Bouteflika évoque Mohamed VI et le Sahara occidental

ID:	38855
Date:	2005-08-19 11:35:00
Origin:	05ALGIERS1753
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario. Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika's efforts to create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right to resume fighting "on its own territory" if it chose to do so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco's last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying he could not accept "dealing with diplomatic relations in such an irresponsible manner." Referring to advice from Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King Mohammed's youth, Bouteflika said, "I am not Jesus Christ, and will not turn my other cheek." Algeria was ready to discuss "objective interests" with Morocco, but only if the Moroccans were "serious." Senator Lugar noted that President Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission, adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the land border and reengage at the highest level. Did Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on the UN's agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting international law and was defending the right of self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the U.S. End summary. LUGAR MISSION ------------- 2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones, and members of Lugar's delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5 General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh, Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel reports Lugar and Bouteflika's discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations and a number of regional issues. A HUMANITARIAN MISSION ---------------------- 3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG's appointment of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of the UN's support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the Senator's record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about Lugar's planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this should "not offend anyone from the land of Washington and Wilson," the leader of a war for independence and the founding father of the idea of self-determination. 4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker's resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the Polisario's. Baker "represented the American values we admire." WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI, BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT ------------------------------------- 5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario, he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not insisting on a time limit. 6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999 he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base. MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN -------------------------- 7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was considered a "mere tribal issue" even though it had been a Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis. From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the conflict. Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis' behalf. Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my sincerest hope, Bouteflika said. ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM ---------------------------------------- 8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum, whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a referendum was a "Pandora's box," but Algeria would accept the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to do so. "I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST" ----------------------- 9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year. Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour later, the Moroccans said that "circumstances were not favorable" for the visit, even though it had been prepared months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not accept dealing with diplomatic relations "in such an irresponsible manner." Morocco would always be Algeria's neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in an "infantile manner." Bouteflika said that in his discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a veteran diplomat. But, he said, "I am not Jesus Christ" and will not turn the other cheek. 10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how they treat Algeria. 11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the AMU. U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING ------------------------------- 12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights and respect for the right of self-determination that Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own national interests were not directly engaged when it was the right thing to do. It was in this context that President Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The President respected Bouteflika's initiative to gain the release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two countries should reopen their border and reengage at the highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see how we could make a difference. 13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria would support the results of a referendum no matter what they were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote still a significant issue? What were the other principal issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not mean it would "condone Moroccan tricks." The Western Sahara has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since independent. Algeria supported respecting international law. It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United States, but Algeria would defend the right of self-determination. 14. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear this message. 15. (U) Minimize considered. ERDMAN http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/Argelia/descarta/enfrentamiento/Marruecos/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_17/Tes

Bouteflika parle du Maroc et du Sahara occidental

ID:	70010
Date:	2006-07-01 11:15:00
Origin:	06ALGIERS1219
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001219 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016 TAGS: PREL, PBTS, WI, MO, AG SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend met with President Bouteflika for three and a half hours June 18. NSC Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti and DCM accompanied Townsend. Bouteflika's Counterterrorism Adviser Rezzag Bara and a notetaker were also present. This cable reports their discussion of the Western Sahara and relations with Morocco. 2. (C/NF) Well into the meeting, Bouteflika raised Western Sahara, noting that U.S. visitors always wanted to discuss it with him. Townsend noted that President Bush had asked both Bouteflika and Moroccan King Mohamed VI to find a way to resolve their differences. Townsend said the President appreciated Bouteflika's role in last summer's release by the Polisario of the remaining 404 Moroccan prisoners, noting that "this would not have happened without your courage." She asked Bouteflika about his view on fully resolving this issue. . 3. (C/NF) Bouteflika responded that as the world's biggest power, the U.S. should respect the decisions of the UN on the Western Sahara. He recalled that in his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, the President had asked him to work faithfully with James Baker and he had done so. Bouteflika noted that he had supported the Baker Plan, even though he would not have done so without President Bush's request. Now, he said, Algeria was "stuck in the middle" with Morocco; "we reject anything they accept and vice versa." Bouteflika commented that despite this stalemate, he had made two important decisions: the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria, and he had made clear to the Moroccans that Algeria had no claims on the Western Sahara's territory or resources. 4. (C/NF) Bouteflika asserted that there was no bilateral problem between Algeria and Morocco. The Moroccans, he went on, claimed the Western Sahara was an issue between Morocco and Algeria. "I would solve it if I could," he stated, "but I cannot speak for the Sahrawis." Morocco and the Polisario must find a solution, and they can do so with American help. Algeria will support any agreement reached by Morocco and the Polisario. But, Bouteflika cautioned, a solution cannot be imposed on the Sahrawis. In that case, Algeria will defend to the end the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. 5. (C/NF) Bouteflika complained that Algeria was in a situation whereby any gesture toward Morocco would be held up by the Moroccan side as the beginning of a process of working out a settlement bilaterally with Algeria. "So I do not want to shake the King's hand." However, Bouteflika said he had recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos. Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!" He added that he could also joke with the King's late father, King Hassan II. King Mohamed, however, "is not open, and he lacks experience." In a rare moment of self-criticism, Bouteflika said he had found his own weak point: he believed others should resolve problems through dialogue, but he did not believe in dialogue for himself with Mohamed VI. 6. (C/NF) Townsend said the Western Sahara continued to be a matter of great interest to President Bush. She added that the lack of a settlement was impeding regional cooperation on counterterrorism and preventing the Maghreb from achieving the level of economic relations that it should enjoy. Bouteflika suggested that James Baker would be a good source of advice to the President, he was a man of "exceptional qualities." It was a "shame Baker quit," Bouteflika commented. He then wondered whether the President might convince Baker to resume his previous role. Bouteflika concluded that offering concessions to Morocco would be tantamount to "giving a bonus to the most undisciplined student in the class." The U.S. "should not award Morocco's bad behavior." 7. (U) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend has cleared this message. ERDMAN

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/malas/relaciones/Buteflika-Mohamed/VI/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_18/Tes

Election de Bensalah et succession de Boutelika

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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1486
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2048
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2834

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000045

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED

REF: A. 2006 ALGIERS 2067

¶B. ALGIERS 30

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 b/d

¶1. (C) Abdelkader Bensalah was re-elected, 129-0, as the
President of the Conseil de la Nation (Senate) on January 12.
Bensalah remains first in line to succeed President
Bouteflika in the event that he is unable to complete his
current term. Bensalah's re-election became a foregone
conclusion when no other senator challenged him for the post.
A reporter for French-language daily newspaper Liberte,
XXXXXXXXXXXX, who covered all aspects of the election, told
us the result was predetermined once President Bouteflika
signaled to the senators that he wanted Bensalah to retain
his position. XXXXXXXXXXXX said senators privately complained
that, out of respect to Bouteflika, no other candidates had
presented themselves. Many told her the election became a
formality rather than an exercise in democracy, which was a
shame in their view.

BOUTEFLIKA APPOINTS SENATORS OF HIS GENERATION
--------------------------------------------- -

¶2. (C) On the day of the election, eight new senators joined
the Conseil de la Nation as part of the third of the
membership appointed directly by President Bouteflika (ref
A). All have one characteristic in common: they are
"moudjahidine," or veterans (like Bouteflika) of the war of
independence against France. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, these
newly appointed senators, as members of the "revolutionary
family" and in a sense "siblings of President Bouteflika,"
will be very loyal to him. Some senators quietly expressed
to her their frustration that the president did not reach out
to members of the younger generation who will need to lead
the country after Bouteflika and his generation pass from the
scene.

VACANT SEATS FOR DEPARTING MINISTERS?
-------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Bouteflika appointed just eight senators out of the 24
allotted to him this year. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a former senator
from the presidential tier, told us Bouteflika made a
conscious decision to leave 16 seats vacant for later
appointment. While it may be true that Bouteflika had not
yet made up his mind in some cases, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought it more likely that he wanted to keep some Senate seats in reserve
for ministers who are expected to be dismissed shortly from
the cabinet. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the number of vacant seats was a
good indicator that a cabinet shuffle was coming soon.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: Even though Bouteflika's illness is receding
in the minds of the public (thanks to television pictures of
an active president), the widely respected Bensalah is
considered able to manage the presidential succession process
should Bouteflika not be able to finish his term. XXXXXXXXXXXX
analysis of the vacant Senate seats also strikes us as on the
mark.

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07ALGIERS45.html
FORD

Bouteflika demande une relations stratégique avec Washington

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S E C R E T ALGIERS 001077

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PBTS KPAL KWBG US IR IZ IS
AF, XA
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Jordan;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General
William Ward met Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
November 25, during Ward's first visit to Algeria since
assuming command of AFRICOM. Ward said AFRICOM's strategy
was to assist African nations in providing for their own
security needs, not do the job for them. The U.S. recognized
Algeria's leadership in the region, and AFRICOM was prepared
to assist Algeria and its neighbors combat terrorism.
Bouteflika said Algeria wanted to be a strategic partner, not
an adversary. Our military relationship already included
training and technical cooperation. End-use-monitoring
requirements infringed on Algeria's national sovereignty and
therefore imposed some limits on military engagement. But
the U.S. and Algeria shared a common goal in combating
terrorism. Terrorism in the region had taken a dangerous
form, and Sahel countries were prepared to address the
problem jointly. More needed to be done to ensure the
participation and commitment of Mali's political leadership
in the regional struggle. Bouteflika told Ward the Malian
president needed to understand he could not be friends with
both the thieves and their victims at the same time.
Trans-Sahara heads of state still planned to convene a
security and development summit in Bamako but had yet to set
a firm date. Bouteflika also reviewed Egyptian-Algerian
tensions in the aftermath of a World Cup qualifying match,
Western Sahara, the negative repercussions of Israeli
settlement activities, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the
soccer issue, he made a point of telling Ward that the king
of Morocco -- in contrast to the strain with Egypt -- had
sent him a very warm congratulatory message after the game.
At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika invited Ward to return
to Algeria in the near future. End summary.

Addressing Common Challenges
----------------------------

¶2. (C) Visiting Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General
William Ward met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
November 25 at the presidential residence. With Bouteflika
were Chief of Staff of the Algerian National Popular Army
(ANP) Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid-Salah, Ministry of
National Defense (MND) Director of External Relations and
Cooperation General Nourredine Mekri, ANP Chief of
Organization and Logistics Major General Abdelhamid Ghriss
and a translator. The Ambassador, General Ward's foreign
policy advisor, Dr. Raymond Brown, the DATT and Poloff
(notetaker) accompanied General Ward to the meeting, which
lasted two hours. Ward emphasized that his visit to Algiers
was symbolic of our countries' growing bilateral
relationship. Africa Command's mission was to assist African
nations address their own security challenges, not to do it
for them. The purpose of his visit, Ward said, was to listen
to Algeria's perspective on enhancing our cooperation as we
seek ways to work together to address common challenges in
Africa. Ward recognized that these challenges were complex
and required development and political solutions, not just
military intervention. Going forward, we sought to cooperate
in areas that Algeria determines are priorities. AFRICOM
welcomed the regional counterterrorism efforts Algeria has
engaged in with neighboring Sahel countries. Algeria is
leading the effort; we will work with Algeria and its
neighbors to assist in eliminating the terrorist threat in
the region.

¶3. (C) President Bouteflika said that the United States and
Algeria shared a common objective and the will to work
cooperatively in the fight against terrorism. Bouteflika
noted the U.S. and Algeria started to work more closely
together during the Clinton administration when both sides
came to realize they were fighting the same problem.
Bouteflika underscored that after 9/11, Algeria was the first
Arab and Muslim country to send a message of solidarity to
President Bush. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of
some Bush policies, political and economic relations between
our countries improved. Today, relations were excellent, he
said, noting that Algeria was the United States' second
largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia
and our largest trading partner in Africa. President Obama's
new approach to U.S. foreign policy was "a breath of fresh
air" and well regarded by developing world countries. But
this meant there were also high expectations for his
administration. Bouteflika predicted that our bilateral
relationship would continue in a positive direction. He
commented that the U.S. and Algeria were moving forward with
cooperation, recognizing the value of dialogue across all
leadership levels. In this regard, Bouteflika declared he
was ready to assist Ward and invited him to visit Algeria
again.

Military Cooperation
--------------------

¶4. (S) Bouteflika attached importance to Algeria's
military-military cooperation with the United States but
noted that U.S. end-use monitoring requirements contravened
Algeria's national sovereignty. Nonetheless, we had made
progress on training and technical cooperation. Bouteflika
said the capabilities of U.S. and Algerian forces were well
understood in the region. Bouteflika argued that frank,
direct talks were the key to a successful military dialogue,
as well as recognizing that, in some cases, there would be
limits on the extent of cooperation. "Tell us what you want,
and we will tell you what we can do." Algeria, he continued,
wanted to be a strategic partner for the U.S. in the region,
not an adversary.

¶5. (S) General Ward thanked Bouteflika for his candid
assessment of our mil-mil relationship. He said the
President, secretaries of State and Defense, and US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, all recognized the value of the US-Algeria
partnership. Bouteflika responded that he would help us to
consolidate that partnership. Ward argued that to enhance
our partnership, Algeria needed to tell us how we can
contribute best to achieve mutual objectives. Despite the
bad things sometimes said about AFRICOM, Ward said with a
smile, his command had not been created to take over Africa.
Without missing a beat, Bouteflika replied with an even
bigger smile that he had been unsure about this himself until
Ward came. Ward said that, as we continue our military
dialogue, we want to do the things Algeria tells us are
important. Ward affirmed Algeria had long recognized the
challenge of extremism and demonstrated its ability to fight
back. AFRICOM would do its part to support Algeria and its
neighbors in this effort. Addressing Bouteflika's point on
end-use-monitoring requirements, Ward suggested focusing our
efforts in areas where cooperation was possible, i.e.,
training and equipping. He acknowledged that some U.S. laws
and regulations may preclude for now Algeria's participation
in other forms of engagement.

Civil-Military Relations
------------------------

¶6. (S) Bouteflika underscored that Algeria's military
"absolutely" respected the authority of civilian leadership.
"This is not at all like Turkey," he said. Bouteflika
asserted that the army was forced to take drastic measures
during the violence of the 1990s in order to save the
country. This was a difficult period, but constitutional
rule had been restored. "The house is now in order," he
stressed, "and I can tell you that the army obeys the
civilians. There is one constitution and all obey it."
Bouteflika acknowledged, however, that the problems of the
past still haunted the country. He cited foreign press
reports referring to Algeria as a dictatorship and argued
that the term was sometimes used carelessly. The Algerian
constitution had established the rule of law. In 2004 it was
decided that there was no more historical "revolutionary
legitimacy". The only legitimacy was the constitution.
"Anyone can be a candidate for election, in accordance with
the constitution, even a general." He paused, then grinned
and said, "but the generals realize the difficulties and none
has been a candidate yet."

Counterterrorism
----------------

¶7. (C) Bouteflika said terrorism in Africa had taken a
dangerous form. The situation in Somalia was hopeless, he
commented. Meanwhile, the Sahel region presented a complex
set of issues. Fortunately, most Sahel countries were
determined to cooperate and have the capability to fight the
threat if they work together. Mauritania expressed a clear
commitment as did Niger, although Bouteflika recognized U.S.
concerns with President Tandja. Mali's full cooperation
remained elusive, however. Mali's policies have failed to
create stability in the north. The result is a lawless
environment in which smuggling, along with arms and drug
trafficking, enable terrorism. Bouteflika said the region
was prepared to tackle this problem, and bilateral and
regional efforts were already underway. In this regard,
Algeria was closely monitoring U.S. military assistance to
Mali and Niger.

¶8. (S) Ward told Bouteflika that he planned to visit Bamako
after Algiers and would encourage Mali's leaders to cooperate
in the region's counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. was
providing military assistance to Mali, and we hoped it
complemented the work Algeria was doing. Ward emphasized
that, ultimately, defeating terrorism was the responsibility
of the region. Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for
U.S. assistance to Mali and said Algeria also provided aid,
including some equipment. Bouteflika urged the U.S. to tell
Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure that "he cannot be a
friend to the thieves and victims at the same time." Many in
Mali's security services shared the same concern, Bouteflika
asserted. In the past, he said, Algeria has waited for the
chance to debrief terrorist suspects held in Mali, only to
find out later that Malian officials were conducting
negotiations for the terrorist's release back to the
terrorist organizations at the same time. "It is difficult
to cooperate in these conditions," he said. Despite
difficulties, Bouteflika said regional leaders still planned
to convene a security and development summit in Bamako. All
agreed on the need for the summit, he said, but there was
still no set date. Bouteflika said that Algeria would be
open to sharing information with the U.S. regarding Algeria's
cooperation with its neighbors. General Ward said AFRICOM
would do the same for Algeria regarding U.S. initiatives in
the region.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶16. (S) The Ward-Bouteflika meeting was significant in a
number of respects. The Algerian president spoke repeatedly
of his readiness to build a strategic relationship with the
US. He transmitted clear readiness for closer coordination
and contact on Sahel counter-terrorism issues. The simple
fact of the meeting with the president was itself a green
light to the military bureaucracy on stepped-up bilateral
military cooperation. Not least, the warm and high-level
official reception provided a powerful antidote to the
persistent negative mythology about Africa Command since the
command's rollout. It was also noteworthy that, in the
presence of three generals, including the chief of staff,
Bouteflika spoke assertively to Ward about civilian control
of the military. He described the revolutionary origins of
military influence in Algeria, said this so-called
revolutionary legitimacy ended in 2004, and the military now
obeys the civilians and they all obey the constitution. In
the course of his regional political review, Bouteflika
delivered Algeria's views on Western Sahara in familiar
terms. But in doing so, he also struck an unusually
positive note about Morocco and the king's message. Clearly,
in the context of the high emotions stirred in Algeria over
the controversial World Cup contest with Egypt, Mohammed VI's
message of congratulations struck a chord with Bouteflika.


JORDAN

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html

Scandale de Sonatrach

ID:	247810
Date:	2010-02-08 16:58:00
Origin:	10ALGIERS111
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #0111/01 0391658 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081658Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8404 INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000111 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 TAGS: PGOV, ENRG, ECON, ETRD, KCRM, PINS, AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA: DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d) Summary ------- 1. (C/NF) Eight directors, including the CEO, of Algeria's national oil company Sonatrach are under investigation for corruption and have been fired and replaced. Industry insiders fear company operations will soon be affected. Algeria's intelligence services are leading the investigation. This scandal is the latest in a dramatically escalating series of investigations and prosecutions that we have seen since last year involving Algerian government ministries and public enterprises. Significantly, many of the ministries affected are headed by ministers considered close to Algerian President Bouteflika, including Energy/Mines Minister Chekib Khelil. Speculation is rife that political infighting between civilian and military leadership lies behind the case, but we have no hard evidence. Bouteflika's determined silence is only fueling the uncertainty. End summary. Eight Senior Officials Implicated --------------------------------- 2. (U) A corruption scandal has broken involving Algeria's largest company, the state oil and gas monopoly Sonatrach. The press first reported on January 14 that an examining magistrate ordered Sonatrach's CEO Mohamed Meziane, VP for pipelines Benamar Zenasni, VP for upstream activity Boumediene Belkacem, and five other company executives to answer questions concerning allegations of irregularities in the awarding of contracts to two consulting firms owned by Meziane's sons and a supplier of security equipment. They were questioned for twenty hours. 3. (U) All eight Sonatrach officials were then placed under formal investigation ("judicial control") which requires a person to report periodically to police and not leave the country). Some were detained. Meziane himself was placed under judicial control; the two Sonatrach VPs were detained in Serkadji prison. An additional Sonatrach senior official, VP for commercialization Chawki Rahal, was placed under judicial control. Four Sonatrach directors (for social affairs, exploration, pipelines and transport, and commercialization) were placed under judicial control. Meziane's two sons were detained -- some stories say, for being major shareholders in companies to which the Sonatrach contracts were awarded. All efforts by defense lawyers to lift the detentions and judicial control have been rejected. Outside Sonatrach, former CEO of the bank Credit Populaire d'Algerie Hachemi Meghaoui and his son were ordered detained. 4. (U) Abdelhafid Feghouli, VP for downstream operations, was immediately appointed acting Sonatrach CEO. The three other VPs under suspicion have been replaced. Energy/Mines Minister Dr. Chakib Khelil, whose ministry has responsibility for Sonatrach, claimed in a January 17 press conference that the investigation had caught him unawares and that all he knew was what had been reported in the press. He has since refused to discuss the allegations or take responsibility for the affair, saying February 2 that he had no details of the charges and that he would not resign. Khelil pleaded that he was responsible for the entire energy sector but not for managing Sonatrach or any of the some 50 other state energy companies under his ministry's purview. He assured the press soon after the affair broke that Sonatrach's production would not be affected and that the company would continue to carry out all projects underway. The week of January 24, the press reported that Sonatrach lawyers would not defend the suspects, since Sonatrach was a victim of the fraud they are suspected of committing. Foreign Producers Worried ------------------------- 5. (C/NF) Ambassador on January 27 met XXXXXXXXXXXX Meziane. XXXXXXXXXXXX sources tell him the issue under investigation is Sonatrach's granting of sole-source contracts. Sonatrach's regulations specify strict conditions for this type of contract ("procedure R-115"). Only CEO Meziane would have had authority to authorize and approve them. 6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX had heard that 1,600 such contracts were under investigation. Some of these contracts reportedly went through Meziane's sons. A few years earlier, Sonatrach had pressed Anadarko to enter into one such contract jointly with the U.S.-Algerian joint venture BRC (Brown and Root-Condor) to develop the el-Merk oilfield. XXXXXXXXXXXX, the contract was never carried out, BRC was liquidated, and Sonatrach in 2008 awarded the el-Merk contract to Anadarko. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that this contract was not/not one of those under investigation. (Comment: BRC, nonetheless, figures in the list of ongoing investigations cited in the press. End comment) 7. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Abdelhafid Ferghouli, former VP for downstream operations now appointed interim CEO, is the one (now former) Sonatrach VP with whom Anadarko was not acquainted. XXXXXXXXXXXX doubted he would last long or be effective in the top position. No one expects the Sonatrach executives under investigation to return to their previous positions. Continuity of Sonatrach Operations ---------------------------------- 8. (C/NF) Energy/Mines Minister Khelil's Jan. 17 assurances that company operations would be unaffected have not gone unchallenged. Several press reports sourced to industry insiders and experts say that fear has paralyzed Sonatrach upper ranks, who are all afraid to make a decision. XXXXXXXXXXXX view paralleled this assessment, and we have heard similar views from French -- quite concerned about Sonatrach because of the French oil company Total's exposure here -- and other diplomats. He said that all senior executives, at least in the upstream end of operations he is familiar with, are looking over their shoulders and afraid to make decisions or sign anything. The company would not sign amendments to XXXXXXXXXXXX insurance contracts on oil production necessitated by the 2009 budget amendments (Complementary Finance Law) -- contracts for which former VP for Upstream Operations Belkacem was responsible. Sonatrach had contracted foreign insurance companies to provide this insurance. Now these companies were not getting paid. Before long, they would cease insuring XXXXXXXXXXXX production operations. If that happened, work would stop. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX fields are the largest upstream project with foreign participation in Algeria. Leading Role of Algeria's Intelligence Services --------------------------------------------- -- 9. (C) All papers report that Algeria's equivalent to the DNI, the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite (DRS), which is no longer under the Ministry of National Defense, carried out the investigation. Although DRS' move out of the shadows and into the limelight has been unprecedented, its special investigative service for internal corruption has been active for years (i.e., even as far back as the Boumedienne era). The magazine "Jeune Afrique" recently claimed, for example, that DRS had investigated 1650 elected Algerian local officials (or about one out of ten) since 2002 for corruption. XXXXXXXXXXXX was well aware of DRS' involvement in the Sonatrach case and related that former VP Belkacem, in many meetings with XXXXXXXXXXXX, had been extremely careful in what he said when others, even company waiters, were present. He was very guarded over the telephone. XXXXXXXXXXXX imputed this behavior to concern over DRS surveillance. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that DRS has interviewed many of XXXXXXXXXXXX company's local staff. Political Ramifications ----------------------- 10. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that no one believed Energy/Mines Minister Khelil's claims to know nothing of the investigation. Most believe Khelil exercised a guiding hand over Sonatrach operations. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that his conversations with industry insiders had pointed to a cousin of the minister known only as Hemche who was a close adviser to former CEO Meziane. His sources believed Hemche was a key decision-maker, although Meziane did the signing. Early last December, Hemche reportedly abruptly retired and took up residence in Lugano, Switzerland. 11. (C) Ambassador noted that Algiers is swirling with speculation about the political background of this and other scandals affecting several government ministries and public enterprises. Some believed it was a logical outcome of President Bouteflika's oft-stated commitment to attack corruption. Most, however, interpret the DRS move against high-level Sonatrach officials -- who all owed their jobs to Bouteflika-confidant Khelil -- as the military's retaliation via the DRS against the civilian control over it that Bouteflika had imposed since his reelection to a second term in 2004. Comment ------- 12. (C) The investigation against the leadership of the company that finances over half the country's budget and produces 98 percent of its export revenue has shocked the country and generated rampant speculation about the political motivations behind it. In a country where power relationships and processes are opaque, speculation is as rife as hard evidence is scarce. A visiting analyst of a leading U.S. risk analysis firm told Poloff the week of January 31, for example, that all his contacts believe the DRS shaped the investigation to send a message to Bouteflika, either that he should allow relatives of leading generals a greater slice of the economic pie, or that Bouteflika's western Algerian "clan" should cede power back to the military (which many regard as dominated by eastern Algerians), or simply that the civilian-dominated authority should restore more behind-the-scenes influence to the military. Despite this theory and others we have heard, we see no hard evidence for any particular political interpretation. What is certain is that the alleged infraction and sums involved in this corruption case may only represent the tip of an iceberg -- which was precisely the point of an open letter to the DRS published by a former Sonatrach VP January 30 in the French language daily "El Watan." That article urged the DRS to look into a long list of much larger Sonatrach operations, including spot market sales to a handful of select customers connected to senior members of the power structure. The U.S. risk analyst's sources were certain the DRS planted this article as a further warning to civilian authority. 13. (C) This case is the latest in a series of corruption investigations that started to surface with increasing frequency since last spring and which are now competing with indignation over TSA measures and Algeria's failed bid to win the African Cup of Nations football tournament for the main headlines in the daily press. Two of the larger cases already underway are alleged wrongdoing in the construction of the East-West Highway and in the awarding of fishing licenses to Turkish companies. Others involve state-controlled telephone operator Algerie Telecom, BRC (mentioned previously), and the National Bank of Algeria. Few cases have yet produced a trial or conviction, helping harden the widespread view that leading public officials continue to enrich themselves with impunity at public expense. With DRS "commissars" believed present in virtually every public company or ministry front office, senior officials are said to be worried that every visitor, especially non-Algerians, is duly noted and reported. DRS files, already swollen with decades of political and personal financial dirt on practically all notable Algerians, are said to be growing fatter with information on suspicious business dealings or allegations of special favors. The big question no one can answer definitively is whether Bouteflika is orchestrating this anti-corruption blitz, as PM Ouyahia has publicly claimed and as would be consistent with Bouteflika's longstanding intention, or is its ultimate target. His silence, noted by the press, has only fueled the speculation. PEARCE http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/destituciones/Sonatrach/elpepuint/20101216elpepuint_13/Tes

L'ambassade de France, la corruption et le troisième mandat de Bouteflika

ID:	138656
Date:	2008-01-25 11:17:00
Origin:	08ALGIERS85
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXRO1124 RR RUEHTRO DE RUEHAS #0085/01 0251117 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 251117Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5162 INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0391 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8776 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6192 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2514 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2125 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6984 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3223 RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000085 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2028 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, FR, AG SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR: BOUTEFLIKA MAY NOT NEED TO MOVE BUT ALGERIA NEEDS TO Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (d) 1. (C) French Ambassador Bajolet told the Ambassador on January 23 that he and the French government are worried that Algeria is gradually headed towards more instability, but they do not see an alternative to Bouteflika's remaining in power for a third term beginning in 2009. Bajolet, who served here in the 1980s, said that the French strategic interest in Algeria above all is stability and economic growth. Increased pressure on Algerians to emigrate to France because of a lack of opportunities in Algeria weighs heavily on French political sensitivities and ultimately on the social ties between the two countries. The French government, he said, sees few positive developments in Algeria now: -- municipalities, who are closest to the population, have no authority or resources to address needs locally; -- there is an inability throughout the government to make hard decisions; Bajolet called it a kind of immobilism; -- the political parties have little space and seem ready to make short-term deals at long-term political loss; -- public interest in the formal political system has diminished sharply, as seen in the two 2007 elections; -- the business climate is difficult and not improving; and investment and job creation are lacking (Bajolet noted that a French business association had prepared a white paper that detailed problems French companies face in Algeria and how to recitify them. Bajolet observed that the Interior Minister Zerhouni and the Algerian government were anxious that it not be released publicly.); -- corruption, all the way up to the Bouteflika brothers, has reached a new level and is interfering with economic development; BOUTEFLIKA'S THIRD TERM AMBITIONS --------------------------------- 2. (C) Bajolet said he understood that the security service leadership has given its approval for the constitution to be changed so that Bouteflika can run for election again in 2009. Bajolet stated that Bouteflika's health is better and that he might live several more years. His improved health and activity has given him more leverage over the army, he speculated. That said, Bajolet also opined that the consensus within the top security leadership to support a third term for Bouteflika resulted in part from the widespread view that Bouteflika will not finish his third term due to his his health problems. The relationship between the security services and Bouteflika is still ticklish. For example, the French have concluded that the security services encouraged Minister of Veteran Affairs Cherif Abbas to criticize Sarkozy on the eve of the French president's visit in order to embarrass Bouteflika by provoking the French to cancel the trip. 3. (C) Bajolet said the French are being extremely careful about what they say to the Algerians about changing the constituton and enabling Bouteflika to run for the third term that everyone understands he will win. Bajolet sensed that the Algerians clearly floated the idea publicly again right before Sarkozy's visit in December to test whether the French president would advise against it. He intentionally did not do so. Bajolet observed that the French see no obvious successor to Bouteflika. Former Prime Minister Hamrouche, he noted, speaks of reform but the French are unsure whether he could actually push through a reform program. Former Prime Minister Ouyahia, they believe, is yet another apparatchik and has little popularity in the country. Bajolet concluded that without an obvious successor, pushing against Bouteflika simply opens up new sources of instability. Instead, the French have decided that the best message for them to deliver is that they are neutral on the issue of Bouteflika's third term but that the government needs to start addressing Algeria's serious economic and political problems. (Bajolet is particularly interested in decentralization, for example.) SECURITY -------- 4. (C) Bajolet expressed great concern about the security situation and asked numerous questions about our latest warden message. Our recommendations that Americans avoid ALGIERS 00000085 002 OF 002 Western schools had put him in a difficult spot, he noted, since there are two official French schools in Algiers. Bajolet asserted that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appears to target the Algerian government mainly and targets foreigners only as a means to embarrass the government. The Ambassador disagreed, expressing his view that AQIM is targeting both but with different goals. It targets the GoA to embarrass it and as a means of retaliating for AQIM losses. It targets foreigners to drive them out of Algeria (and ultimately help destabilize the GoA). Bajolet noted that there are multiple French vulnerabilities, including French cultural centers around Algeria and scattered diplomatic residences. So far, however, the Algerian security services have handled threats to the French appropriately and have, he claimed, kept the French authorities informed. 5. (C) COMMENT: Bajolet opined that external pressure on the government here to try to force it to drop the Bouteflika third-term idea will not compel the GoA to drop it. Instead, he thought, it would merely make working with the Algerians more difficult, and the French now perceive that on both security and economic/social issues they must work with Algiers. He readily admitted that the medium- and long-term outlook here is not good unless the government really begins to fix the economy and the political system. He was not confident that it would, but he had no clear idea of what to do in that case. FORD http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/recoge/opinion/embajador/frances/Argelia/elpepuint/20101216elpepuint_12/Tes