner for the U.S. in the region,<br />not an adversary.<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) General Ward thanked Bouteflika for his candid<br />assessment of our mil-mil relationship. He said the<br />President, secretaries of State and Defense, and US Joint<br />Chiefs of Staff, all recognized the value of the US-Algeria<br />partnership. Bouteflika responded that he would help us to<br />consolidate that partnership. Ward argued that to enhance<br />our partnership, Algeria needed to tell us how we can<br />contribute best to achieve mutual objectives. Despite the<br />bad things sometimes said about AFRICOM, Ward said with a<br />smile, his command had not been created to take over Africa.<br />Without missing a beat, Bouteflika replied with an even<br />bigger smile that he had been unsure about this himself until<br />Ward came. Ward said that, as we continue our military<br />dialogue, we want to do the things Algeria tells us are<br />important. Ward affirmed Algeria had long recognized the<br />challenge of extremism and demonstrated its ability to fight<br />back. AFRICOM would do its part to support Algeria and its<br />neighbors in this effort. Addressing Bouteflika's point on<br />end-use-monitoring requirements, Ward suggested focusing our<br />efforts in areas where cooperation was possible, i.e.,<br />training and equipping. He acknowledged that some U.S. laws<br />and regulations may preclude for now Algeria's participation<br />in other forms of engagement.<br /><br />Civil-Military Relations<br />------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S) Bouteflika underscored that Algeria's military<br />"absolutely" respected the authority of civilian leadership.<br />"This is not at all like Turkey," he said. Bouteflika<br />asserted that the army was forced to take drastic measures<br />during the violence of the 1990s in order to save the<br />country. This was a difficult period, but constitutional<br />rule had been restored. "The house is now in order," he<br />stressed, "and I can tell you that the army obeys the<br />civilians. There is one constitution and all obey it."<br />Bouteflika acknowledged, however, that the problems of the<br />past still haunted the country. He cited foreign press<br />reports referring to Algeria as a dictatorship and argued<br />that the term was sometimes used carelessly. The Algerian<br />constitution had established the rule of law. In 2004 it was<br />decided that there was no more historical "revolutionary<br />legitimacy". The only legitimacy was the constitution.<br />"Anyone can be a candidate for election, in accordance with<br />the constitution, even a general." He paused, then grinned<br />and said, "but the generals realize the difficulties and none<br />has been a candidate yet."<br /><br />Counterterrorism<br />----------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) Bouteflika said terrorism in Africa had taken a<br />dangerous form. The situation in Somalia was hopeless, he<br />commented. Meanwhile, the Sahel region presented a complex<br />set of issues. Fortunately, most Sahel countries were<br />determined to cooperate and have the capability to fight the<br />threat if they work together. Mauritania expressed a clear<br />commitment as did Niger, although Bouteflika recognized U.S.<br />concerns with President Tandja. Mali's full cooperation<br />remained elusive, however. Mali's policies have failed to<br />create stability in the north. The result is a lawless<br />environment in which smuggling, along with arms and drug<br />trafficking, enable terrorism. Bouteflika said the region<br />was prepared to tackle this problem, and bilateral and<br />regional efforts were already underway. In this regard,<br />Algeria was closely monitoring U.S. military assistance to<br />Mali and Niger.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) Ward told Bouteflika that he planned to visit Bamako<br />after Algiers and would encourage Mali's leaders to cooperate<br />in the region's counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. was<br />providing military assistance to Mali, and we hoped it<br />complemented the work Algeria was doing. Ward emphasized<br />that, ultimately, defeating terrorism was the responsibility<br />of the region. Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for<br />U.S. assistance to Mali and said Algeria also provided aid,<br />including some equipment. Bouteflika urged the U.S. to tell<br />Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure that "he cannot be a<br />friend to the thieves and victims at the same time." Many in<br />Mali's security services shared the same concern, Bouteflika<br />asserted. In the past, he said, Algeria has waited for the<br />chance to debrief terrorist suspects held in Mali, only to<br />find out later that Malian officials were conducting<br />negotiations for the terrorist's release back to the<br />terrorist organizations at the same time. "It is difficult<br />to cooperate in these conditions," he said. Despite<br />difficulties, Bouteflika said regional leaders still planned<br />to convene a security and development summit in Bamako. All<br />agreed on the need for the summit, he said, but there was<br />still no set date. Bouteflika said that Algeria would be<br />open to sharing information with the U.S. regarding Algeria's<br />cooperation with its neighbors. General Ward said AFRICOM<br />would do the same for Algeria regarding U.S. initiatives in<br />the region.<br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br /><a id="par16" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html#par16">¶</a>16. (S) The Ward-Bouteflika meeting was significant in a<br />number of respects. The Algerian president spoke repeatedly<br />of his readiness to build a strategic relationship with the<br />US. He transmitted clear readiness for closer coordination<br />and contact on Sahel counter-terrorism issues. The simple<br />fact of the meeting with the president was itself a green<br />light to the military bureaucracy on stepped-up bilateral<br />military cooperation. Not least, the warm and high-level<br />official reception provided a powerful antidote to the<br />persistent negative mythology about Africa Command since the<br />command's rollout. It was also noteworthy that, in the<br />presence of three generals, including the chief of staff,<br />Bouteflika spoke assertively to Ward about civilian control<br />of the military. He described the revolutionary origins of<br />military influence in Algeria, said this so-called<br />revolutionary legitimacy ended in 2004, and the military now<br />obeys the civilians and they all obey the constitution. In<br />the course of his regional political review, Bouteflika<br />delivered Algeria's views on Western Sahara in familiar<br />terms. But in doing so, he also struck an unusually<br />positive note about Morocco and the king's message. Clearly,<br />in the context of the high emotions stirred in Algeria over<br />the controversial World Cup contest with Egypt, Mohammed VI's<br />message of congratulations struck a chord with Bouteflika.<br /><br /><br />JORDAN<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html<br /></pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-21143142857683273312010-12-21T06:01:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:02:24.687-08:00Attaques kamikazes et situation sécuritaire<pre>VZCZCXYZ0000<br />OO RUEHWEB<br /><br />DE RUEHAS #1809/01 3541012<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />O 201012Z DEC 07<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5028<br />INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0358<br />RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8739<br />RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1408<br />RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6154<br />RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2473<br />RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2084<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 6941<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3188<br />RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T ALGIERS 001809<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2027<br />TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, AG<br />SUBJECT: AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A<br />LONG HAUL<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par1">¶</a>1. (S) SUMMARY: The December 11 bombings in Algiers demonstrate that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) can adapt its tactics to discredit the Algerian government even if it cannot destabilize the state. Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by Al-Qaida in Iraq and we expect in the future to see AQIM resort to operations such as kidnapping, attacks by women suicide bombers and more suicide vests, for example. The Algerian security forces appeared to enjoy some success dampening AQIM operations in October and November, but there is no sign that they can completely secure the capital. Indeed, they are warning in public and private that they cannot. Their public line is, therefore, that the country must soldier on even with the occasional terrorist atrocity. Behind closed doors, however, the December 11 bombings have opened a debate about whether President Bouteflika’s amnesty program is appropriate or not; some in the security services want to cast it aside and use an iron fist. According to the Portuguese ambassador, who joined his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, the Algerian president appeared shaken and unsure of how to respond to the bombings. His advisors appear glum, and Bouteflika himself has yet to say anything to the nation in the wake of the bombings. Looking forward, we see a terror organization able to adapt and shift tactics and targets facing a government that easily holds military superiority but is not exactly sure what more it can or should do. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent new attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. Thus, the security situation could stay roughly as it is now, or it might deteriorate further; we do not expect it to improve. Our contacts all expect more terror attacks, although none knows when or what form they will take. Al-Qaida tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. The Embassy has already adopted stricter security measures for staff and dependents and is urging the non-official American community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will have to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. END SUMMARY.<br /><br />----------------------------<br />AQIM IS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM<br />----------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par2">¶</a>2. (SBU) AQIM is using a variety of tactics to keep the Algerian government guessing and that are slowly raising concerns among the foreign community and the broader public in Algiers. The following list shows the evolution of AQIM tactics:<br />-- Summer 2006: ambushes with roadside bombs and gunfire against Algerian army patrols in the mountains east of Algiers;<br />-- October 2006: first car bombs in years in the Algiers region, hitting two police stations;<br />-- December 2006: first attack on foreigners in years, using a roadside bomb to hit a U.S.-Algerian company bus in Algiers suburb, killing two (no Amcits);<br />-- February 2007: multiple, coordinated, powerful car bombs in towns scattered in the mountains outside Algiers;<br />-- March 2007: another roadside bomb against a bus full of foreigners, this time a Russian company bus west of Algiers;<br />-- April 2007: suicide van and truck bombs simultaneously hit Prime Minister’s offices in downtown Algiers and destroy a police station east of the city center near the airport; there were two suicide vehicles against the police station in a tactic very similar to that seen in Iraq;<br />-- July 2007: suicide truck bomb hits Algerian army base at Lakhdaria, east of Algiers, killing dozens of soldiers;<br />-- September 2007: another suicide truck bomb, this one driven by a 15 year old, hits Algerian coast guard base at Dellys, east of Algiers, again killing dozens; -- September 2007: first suicide vest attack, this one directly targeting President Bouteflika in Batna, 200 miles east of Algiers;<br />-- September 2007: drive-by suicide car bomb attack on a French/Italian company convoy in the mountains east of Algiers<br />-- September 2007: suspected planning of a kidnapping of two French nationals working at the Algiers airport leads to the sudden departure of the two men;<br />-- December 2007: roadside bomb attack again targets a Russian company bus west of Algiers;<br />-- December 2007: simultaneous suicide truck bombs destroy UN offices and damage Supreme Court building in central Algiers; one of the truck drivers was 64 years old, something heretofore unseen here.<br /><br />---------------------------------------------<br />EXPECT MORE ATTACK METHOD VARIATION A LA IRAQ<br />---------------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par3">¶</a>3. (S) The Al-Qaida in Iraq network, which already has ties to jihadi groups in Algeria, has strong influence on AQIM elements. The suicide bomber in July 2007 was nicknamed “Abu Musaab” because he was so enamored with Zarqawi in Iraq. The AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq in terms of the music, Quranic citations and filming of hits on enemy targets they show. They strongly pitch the alleged American wrongdoings in Iraq and Palestine to recruit men to join AQIM. AQIM is also copying tactics we have seen in Iraq, including use of suicide vehicle bombs and vests. (Comment: Notably, during the 1990s violence in Algeria, there was only one suicide attack. We have now seen nine since April 2007. End Comment.) Water Resources Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, who previously held top jobs in the Interior Ministry, warned Ambassador on December 16 that it would be easy to imagine AQIM resorting to SVBIEDs driven by women or women attacking a target wearing a suicide bomb vest. Security officers at other embassies have pointed to the use of kidnappings in Iraq and worry that AQIM could actively start such a campaign in Algeria. Historically, AQIM has paused between vehicle bomb attacks, although we do not know if that is due to resource constraints or tactical decisions. History suggests we may have a pause lasting as long as months before the next car bomb attack, although it could be much sooner. In any case, our intelligence is incomplete and we may not see the next attack, in whatever form it takes, coming.<br /><br />-----------------------------------<br />IRAQ AND PALESTINE HELP RECRUITMENT<br />-----------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par4">¶</a>4. (C) A prominent conservative Islamist political leader, Abdallah Djaballah, told the Ambassador on December 17 that the suicide attacks demonstrated the influence of the Iraqi jihadis whose appeal to religious sensitivities finds a ready audience here. In addition, he noted, Islamist extremists released under the government’s amnesty program are hugely frustrated because they can find no jobs and lack any means to support themselves. They are easy to recruit, he claimed. AQIM’s choice to put a video of Ayman Zawahari ranting about Palestine last week is likely to further boost recruitment. The website has had over 35,000 hits in a week. Djaballah warned that many young Algerians react strongly to any suggestion that foreign forces are attacking Islam itself, and Palestine, along with Iraq, is the perfect symbol. Jaghloul Abdelghafar, a counselor at the Presidency working on extremism issues, echoed the point about Algeria suffering because of Palestine and Iraq to the Ambassador December 18. He stated that there is a “hard-core five percent” that will always plague Algeria. Political scientist Lyes Boukraa, who has written two books about the terrorism phenomenon in Algeria, told DCM December 18 that he thought the terror groups have more potential recruits than they need.<br /><br />-------------------------------------<br />ALGERIAN SECURITY FORCES: FRUSTRATED<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S) The Algerian government is trying to figure out how best to contain and eliminate the extremist problem.<br />Algerian military forces conducted major sweeping operations in the troublesome mountains east of Algiers as well as along the eastern border region near Tebessa in November. They also continued to try wrapping up AQIM support networks and, until the December 11 bombings, they appeared to be having some successes. The number of security force casualties reported in the press dropped steadily in October and November 2007 from the spike seen in September 2007 due to the AQIM suicide attack in Dellys. In contrast to 1994-1996, the Algerian army and gendarmerie can deploy to any location in the country and immediately establish control. AQIM in its December 12 communique felt obliged to tell the government very directly that it had not disappeared.<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par6">¶</a>6. (C) The government now is warning the public that it cannot completely contain the terrorist threat. Interior Minister Zerhouni told the press after the December 11 bombings that there was no such thing as perfect security posture since bomb attacks were so easy. Other terror attacks are possible even though the terror groups are weakening, Zerhouni told the press December 12. He also commented that the security forces had relaxed somewhat after their successful security measures for the November 29 local elections, and the suicide bombers had exploited that opening. Head of the Defense Ministry’s External Relations Director General Sefendji told DATT on December 17 that the Algerian military had enjoyed successes in combined air-ground operations against terrorist groups in mountainous areas, but they could not stop suicide attacks in Algiers. National police chief (DGSN director) Ali Tounsi told the press on December 15 that the security services had put in place special measures to protect the Constitutional Council in view of the threat information the GOA had. However, he commented, there was no way to protect against such an “exceptional” attack. Tounsi pledged that the GOA would stand up new, stronger security measures in Algiers in the wake of the December 11 bombings. Pressed by Ambassador for details about the measures on December 18, Tounsi would only say that police reinforcements would surge into the capital in the coming days. He declined to give more details but said he would consider the Ambassador’s strong suggestion that the DGSN brief the key ambassadors about the new security plan. (Comment: Tounsi appeared not entirely on top of the brief and probably couldn’t have provided many details even if he had wanted to. The Interior Ministry is avoiding repeated requests from embassies for information on Interior Ministry plans and operations. End Comment.)<br /><br />-----------------------<br />HARD LINE OR SOFT TOUCH ?<br />-----------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par7">¶</a>7. (S) Water Resources Minister Sellal, who is often rumored to be on a short list to be the next prime minister, told Ambassador December 16 that the GOA ought to strike much harder against the terrorists than it is doing. He was entirely in favor of the iron fist, he stated flatly. However, he noted, current political reality (“la conjuncture politique”) does not allow for such a tough policy. Indeed, Prime Minister Belkhadem had reiterated on December 12 that Bouteflika’s signature national reconciliation program would continue. Ahmed Fattani, publisher of L’Expression newspaper who has good contacts in the security services, told Ambassador December 17 that many in the security forces want to launch a broad campaign of arrests. For this reason, he said, they leaked to him information that some 250 of the Islamist extremists previously released under President Bouteflika’s amnesty program had rejoined the AQIM fight against the government. Fattani claimed that some in the security services said the number was even higher, but L’Expression used the 250 number so as not to anger Bouteflika further.<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) Bouteflika himself has made no public remarks in the wake of the December 11 bombings. The Portuguese ambassador, who accompanied his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, told the Ambassador on December 18 that Bouteflika appeared very distressed by the Algiers bombings and unsure of what to do. According to the Portuguese, Bouteflika urged Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates to convince European states to help the Algerian security services. Bouteflika reportedly asked for advice on how to secure fixed sites and sought help from the Europeans to tap cell phones whose SIM cards are changed. One of Bouteflika’s aides, Rachid Aissat, who was the Algerian DATT in Damascus and Moscow in the 1960s, earnestly asked the Ambassador on December 16 for help in countering car bombs. The GOA, he conceded, had no good sense of how to respond. (Comment: Many of our contacts interpret Bouteflika’s silence since December 11 to his embarrassment that both suicide bombers were previously known to the security services and had benefited from the provisions of the national reconciliation program. End Comment.)<br /><br />-------<br />COMMENT<br />-------<br /><br /><a id="par9" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par9">¶</a>9. (S) AQIM is very far from being able to bring down the Algerian government but it can certainly make it look weak and foolish. From a narrow security perspective, the December 11 attacks represent not so much the result of diminished Algerian security capabilities as a successful change in AQIM targeting to hit the UN and the Constitutional Council. Security and military contacts have been asking us for a technological fix for the car bomb threat for months. They do not seem to fully appreciate the fact that they are now fight an al-Qaida group, and not just the old Algerian terrorist group GSPC of the late 1990s. AQIM subscribes to international jihadist goals as well as attacking the Algerian government. The more success the GOA has killing the senior terrorist leaders from the GSPC, the more quickly the newer amirs recruited under the al-Qaida banner will rise to the forefront.<br /><br /><a id="par10" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html#par10">¶</a>10. (S) Looking forward, we can imagine that the security situation could stay roughly as it is now or deteriorate; we do not expect it to improve. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent more terrorist attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. AQIZ tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. Meanwhile, the GOA is slow at best to share information with us. As a result, the Embassy has taken stricter security measures for staff and dependents, and upgraded security of our chancellery and main staff residence. We are telling the non-official community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will need to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. FORD<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1809.html<br /></pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4104564207779964883.post-15628249759062143632010-12-21T06:00:00.000-08:002010-12-21T06:01:05.109-08:00Analyse sur l'Algérie avant la visite d'un haut responsable de l'Etat américain<pre>VZCZCXRO5451<br />PP RUEHCD<br />DE RUEHAS #0198/01 0531128<br />ZNY SSSSS ZZH<br />P 221128Z FEB 08 ZDS<br />FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS<br />TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5295<br />INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2178<br />RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7030<br />RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3265<br />RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE</pre> <code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000198<br /><br />SIPDIS<br /><br />C O R R E C T E D COPY --CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION<br /><br />NOFORN<br />SIPDIS<br /><br />NEA FOR K.HARRINGTON AND M.POPAL<br /><br />EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2023<br />TAGS PREL, PGOV, AG<br /><br />SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA<br />REF: A. ALGIERS 111 B. ALGIERS 110 AND ALGIERS 140 C. 07 ALGIERS 1806 D. 07 ALGIERS 1807 AND 08 ALGIERS 0075 E. ALGIERS 141<br /><br />Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)<br /><br /><a id="par1" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par1">¶</a>1. (C) We and the Algerians are looking forward to your visit next week. There was a prominent article about your visit, generated with help from our PAO, in best-selling el-Khabar newspaper on February 21. You will be visiting just as the government machine is gearing up to amend the Algerian constitution to enable President Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. There is no strong, influential voice criticizing this effort; only small parties and a few notable individuals have spoken against the building momentum (ref A). The only issue that appears unresolved inside the top civilian and military leadership is whether or not there should be a change to the constitution that establishes a vice president as well. This vice president would be the obvious successor to Bouteflika, especially if his health prevents him from serving out a third term that would expire in 2014. We are arranging for you to meet with former Prime Minister Ouyahia, the man most frequently thought to be tapped for vice president.<br /><br />AN UNHAPPY COUNTRY<br />------------------<br /><br /><a id="par2" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par2">¶</a>2. (C) There is much discussion among political circles about the constitution, the third term and the succession issue, but precious little discussion about how to address long-standing political alienation and social discontent throughout the country. Housing is woefully short, while unemployment and underemployment are endemic (at least 50 percent among young people). In a relatively new phenomenon, many young people are trying to flee the country, by small boat if necessary. The average age at which Algerians marry is now into the mid 30s - a vivid indicator of how unhappy the twenty-somethings are. Meanwhile, most world food price hikes are being passed to consumers, resulting in strikes by different labor groups almost weekly (see ref B for example. Notably, while you are here we expect school teachers nationwide to strike; on the positive side, school closures may ease traffic during your visit, inshallah.) Almost daily there are isolated demonstrations with the occasional government office in some distant town attacked. Meanwhile, voter turnout for the 2007 legislative and local elections was lower than ever before because Algeria’s young people do not see the political system as having any relevance to addressing their problems. This is not the quaking state of the early 1990s. The government is firmly entrenched. However, much of political and social elite sense that Algeria is drifting (see also ref C).<br /><br />THE VISION THING<br />----------------<br /><br /><a id="par3" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par3">¶</a>3. (C) These political, economic and social problems notwithstanding, Algeria is richer than ever. The oil and gas sector is running up record export revenues - USD 70 billion likely in 2007, while imports will only be about USD 45 billion, according to the IMF. As a result, the GoA is piling up record foreign exchange reserves, now around USD 110 billion. The public knows about the riches and the GoA’s inability to relieve problems like housing and unemployment hits at the GoA’s credibility. Bouteflika and his team have only one approach to energize the economy: spend tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure as well as some grandiose projects to generate jobs and also create a Bouteflika legacy. The construction industry is growing but not as fast as in other oil-boom states. Red tape, burdensome regulations and centralization slow project implementation and impede new private investment. The GoA seems incapable of addressing these systemic problems. This inability stems from a lack of vision at the top. Bouteflika and his team have yet to make a choice on whether Algeria will be a market-driven economy where Algerians must integrate into the world economy or an economy whose government still provides the old social contract of the 1960s and 1970s. We have small technical assistance projects to help the GoA reform its financial and education sectors, but bureaucratic ineptitude and a lack of Algerian urgency slow progress. We therefore extract small, new reforms where we can get them. (Treasury DAS McDonald will be here at the same time as you to look at Treasury-funded assistance<br />ALGIERS 00000198 002 OF 004<br />programming.)<br /><br />TERRORISM PROBLEM NOT A THREAT TO STABILITY<br />-------------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par4" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) The social discontent enables al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to find a steady supply of recruits but not enough to threaten stability. There are terror-related attacks almost daily now, usually in the mountains east of Algiers. (There are occasional attacks in southern and western Algeria now too.) AQIM and other Islamist extremists usually hit Algerian security forces, but there are regular threats against Western interests, especially French and American. The terrorists’ tactics have not much changed except in one important manner: nine suicide car bomb attacks since April 2007. AQIM can’t threaten the government’s stability but it has hurt the credibility of Bouteflika’s national amnesty program; it likely weakened him in internal debates with the Algerian hard-liners inside the security force leadership. It has hurt the credibility of the Algerian security forces among the Algerian public and the Western community here. In particular, the December 2007 attack that destroyed the UN headquarters here deeply embarrassed the Algerian government. When the UN said it would conduct its own investigation into the security shortcomings before the attack, the hypersensitive Algerian authorities reacted vehemently and forced the UN to back down. Watching this brittle response, Western companies and embassies now are jittery. Many say that they are watching us for signals on when to send out expatriates. Algiers has seen no incidents since December 11 but there are constant threat reports in sensitive channels.<br /><br />COUNTER-TERROR COOPERATION VERY GOOD<br />------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par5" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par5">¶</a>5. (S/NF) As the AQIM threat has ratcheted up, we have increased our collaboration with Algerian military intelligence. They are prickly, paranoid group to work with, but with them we have rolled up several networks that sent Algerian jihadis to Iraq. According to information from an al-Qaida in Iraq cell, 64 Algerian fighters reached Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. Thus, our collective work is not perfect, but the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq likely would have been far higher were we not working closely together. We have also helped the GoA roll up AQIM networks that were planning attacks inside Algeria. Notably, the Algerian authorities do not like to discuss our cooperation against AQIM publicly. Instead, they limit themselves to saying that they cooperate with the U.S. and other nations against international terror networks. We have a new FBI office at the embassy that we hope will establish collaborative programs with the Interior Ministry, but the Algerians are not rushing to cooperate.<br /><br />MILITARY TO MILITARY: WE MUST BE PATIENT<br />-----------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par6" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par6">¶</a>6. (S/NF) While the Algerians are not rushing to expand our mil-mil relationship. it is slowly growing. For the first time in early 2007 the Algerians themselves proposed some joint activities, and we undertook training exercises here involving the navy and air force. AFRICOM has offered much more, but the Algerians purposely keep a foot on the brake. They want to avoid dependence in their military relations, so they spread out activities among foreign partners. They have limited administrative capacity, and the officers who work on bilateral activities with France or Germany or Russia are the same ones who work with us. They are not good at multi-tasking. Part of the Algerian caution also results from bureaucratic gamesmanship and paranoia. In contrast to programming with some other countries, Algerian military intelligence clears all our bilateral military activities. (They likely seek to enhance their own position within the Algerian power structure by controlling the security relationship with the U.S.) In addition, GoA security personnel are exceptionally careful in their contacts with foreigners due to their CI concerns. Probably because Algerian military intelligence was not ready, the Algerians lost their chance to have a high-level bilateral military committee meeting at the Pentagon in April 2008 that would have drawn up plans for expanded activities into 2009. Their failure to reserve the April dates probably will push that meeting into the autumn or even to the next administration. We warned them clearly but their own system was too sclerotic to respond.<br />ALGIERS 00000198 003 OF 004<br /><br />REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US<br />-------------------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par7" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par7">¶</a>7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us:<br />-- Peace Process: They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement (ref D). They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.<br />-- Lebanon: The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues (ref E). Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.<br />-- Iraq: President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.<br />-- Iran: Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iran’s regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte’s visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.<br />-- Western Sahara: This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don’t want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western Sahara is so important to the throne’s hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the<br />ALGIERS 00000198 004 OF 004<br />exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.<br /><br />AND THE GUANTANAMO PROBLEM<br />--------------------------<br /><br /><a id="par8" href="http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html#par8">¶</a>8. (S) For the past two years we have sought GoA approval for the repatriation of some of the two dozen Algerians held at the facility. During the April 2007 visit of S/WCI Williamson we all agreed on principles to govern the return of Algerians, but since then the GoA has refused to agree to accept even a single detainee back despite our repeated attempts. We think that President Bouteflika and military intelligence chief LTG Medienne agree that it would be harmful to Algeria to take any detainees back, and that consensus at the very top makes any movement by lower officials impossible. The GoA has told us we can send detainees back to the countries where we detained them, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a non-starter. We need you to explain firmly that the Guantanamo detainee issue will not go away and probably will become more important in the next year as we move closer to shutting down the detention center at Guantanamo.<br />FORD<br /><br />http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/02/08ALGIERS198.html<br /></pre>A and T Agencyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17614194165617352807noreply@blogger.com0