Bouteflika évoque Mohamed VI et le Sahara occidental

ID:	38855
Date:	2005-08-19 11:35:00
Origin:	05ALGIERS1753
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario. Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika's efforts to create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right to resume fighting "on its own territory" if it chose to do so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco's last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying he could not accept "dealing with diplomatic relations in such an irresponsible manner." Referring to advice from Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King Mohammed's youth, Bouteflika said, "I am not Jesus Christ, and will not turn my other cheek." Algeria was ready to discuss "objective interests" with Morocco, but only if the Moroccans were "serious." Senator Lugar noted that President Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission, adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the land border and reengage at the highest level. Did Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on the UN's agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting international law and was defending the right of self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the U.S. End summary. LUGAR MISSION ------------- 2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones, and members of Lugar's delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5 General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh, Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel reports Lugar and Bouteflika's discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations and a number of regional issues. A HUMANITARIAN MISSION ---------------------- 3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG's appointment of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of the UN's support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the Senator's record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about Lugar's planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this should "not offend anyone from the land of Washington and Wilson," the leader of a war for independence and the founding father of the idea of self-determination. 4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker's resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the Polisario's. Baker "represented the American values we admire." WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI, BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT ------------------------------------- 5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario, he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not insisting on a time limit. 6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999 he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base. MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN -------------------------- 7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was considered a "mere tribal issue" even though it had been a Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis. From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the conflict. Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis' behalf. Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my sincerest hope, Bouteflika said. ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM ---------------------------------------- 8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum, whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a referendum was a "Pandora's box," but Algeria would accept the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to do so. "I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST" ----------------------- 9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year. Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour later, the Moroccans said that "circumstances were not favorable" for the visit, even though it had been prepared months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not accept dealing with diplomatic relations "in such an irresponsible manner." Morocco would always be Algeria's neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in an "infantile manner." Bouteflika said that in his discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a veteran diplomat. But, he said, "I am not Jesus Christ" and will not turn the other cheek. 10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how they treat Algeria. 11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the AMU. U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING ------------------------------- 12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights and respect for the right of self-determination that Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own national interests were not directly engaged when it was the right thing to do. It was in this context that President Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The President respected Bouteflika's initiative to gain the release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two countries should reopen their border and reengage at the highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see how we could make a difference. 13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria would support the results of a referendum no matter what they were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote still a significant issue? What were the other principal issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not mean it would "condone Moroccan tricks." The Western Sahara has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since independent. Algeria supported respecting international law. It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United States, but Algeria would defend the right of self-determination. 14. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear this message. 15. (U) Minimize considered. ERDMAN http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/Argelia/descarta/enfrentamiento/Marruecos/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_17/Tes

Bouteflika parle du Maroc et du Sahara occidental

ID:	70010
Date:	2006-07-01 11:15:00
Origin:	06ALGIERS1219
Source:	Embassy Algiers
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #1219/01 1821115 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 011115Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1480 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8466 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1868 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1356 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 6204 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0358 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0365
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001219 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016 TAGS: PREL, PBTS, WI, MO, AG SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend met with President Bouteflika for three and a half hours June 18. NSC Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti and DCM accompanied Townsend. Bouteflika's Counterterrorism Adviser Rezzag Bara and a notetaker were also present. This cable reports their discussion of the Western Sahara and relations with Morocco. 2. (C/NF) Well into the meeting, Bouteflika raised Western Sahara, noting that U.S. visitors always wanted to discuss it with him. Townsend noted that President Bush had asked both Bouteflika and Moroccan King Mohamed VI to find a way to resolve their differences. Townsend said the President appreciated Bouteflika's role in last summer's release by the Polisario of the remaining 404 Moroccan prisoners, noting that "this would not have happened without your courage." She asked Bouteflika about his view on fully resolving this issue. . 3. (C/NF) Bouteflika responded that as the world's biggest power, the U.S. should respect the decisions of the UN on the Western Sahara. He recalled that in his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, the President had asked him to work faithfully with James Baker and he had done so. Bouteflika noted that he had supported the Baker Plan, even though he would not have done so without President Bush's request. Now, he said, Algeria was "stuck in the middle" with Morocco; "we reject anything they accept and vice versa." Bouteflika commented that despite this stalemate, he had made two important decisions: the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria, and he had made clear to the Moroccans that Algeria had no claims on the Western Sahara's territory or resources. 4. (C/NF) Bouteflika asserted that there was no bilateral problem between Algeria and Morocco. The Moroccans, he went on, claimed the Western Sahara was an issue between Morocco and Algeria. "I would solve it if I could," he stated, "but I cannot speak for the Sahrawis." Morocco and the Polisario must find a solution, and they can do so with American help. Algeria will support any agreement reached by Morocco and the Polisario. But, Bouteflika cautioned, a solution cannot be imposed on the Sahrawis. In that case, Algeria will defend to the end the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. 5. (C/NF) Bouteflika complained that Algeria was in a situation whereby any gesture toward Morocco would be held up by the Moroccan side as the beginning of a process of working out a settlement bilaterally with Algeria. "So I do not want to shake the King's hand." However, Bouteflika said he had recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos. Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!" He added that he could also joke with the King's late father, King Hassan II. King Mohamed, however, "is not open, and he lacks experience." In a rare moment of self-criticism, Bouteflika said he had found his own weak point: he believed others should resolve problems through dialogue, but he did not believe in dialogue for himself with Mohamed VI. 6. (C/NF) Townsend said the Western Sahara continued to be a matter of great interest to President Bush. She added that the lack of a settlement was impeding regional cooperation on counterterrorism and preventing the Maghreb from achieving the level of economic relations that it should enjoy. Bouteflika suggested that James Baker would be a good source of advice to the President, he was a man of "exceptional qualities." It was a "shame Baker quit," Bouteflika commented. He then wondered whether the President might convince Baker to resume his previous role. Bouteflika concluded that offering concessions to Morocco would be tantamount to "giving a bonus to the most undisciplined student in the class." The U.S. "should not award Morocco's bad behavior." 7. (U) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend has cleared this message. ERDMAN

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/malas/relaciones/Buteflika-Mohamed/VI/elpepuint/20101203elpepuint_18/Tes

Relations entre l'Algérie et le Maroc, rencontre avec Mohamed VI

ID:	143518
Date:	2008-02-28 16:08:00
Origin:	08RABAT185
Source:	Embassy Rabat
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXRO9993 PP RUEHTRO DE RUEHRB #0185/01 0591608 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281608Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8201 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4700 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0595 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0096 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2297 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0444 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0705 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1410 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3534 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3669 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4946 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0682 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0274 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9535 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3919 RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 2226 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1933 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0786 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000185 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, EUR/SCE AND AF/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: PREL, OVIP, MO SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH,S MEETINGS WITH KING MOHAMMED VI AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TAIEB FASSI FIHRI Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: King Mohammed VI received NEA A/S Welch for an hour on February 25. The wide-ranging exchange of views focused on bilateral cooperation, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria, Algeria and Western Sahara. In most respects, the audience mirrored the meeting that preceded it with Minister of Foreign Affairs Fassi Fihri and MFA Director General for Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Azeroual. However, we heard that Amr Moussa,s latest visit to Beirut had been "a catastrophe;" the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend the Arab summit in Damascus; and Morocco was looking at other Arab countries' reaction to Kosovo's declaration of independence. The King asked us to assist Mauritania and warned that the POLISARIO must not attempt to occupy the area east of the berm in Western Sahara. In his meeting with the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Welch pressed for an agreement on the status of the American schools in Morocco and informed the Minister of a planned accord with the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. END SUMMARY. BILATERAL COOPERATION --------------------- 2. (C) Receiving NEA A/S Welch, the Ambassador, DCM and Erin Yerger, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Elliot Abrams, at the royal palace in Marrakech on February 25, the King thanked the United States for the excellent cooperation on counterterrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account and the Free Trade Agreement. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri also attended the audience. KOSOVO ------ 3. (C) The King noted that he had just met with the Greek Foreign Minister, who urged him not to recognize Kosovo. The King and the Foreign Minister indicated that they intended to discuss recognition with other Arab leaders at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Dakar in March. Fassi Fihri said the Serbian Foreign Minister has also requested a meeting. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS ---- 4. (C) Ambassador Welch began by underscoring that this is an important year for the region and that the President is determined to make progress on the MEPP. Welch briefed the King and the Minister on the process and assured them that the Israelis and the Palestinians are making progress, but the public is unaware of it. On Gaza, Welch averred that Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is focused on the least bad option. For his part, the King expressed deep concern about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. LEBANON ------- 5. (C) Turning to the continuing leadership vacuum in Lebanon, A/S Welch said that we see three options: 1) to continue efforts to elect a President by consensus; 2) to elect a President with 50 percent of the vote plus one; or 3) to support the Siniora government. Welch indicated that we increasingly believe the third option affords the best means to support Lebanon,s institutions. Asked about Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Beirut, Fassi Fihri SIPDIS characterized it as 'a catastrophe.' SYRIA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT -------------------------------- 6. (C) Noting that Kings Mohammed VI and Abdullah II of Jordan had come to power at approximately the same time as RABAT 00000185 002 OF 003 President Bashar al-Assad, Welch decried Syria,s lost opportunities. Welch said that he understood that the Syrian Foreign Minister would be in Marrakech on February 26 to deliver an invitation to the Arab Summit in Damascus, and Welch predicted that attendance would be poor. The King said he understood that the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend, implying that Morocco would be represented at the ministerial level at best. IRAN ---- 7. (C) Ambassador Welch asked if he might say a few words about Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The King responded that he understood that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program. Welch thanked the King for the opportunity to clarify, declaring that the U.S. intelligence estimate had been misunderstood and that the reporting on this issue has been unclear. Welch said that we continued to believe that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons; so President Bush was seeking a middle ground "between the bomb and bombing," without giving up any option. Diplomatic pressure is best for now. When the King asked what that middle ground might look like, Welch said that more Security Council-approved sanctions loom and that Iran must accept a diplomatic solution. ALGERIA ------- 8. (C) The conversation then turned to Algeria, and Welch asked if the GOM had any views on President Abdelaziz Bouteflika,s plans. The King said he understood that Bouteflika was amending the Constitution to permit a third term, and Welch noted wryly that Bouteflika was doing so without Syrian assistance. The King praised the "frustrated" Algerian Ambassador in Rabat for his tireless efforts to improve bilateral relations, stating, &We have no relations with Algeria, except for limited cooperation on security issues." In spite of obvious opportunities for cooperation in agriculture, energy and a host of other areas, President Bouteflika and his government clearly prefer the status quo. The King noted that he had even traveled to Algiers to try to break the impasse, but the GOA continues to insist on the Western Sahara issue being resolved before proceeding with other bilateral or regional initiatives. WESTERN SAHARA -------------- 9. (C) The King and Fassi Fihri expressed grave concern about the POLISARIO's stated plans to move people into the area east of the berm. The King said bluntly that Morocco could not allow that. Praising the King,s autonomy initiative, Welch urged the GOM to press ahead with the Manhasset talks. He said support for Morocco,s position is growing ever so slowly. Separately, Welch cautioned the King's intelligence chief against militarization of the dispute. MAURITANIA ---------- 10. (C) Looking at Western Sahara's neighbor Mauritania, the King stressed that Mauritania needs help and that he will see the Mauritanian President in Dakar. AMERICAN SCHOOLS ---------------- 11. (U) Welch took advantage of a few private minutes with Fassi Fihri to underscore the need for an agreement on the status of the American schools in Morocco. Noting that he had attended the Rabat American School (RAS)as a child, Welch said if a solution is not found soon that RAS could not produce more David Welches. Fassi Fihri replied that he had RABAT 00000185 003 OF 003 been in contact with Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi and Director General of Taxation Nouredine Bensouda about our proposal. U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM ------------------------------ 12. (U) Welch also raised made the Minister aware of the planned signing of an accord between the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Moroccan National Archives. Welch also mentioned that the Museum still planned to host a conference on the Holocaust in Arab lands. COMMENT ------- 13. (C) Although his face looked puffy, the King appeared relaxed and rested after four weeks in France. The meeting itself underscored how much U.S. and Moroccan views coincide. END COMMENT. 14. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ***************************************** Riley

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